Ever since 2008, I’ve been posting proposals of real reforms of the DOD. I publish the complete, updated, comprehensive package of defense reform proposals (which I dubbed the DRPP) every month. In this 23rd edition of the DRPP, I’m presenting all the reform proposals that I have devised to date (including ca. 144 annual money-saving reforms). Many of them are my own original proposals; many others are the ideas of other people and organizations, including former Secretaries of Defense Frank Carlucci, William Cohen, Donald Rumsfeld, and Robert Gates; DOD agencies and boards; members of Congress, including members of the House Armed Services Committee; and the Heritage Foundation.
A) Healthcare cost and benefits reforms
1) The military retirement system reform proposals of Senator McCain and the CBO (except the proposal to deny TRICARE benefits to military retirees, who have earned them) should be adopted. These reforms would save at least $100 bn over 10 years. Alternatively, Congress could adopt the reform proposals devised by Baker Spring of the Heritage Foundation and other recommendations of the HF. These include: “military health care coverage programs under TRICARE should be converted from the existing defined-benefit structure to a defined-contribution structure. Under this approach, a portion of the reductions in benefits can be offset by increasing the level of basic pay provided to the troops. Additionally, military service members, retirees, and their dependents may be provided tax advantages they carry with them for the rest of their lives.” Senator McCain’s and the CBO’s proposals are preferrable, however. (http://blog.heritage.org/2011/11/11/reforming-the-military-health-care-system/; http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/wm3375.pdf;http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/11/saving-the-american-dream-improving-health-care-and-retirement-for-military-service-members)
2) The DOD should stop sending ordinary MRAP vehicles and conventional armored vehicles (IFVs, APCs, Humvees) to Afghanistan and start using small MRAP vehicles there instead (because ordinary MRAP vehicles, AKA big MRAP vehicles, often roll over). This will radically reduce healthcare costs for the DOD and the DVA, and reduce the costs of replacing vehicles that have been written off.
3) As for other IED-intensive theaters, the only vehicles sent by the US military to those theaters should be mine resistant vehicles such as RG-32s, RG-33s, Stryker-based ambulances, Cougars, Casspirs, etc. (but not RG-31s, MATVs nor Humvees).
4) M113s, including M113-based ambulances, must be withdrawn from all theaters, and eventually retired and replaced with GCVs or Strykers and Stryker-based ambulances. These four reforms would protect American soldiers from mines, thus reducing healthcare costs and vehicle costs.
5) Military housing projects should be built, whenever possible, on lands already owned by the Federal Government.
6) The bureaucratic labyrinth that harms many wounded soldiers should be radically reduced; the budget of the DVA (Department of Veterans’ Affairs) should be reduced – DVA should provide good services to American vets at a low cost.
7) Backlogs of claims of DVA benefits must be eliminated and so should be the bureaucracy that created them.
(8) The bureaucratic hurdles and long waits that American vets complain about should be eliminated; the waits should be short.
9) The DOD and the DVA should have a unified benefits-for-vets system.
10) VA hospitals should be privatized if this would reduce VA healthcare costs.
11) Only military personnel, their relatives, veterans, DOD officials and the President should be allowed to use DVA and DOD hospitals. (Currently, Members of the Congress are also allowed to use these hospitals, with the DVA or the DOD paying the costs.)
12) All DVA and DOD hospitals must adopt electronic health records to reduce costs.
13) VA policies and VA disability regulations must be made simple, and their numbers must be reduced. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/13/AR2007101301426.html)
14) Religious workers (priests, pastors, pops, rabbis, imams, et al.) should always be available to all veterans.
15) The Martinsburg VA hospital PTSD program should be expanded by 25 beds. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/13/AR2007101301426_4.html?sid=ST2007101902742)
16) DOD hospital staff and DVA hospital staff should be legally obliged to ensure that their patients will not overuse prescription drugs and will not drink alcohol. Alcohol drinks must be banned from DOD installations, DOD hospitals and DVA hospitals. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/17/AR2007021701172_2.html)
17) Spanish-speaking personnel of DOD hospitals must always be called upon to help Spanish-speaking troopers and vets. All recruits who don’t speak English must be taught this language after they join the military.
18) Because 88% of American troopers believe that current Army literature for DODH patients is useless, the Army must prepare a handbook called “the handbook no one gets”, which would explain how outpatients live.
19) The complex disability benefit process must be simplified and its costs curtailed.
20) The number of documents a soldier is required to file with the DOD must be reduced from the current level (22); the 8 commands he must file them to must be merged with each other (thus creating a single command); a single information system should be used to process all forms (rather than 16 different inf. systems); the Army’s 3 personnel databases must be merged; the new single Army personnel database must be able to interact with the separate pay system and the medical recordkeeping databases. The Army should merge these MR databases. As few forms as possible should be required, and as many of them as possible should be made possible to be submitted through the Internet. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/17/AR2007021701172_4.html)
21) Forms and records must always be kept on the military’s databases and at DOD hospitals, and must never disappear (the disappearance of forms and records is the most common reason why troopers languish at WRAMC); the name and photo of every trooper who ever served in Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam and other warzones must be entered to the apropriate databases and sent to all DOD and DVA hospitals.
22) “Civilian care coordinators” and case managers must be well-trained by the DOD or the DVA and and must understand the DOD medical system. When hiring them, the DOD and the DVA should always choose experienced DVA or DOD employees and experienced vets who have used the DOD system or the DVA system. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/17/AR2007021701172_4.html)
23) Every hospital platoon sergeant and every case manager must keep a written list of all patients assigned to him, the wars during which they fought, and their sigs, and must always have a copy of that list in his pocket.
24) Troops should be allowed to use umbrellas at military hospitals. They should also be given winter clothes. Amputees and troopers whose legs or arms are broken shouldn’t be required to wear uniforms. DOD hospitals should try to devise a way other than a formation (which soldiers hate) to “keep track of their patients”. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/17/AR2007021701172_5.html)
25) The staff and the platoon sergeants of DOD hospitals should eliminate all rodents at DOD hospitals.
26) Hospital cafeterias must be located close to hospital rooms.
27) Injured soldiers (except lightly injured soldiers) shouldn’t be obliged to guard military hospitals – healthy soldiers should serve as their guards.
28) The streets and boroughs surrounding military hospitals must be purged of drug dealers by municipal PDs, state PDs and the FBI.
29) Paperwork for new uniforms must always be kept at appropriate desks, and must never disappear. Troopers who lack new uniforms must be provided with civilian business attire as interim solutions (they need appropriate attire for their Purple Heart ceremonies). (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/17/AR2007021701172_4.html)
30) DOD hospital staff must fight all kinds of stachybotrys, including black mold, and must fight cockroaches and any other insects that invade DOD hospitals. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_mold)
31) Every DODH platoon sergeant and every DODH employee must study all of his patients.
32) A CH system and water must be available at all DOD hospitals. Their elevators and garage doors, if broken, must be repaired. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/17/AR2007021701172_5.html)
33) The Service Secretaries should review all military hospitals and, if they can, merge them with each other to reduce installation costs (just like Walter Reed is scheduled to merge with Bethesda Naval Medical Center). Hospitals should be merged with the BNMC, Fort Detrick, the Dewitt Army Hospital, or other hospitals. The medical unit based at Bolling AFB should be relocated to Andrews AFB. Other hospital mergers and unit mergers should be decided by Service Secretaries. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_Detrick; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DeWitt_Army_Community_Hospital http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walter_Reed_National_Military_Medical_Center; http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=31660)
34) All records of veterans retired from the military should be stored exclusively by the DVA. The DOD should store the records of currently-serving servicemen and send these records to the DVA when these servicemen retire (but maintain the copies); and it should give the DVA any records it asks for. It shall manage the records together with the DVA.
35) The number of forms and signatures required of veterans by the DVA should be significantly reduced. The DVA should use all the information it has about veterans before it asks them for any further information, forms, or signatures. It must also solve all other problems mentioned by this article: http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2010/03/va_nightmare_a_harbinger_of_wh.html
36) Burger King, KFC, McDonald’s, Pizza Hut, and Popeye restaurants should be banned from all American military installations in the US and abroad. Junk food should be banned from all American military installations, as well as OCSes, military academies, military colleges, and DOD-sponsored schools. (http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/02/gns_obese_troops_020109/; http://www.frumforum.com/the-armys-war-on-fat)
37) All members of the US military should be required to perform an annual physical test consisting of e.g. 36 push-ups. If they don’t pass it, though, they should be allowed to try to pass the test again. Members who are too obese to serve should be allowed to physically exercise and pass the physical test before they are discharged.
38) The Congress (or state legislatures) should ban junk food and tobacco from all schools across the US, and require all American children to pass a comprehensive physical exam every 4 years. It should be required to graduate from elementary school and high school. It should entail: 1) push-ups 2) sit-ups 3) runs.
39) Cigarettes, cigarette machines and cigarette sellers shall be banned from, and smoking should be banned at, all American military installations (in the US and abroad) as well as OCSes, military academies, military colleges, and DOD-sponsored schools. This should include the Pentagon building. Smoking should also be prohibited for troops on duty, regardless of where they are.
40) The Congress should adopt the wide-ranging nutrition statute proposed by the Mission Readiness group, except that it should not increase nutrition funding. (http://townhall.com/news/politics-elections/2010/04/20/report_says_school_food_making_kids_unfit_to_serve)
41) All members of the US military should be forbidden to eat junk food and served only healthy food. (http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/02/gns_obese_troops_020109/)
42) The US military should hire only physically-fit, non-obese individuals; yoga should not be taught to recruits; recruits should be required to do pushups, sit-ups and runs. Schools and parents must force American youngsters to do exercise frequently, and the percentage of youngsters ineligible to join the US military must be reduced from the current level (75%). The military’s training curriculum must be revised. (http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2010/03/army_softens_training_for_recr.html)
43) The military retirement age should be increased to 70 years of age. Military personnel should be entitled to a full military pension after they serve for 30 years (which should be the baseline service period for military benefits). The retirement system must be dramatically simplified by the Congress. (http://usmilitary.about.com/cs/generalpay/a/retirementpay.htm)
44) The DOD’s HC programs must be restructured and reformed so that they will function like free-market programs.
45) Military personnel dependents older than 18 years of age should not be eligible to use the DOD’s HC programs. It is ridiculous to claim that 26-year-old people are “children”.
46) The DOD should request additional Military Construction Appropriations to repair Camp Lejeune (NC), stop the toxic spill now plaguing that installation, and clean the base up. (http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DKnKFeGa3lUI&h=d68b8)
47) All medical facilites, agencies and commands of the DOD should be merged into a single Military Medical Command, which should be responsible to the relevant Assistant SECDEF. The saving would be $307 mn in CY/FY2007 dollars (i.e. $323.97 mn in 2010 dollars). (doctor-student.net/article.php%3Fid%3D616046)
48) The DOD should raise TRICARE program premiums to adequately finance that program. (http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4617597)
49) HC program costs must not be allowed to grow in real terms by even 1%, and must be reduced to their FY2001 levels.
50) The 2014 QDR must review how to stop the growth of personnel costs and HC program costs and how to reduce them. But even before the QDR is written, the DOD should submit reform proposals along with an annual DOD budget request. (http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4617597)
51) Every year, the DOD’s medical facilities and agencies must find savings on their programs.
52) The pill that treats PTSD (reported by the MSNBC) should be used widely by the DOD.
53) It shall be illegal to smoke on all lands owned by the DOD, at all DOD installations, inside all buildings owned or used by the DOD, and aboard all vehicles and ships owned by the DOD.
54) The DOD’s benefits and assistance policies must be modernized. They must stop emulating the failed Soviet model and start emulating the competitive private sector model, which is the envy of the world. (http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/93/2001-06-25%20re%20The%20DoD%20Challenge.pdf)
55) The DOD’s HC program system must be broadly restructured to save $460 mn per year, as per the recommendation of the GAO. In addition, all other reforms reccommended by the GAO in its report of 1/3/2011 should be implemented. (http://www.teapartynation.com/forum/topics/gao-details-billions-in; http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11318sp.pdf) Also, all wasteful expenses identified by the DOD’s IG should be abolished.
56) The military’s pay, benefit and pension systems must be reformed and their costs must be significantly reduced. No member of the military should see a pay cut, but the current “one size fits all” model of pay, benefits, and pensions must be abolished and replaced with a graduated system which will reward combat personnel (and especially those such as Navy SEALs who conduct the most daring, most dangerous missions) more generously and noncombat personnel (e.g. desk officers, staff personnel, HQ personnel, and grass mowers) less generously. Also, the entire pensions (retirement packages) system must be reformed and its cost significantly reduced; the required length of service and the military retirement age should be increased. Servicemembers should also be encouraged to remain within the ranks of the military for as long as possible, rather than retire when they’re in their 40s or 50s as is the case now. There should be no change for those who have already retired or are set to retire in the next few years, just as the SS program should not be changed for those who have already retired or are set to retire in the next few years. But there should be no other grandfather clause. The effect of reforms must be immediate. (http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1570)
57) Every service must establish a task force on troopers’ suicides and implement every policy necessary to prevent troopers from committing suicide; American troopers and veterans should be told that they shouldn’t be ashamed if they’re suffering from TBI or PTSD and should be encouraged to go to DVA hospitals.
58) Drugs which don’t treat PTSD should be withdrawn. New drugs which treat PTSD must be invented and introduced.
59) The entire recommendation of the DBB regarding military pension reform (i.e. reform of the military retirement system) should be adopted, without prejudice to other proposals contained in the DRPP. The military retirement age should still be raised. The service years minimum should be 25 years. (http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/08/15/pentagon-scraps-traditional-pensions-in-its-proposed-retirement-program/)
60) If the costs of DOD medical programs increase, premiums should be increased further, but only to the extent necessary to fully fund these programs.
61) The following reforms recommended by the DOD in September 2011 should also be implemented: a) Military retirees would pay an annual fee for TRICARE-for-Life health insurance, and TRICARE pharmacy co-payments would be restructured; b) savings of $6.7 billion over 10 years by establishing “modest annual fees” for members of TRICARE-for-Life, which becomes a second-payer insurance to military retirees who transition to the federal Medicare program upon turning age 65. The change would begin with a $200 annual fee in fiscal 2013; c) savings of $15.1 billion in mandatory funds and $5.5 billion in discretionary funds over 10 years by restructuring co-payments for TRICARE pharmacy benefits; d) to bring the TRICARE plan more in line with private and other federal plans, the plan would eliminate co-pays for generic mail-order drugs, while shifting retail co-pays from a dollar amount to a percentage co-pay. The change would apply to military families and retirees, but not active duty service members. e) As the DOD’s plan proposes, there should be a “grandfather clause”. (http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=65377)
62) The DOD needs to devise some retirement system reform proposals to change the current retirement system so that it will no longer be profitable for servicemembers (LTCOLs, LTCDRs/CDRs, and Sergeants First Class) to retire immediately after 20 years of service. This means incentivizing them to retire at their prime during their best years, when they’re still fit to serve. Instead, the DOD’s retirement system should incentivize people to continue serving with the US military.(http://appropriations.senate.gov/webcasts.cfm?method=webcasts.view&id=72709754-3461-4884-b813-5793272602f2)
63) The lowest-cost bidder should always be picked for the TRICARE program. (http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2Fb9rr5kNb&h=2AQE2qsyAAQGfWb1s6Pps8JaDoYE-hRaFCpCg-gham3qvvw)
64) The DOD, the DVA, and the NIH must do a better job sharing information and consolidate all of their duplicative programs, especially medical research programs. (http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120320/DEFREG02/303200013/GOP-Senators-Target-Defense-Program-Overlap-First?odyssey=mod_sectionstories)
65) All DOD programs intended to help wounded veterans should be transferred to the DVA and they should become the DVA’s exclusive responsibility. The programs must become much more efficient and much easier for the wounded and their families to navigate. Only one person should handle one patient or his insurance policy, and wounded vets should receive their programs and their recovery plans solely from the DVA. (http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120320/DEFREG02/303200013/GOP-Senators-Target-Defense-Program-Overlap-First?odyssey=mod_sectionstories)
66) All layers of bureaucracy in the DVA must be radically reduced, as should be the salaries of DVA officials. The DVA’s total budget should be reduced by at least 10%.
67) The DOD needs to shift its health programs and its retirement system from a defined benefit basis to a defined contribution basis. Furthermore, all members of the military should be allowed to choose between the DOD retirement system and a private retirement fund (as is the case in Chile and Galveston) and to contribute to either of them on a defined contribution basis.
68) All programs supporting single mothers should be made contingent on these women marrying someone no later than one year after the enactment of this requirement.
69) The DOD’s programs of benefits for the troops should be reformed along the lines proposed by the CSBA in this study. (http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2012/07/rebalancing-military-compensation-an-evidence-based-approach/)
70) The DOD should create a single payment system for all members of the military (just like the single payment system for all civilian employees of the DOD) to replace the separate payment systems of the separate military services that exist now, while reforming and graduating it. (http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1321)
71) All of these recommendations should be implemented to reduce the epidemic of soldier suicides. Furthermore, spending on suicide prevention should be increased. Anti-anxiety pills should be widely distributed to troops experiencing mental illnesses. (http://nation.time.com/2012/08/01/soldier-suicides-an-epidemic-we-must-defeat/; http://healthland.time.com/2012/07/12/military-suicide-help-for-families-worried-about-their-service-member/; http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2011/11/11/a-thought-for-veterans-day-isolation-kills-and-community-heals/; http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2011/07/14/military-suicides-the-families-left-behind/; http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2119337,00.html)
72) The US military should stop shifting personnel from assignment to assignment too soon; assignments should become much longer than they are now (on average, 4 years long) so that personnel costs are reduced and people have the time to get used to their new assignments and become proficient in them. (http://defense.aol.com/2012/08/03/senate-appropriators-keep-global-hawks-flying-air-force-navy-g/?icid=related1; http://defense.aol.com/2011/09/12/big-army-must-improve-people-management-or-lose-talent/)
73) As Sen. Coburn has proposed, “Congress should assess the long term affordability of DOD personnel pay and benefits, including for dependents, retirees, and survivors. Pay and benefits should be reformed to the extent that all such benefits are affordable within a DOD budget that assumes zero real growth for the foreseeable future. One of the areas that should be examined is the massively complicated pay structure built in to the Department of Defense. The layers of complexity involved with administering all the special pays, incentives, and tax benefits have a huge cost on the Defense Department in the area of administrative and human resources costs that do not benefit our troops. Similarly, the Defense Department should determine which benefit programs are valued the most by our servicemen and women to determine if certain prized benefits can be boosted while underutilized and obsolete benefits are phased out.” (http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=3ae23727-6bbe-4ce1-8516-2b82726911cc)
74) All military personnel costs should be consolidated into a single appropriation.
75) Troop pay should be frozen for 1-2 years.
Aside from these reforms (including 35 cost-controlling methods), the DOD and the DVA could certainly devise additional ways of healthcare cost reduction if they wanted to. The goal should be to reduce the annual total cost of the DOD’s HC programs by 60%, from $50 bn proposed for FY2011 to $20 bn. (One analyst claims that the FY2010 cost of DOD HC programs was $59.7 bn.) This annual cost must, of course, be prevented from ever rising to $65 bn per year. (http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4669) However, to stop the growth of, and reduce, HC program costs, the US government must also stop waging unnecessary wars and stop deploying American troopers to countries where they don’t need to be.
The DOD’s total personnel costs (not just the number of personnel) must be SIGNIFICANTLY reduced below today’s level of $148 bn per year (as of FY2012), not merely prevented from rising. (http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/12/an-unacceptable-squeeze-on-defense-modernization)
B) PROCUREMENT METHODS REFORM
This chapter of the DRPP deals with two questions: how to reform the entire DOD acquisition system, and how to reform certain weapon programs (or keep nascent programs from going wrong). We shall start with reforms to the entire system.
1)In general, across all DOD procurement programs, costs can be contained by: starting programs on a solid foundation of knowledge with realistic cost and schedule estimates and budgeting to those estimates; locking in sufficiently defined requirements early; managing the cost, schedule and performance trade-space effectively to ensure that needed capability is procured within a fixed, reasonably short period of time; insisting on early and continued systems engineering; leveraging mature technologies and manufacturing processes, being careful about buying weapon systems that promise generational leaps in terms of capability; and certainly not doing so under cost-plus contracts. “We must also ensure transparency and accountability throughout, and use competition to encourage industry to produce desired outcomes and better incentivize the acquisition workforce to do more with less. We should also embrace initiatives geared at making the government as skilled and knowledgeable a buyer as Industry is a seller.” These reforms have been suggested by Sen. John McCain. No cost-plus contracts for anything should ever be signed by the DOD. (http://mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice.FloorStatements&ContentRecord_id=42987243-f045-7da7-6952-e32c98949a64)
2) The root causes of cost overruns and delays, identified by Sen. John McCain, must be tackled. They are: “aggressive promises for ‘revolutionary’ capability; poorly understood or fluid requirements; unrealistic initial cost estimates; overly optimistic schedules and assumptions; unreliable manufacturing and integration risk assessments; starting major production with an immature design or unproven critical technologies; and poorly performing government and industry teams. The disruption from those root causes has been exacerbated by a shocking lack of any accountability. So, over time, we have been left with a defense procurement system that has actually incentivized over-promising and underperformance.” (http://mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice.FloorStatements&ContentRecord_id=42987243-f045-7da7-6952-e32c98949a64
3) Whenever a contractor of any governmental department (e.g. the DOD) allows a large-cost overrun to happen, the guilty contractor should be punished (the US government does not do that at present even though it legally could).
4) The US government should sign free trade agreements with raw material supplier countries (including titanium producing countries) to bring the prices of raw materials (including titanium, which is used to produce F-22s among other things) down.
6) The procedure for the acquisition of military equipment by the DOD should be as follows: when the DOD decides to order a new weapon type, it should first send RFPs and tell candidates what the exact requirements of the DOD are. After candidate corporations submit their proposals, the DOD should objectively evaluate them according to the requirements earlier stated to these candidates, and choose the best offer, regardless of local politics. For example, in the KC-X program, the DOD should choose whichever tanker type is the best one, regardless of the protests of trade unions and certain regionalist members of the Congress. (Update: the DOD has chosen Boeing.)
7) Program requirements should never change (except for exceptional circumstances) after the deadline for candidate companies to submit bids.
(8) To curb inflation, the US government should stop printing money, and must adopt the gold standard.
9) To further drive weapon costs down, the DOD, the DOS and the White House should permanently conduct a huge campaign of promoting American weapons abroad in order to receive foreign contracts for American weaponry. Currently, foreign orders are small. For details, please read this: http://zbigniewmazurak.wordpress.com/2011/03/17/what-american-weapons-should-be-offered-to-whom/
10) The US military must never decrease the number of weapons it has and must never trade quantity for quality.
11) No Defense Acquisition Program should progress beyond Low Rate Initial Production until the Director of Op. Test&Evaluation certifies to the SECDEF and the Congress that the weapon is suitable and effective and that its developmental and operational testing has been completed. There should be no exception to this, except in wartime on the written request of a regional commander or a COCOM. Otherwise, there should be no exception to this prohibition of concurrency. Any immediate savings from the suspension of premature production of incompletely or untested defense programs should be reinvested in expanded production of fully tested weapon to enlarge operational inventories and reverse inventory aging and shrinkage. (http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=3ae23727-6bbe-4ce1-8516-2b82726911cc)
12) The US should ratify DTCTs with the UK and Australia; and negotiate, sign and ratify DTCTs with Denmark, Holland, Germany, El Salvador, Turkey, Kuwait, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Chile, Panama, Norway, the Philippines, Georgia, Colombia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Canada, and Eritrea, and possibly other countries as well.
13) No-bid contracts should be banned.
14) Once the DOD signs an order for a given quantity of weapons, it should not reduce its order.
15) The US should sign titanium purchase agreements with the Russian state-owned titatium producing corporation and other titanium producers and establish a vertical supply chain for titanium.
16) Multi-year-procurement-contracts should become the standard procedure for purchases of any significant quantities of weapons, i.e. for the majority of weapon programs. The DOD should always use multiyear procurement contracts when ordering surface combatants, submarines, fighterplanes, attack aircraft, EW aircraft, bombers or helicopters, and any other products whose purchases are spread over more than one FY, because MPCs reduce costs and stabilize the shipbuilding industry and other industries that make products for the DOD. Almost all DOD weapon procurement programs should be conducted on a MYP basis. (http://www.marines.mil/unit/hqmc/cmc/Documents/2010%20SASC%20Posture%20Hearing.pdf)
17) To further stabilize procurement programs, and all other defense programs, as well, the Congress should (1) combine the authorization and appropriations processes; (2) reduce the number of committees and subcommittees having overlapping oversight of DoD budgeting; (3) revise procedures to make it impossible for individual members to introduce amendments to the budget bill forcing the president to buy items not in his budget request; (4) shift to a biennial Defense budget; and (5) adopt reforms to further stabilize the procurement process, including funding more programs on a multiyear basis. The multi-year procurement method should be the rule, not the exception. These reforms were suggested as early as September 1988 by Secretary Frank Carlucci. (http://www.defense.gov/specials/secdef_histories/bios/carlucci.htm) To accomplish #4, the Congress should pass, and send the President for signature, the Biennial Budgeting Act (H.R. 114, S. 211) sponsored by Rep. David Dreier (CA-26) and Sen. Johnny Isakson (R-GA). (http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d112:11:./temp/~bdRfXv:@@@L&summ2=m&; http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d112:6:./temp/~bdgLEU:@@@P)
18) With few exceptions made on a case-by-case basis, the DOD should rely exclusively on governmental employees rather than contractors. DOD contracts must be managed only by DOD employees, not by contractors.
19) For all future weapon programs, the DOD must abide by the following principles: 1) precisely define the program’s requirements at the beginning of the program; 2) give yourself enough time to develop the weapon type; 3) incremental-knowledge based acquisition. (http://www.youtube.com/user/HASCRepublicans#p/u/19/AtwKKt4i5A0, 1:14:00)
20) Generally, for most equipment purchase programs, the DOD should employ competitive-bidding, competitive-purchasing procedures (as opposed to sole-source purchases).
21) America’s allies should not be required to obtain licenses to repair their American-produced equipment. (http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/reform-of-export-controls-is-part-of-the-gates-grand-design?a=1&c=1171)
22) There must be a single agency responsible for licensing and enforcement (which must be a part of the DOD), with one all-encompassing list of controlled items (right now there are several lists that are the responsibility of different agencies) and a unified information system for tracking license requests and licensed items. The US government should also establish a single enforcing agency that would enforce the law and coordinate, and a single black list of all end-receivers who must not be allowed to receive American technology. Such a list should include any country or group that is hostile to the US or conducts policies that harm the US. (http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4613; http://www.defense.gov//News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=58830)
23) The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) should use its subpoena prerogative whenever necessary, including when contractors refuse to provide information requested by the DOD, and should deliberately look out for scandals, scams, cases of fraud, and cases of theft. The institutional culture of the DCAA should therefore be changed, and the directive related to the DCAA, signed in 2009 by Deputy SECDEF William Lynn, should be amended if need be. Also, the DOD must eliminate the staffing shortages, audit backlogs and significant audit delays experienced by the DCAA; increase the capability of companies to compete for, and obtain, federal contracts must be increased; replace “pass/fail audits” with “inadequate-in-part” audits; and ensure that it will take the DCAA no more than 3 months, rather than several months or years, to revalidate the corrections a contractor has taken to fix any inadequacies found in a contractor’s business system. (http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=7953f7b8-84cb-49ef-ab26-9ed7078c9d6c) (http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/510536p.pdf)
25) The highest-priority programs of the DOD, such as bomber, submarine, fighterplane, tanker, AWACS, ICBM, SLBM, cruise missile, attack aircraft, aircraft carrier, amphibious assault ship and LPD programs, should be managed by three-star officers and be outside the DOD’s regular acquisition system, just like the MRAPV program.
26) Strict product quality standards and anti-counterfeit standards must be imposed on American and imported products (including equipment parts), and the DOD must fight counterfeit products and ensure that it doesn’t buy them and that they do not reach the US military’s inventory. Anyone selling or trying to sell the US government counterfeit products must be severely punished. (http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htproc/articles/20110621.aspx)
27) As the Heritage Foundation has recommended, the Congress and the DOD should “Modernize Logistics Systems. Currently, performance-based logistics partnerships between Department of Defense and defense industry personnel have helped increase our combat capabilities. The Aerospace Industries Association estimates that modernizing and expanding such performance-based logistics could save as much as $32 billion per year.” (http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/08/The-Building-Blocks-of-a-Strong-National-Defense)
28) As the HF suggests, the Congress should “Undertake Broader Acquisitions Reform. Congress should promote a wider reform agenda for acquisitions that includes restoring a systems engineering team approach, simplifying criteria, continuing competition well into the production phase, and carefully deregulating the defense market to remove barriers to entry and cut through the red tape that drives up costs.” (http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/08/The-Building-Blocks-of-a-Strong-National-Defense)
29) There must be a fast-lane development/procurement procedures for those goods (including weapons) that troops need urgently. The Lean Six Sigma method should be used to hasten their production (and the production of all other products that the DOD buys). The Lean Six Sigma method should be implemented across the entire DOD.
30) The DOD must develop a rapid, cost-efficient method/procedure of procuring everything it needs, including insulation materials and other products that reduce the rates of consumption of fossil fuels. But whenever possible, the DOD should buy commercial (civilian) off-the-shelf-products – e.g. civilian insulation materials, which the Army is already buying. (http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=61265)
31) As suggested by former Vice Chairman of the JCS Gen. James Cartwright, the DOD should develop three lanes of development and acquisition of weapons and other goods: 1) a fast lane for the most urgently needed goods; 2) a medium-speed lane; 3) a slow-speed lane for long-term priority weapons that need to be developed slowly and carefully. However, the development times of even long-term priority weapons must be dramatically shorter than they are now, because technology progresses in months or years, not in decades.
32) The Congress should pass, and the President should sign, the Defense Cost-Type Contracting Reform Act of 2011 sponsored by Sen. McCain and cosponsored by Senators Ayotte and Graham (S.1694). Furthermore, for all current and future weapon programs, contractors should pay for 100% of any cost overruns, and must accept this rule as a part of the contract when they sign it. (http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d112:75:./temp/~bdgLEU::)
33) The US military should purchase bombers and other high-tech weapons in “blocks” or batches, not in one huge tranche, and with block upgrades, as suggested by former DOD acquisition czar Dr Paul Kaminski. Such a reform would reduce costs and the development cycle and enable the DOD to add new capabilities or mods to aircraft as laboratories develop them. Dr Kaminski was right that “we can’t afford 20-year-development-cycles” – these days, technology progresses in months and years, not decades, and weapons can become obsolete in a decade or less. (http://www.dodbuzz.com/2011/02/09/dsb-chief-block-buys-best-for-bombers/) Furthermore, the DOD should avoid goldplating the requirement for these (or any other) weapons, use all possible existing parts (technologies such as landing gear, LG housing, crew escape mechanisms, etc.) from other aircraft (military and civilian), and make them undergo nuclear mission certification at the time they enter service, NOT later, in order to save money, because doing so at the time they enter service will allow the USAF to detect and correct design flaws early, rather than at a later time and retrofit the entire bomber fleet at a greater fiscal cost. (http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/11/nuclear-certification-for-a-new-bomber)
34) The entire US government, including the DOD, must immediately stop buying anything (including parts for military systems and complete systems and items) from China, and must buy everything they buy from American producers if possible. Protective tariffs should be instituted, China should be punished for the manipulation of its currency, a new Buy American EO and a new Buy American DOD Directive should be issued, and a new Buy American Act should be passed. All parts for all military systems and other pieces of equipment used by the DOD (from fighterplane parts to transistors) must be produced in the US (not abroad) by companies headquartered in the US (not abroad),must have the “Made in the USA” label (and this label must be verifiable), must be new (not used), and must be certified to have been produced in the US. Moreover, the DOD (and other government agencies) should always buy parts (and entire military systems) only from the producers themselves, their authorized dealers, and trusted suppliers. Equipment producers themselves should buy parts only from trusted suppliers (never from unvetted ones) and only those who are based in, and produce these parts in, the US. They must always know the original source of the parts. Equipment producers/contractors must be held accountable for the quality of the equipment they sell (including their parts), and they must, in turn, hold their subcontractors and suppliers accountable. Furthermore, the cost of repairing equipment containing defective/counterfeit parts, or replacing such parts, must be covered, in full, by the contractor (the seller), NOT the taxpayer; and any parts or complete equipment found to be defective must be reported to the DOD and to criminal authorities through GI (this language needs to be given statutory authority). As one industry executive has told the SASC, sharing information on flawed/counterfeit parts through the GIDEP “can help stop suppliers of counterfeit parts in their tracks.” Furthermore, the DOD must enhance its ability to determine the extent to which counterfeit parts exist in its supply chain, and the DLA must start consistently reporting into the GIDEP and maintain a list of instances whereby flawed/counterfeit parts have been bought by US defense contractors or the DOD, or made it into US military equipment. Furthermore, all defense contractors must subject the parts they buy to extensive testing, e.g. exposing a part to aggressive solvents to determine whether markings are authentic or delidding part samples to examine their die. This will protect the US military from flawed or used-up Chinese parts while rebuilding the US industrial base. An investigation in China must be conducted, China must be pressured to allow that investigation to happen (with sales of advanced weapons to Taiwan if need be), and failing that, all parts from China should be blocked from entering the American market (and not merely from being bought by the US government, which should be prohibited anyway). All cargo (including all electronic parts) entering the US from China must be carefully screened, and China must be forced to shut down all of its counterfeit part production centers. (http://bigpeace.com/sfr/2011/11/08/defective-military-hardware-from-china/;http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/in_the_news/article/counterfeit-electronic-parts-threaten-our-troops-and-our-security/; http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/senate-armed-services-committee-releases-report_on-counterfeit-electronic-parts; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LAQqt96hEes)
36) For all future weapon programs, and for as many current weapon programs as possible, the DOD should use, to the fullest extent possible, off-the-shelf technology, including commercial off-the-shelf technology.
39) The DOD must create and sustain competition throughout the life-cycle of weapon systems for components and subcomponents. Air Force estimates indicated that this type of competition could render up to $2 billion in savings annually when applied to sustainment of Air Force commercial derivative aircraft engines alone, yet the Department has not embraced this competitive approach.
40) The DOD pre-acquisition process should be as follows: a) A Service or a COCOM that needs a weapon system should make an initial determination that it’s needed and define the basic requirements precisely, under the SECDEF’s supervision. b) It should then forward the plans for such weapon system to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which should, based on the Service’s input, define all requirements with pinpoint precision and ensure that neither it nor the Service are goldplating the system. c) The JROC’s decision should then become an official DOD requirement/need, subject to review only by the USD for AT&L, the SECDEF, and the President. If none of them voice an objection, the DOD should announce the requirements and, on their basis, a Request for Proposals from the industry and proceed to select a vendor. The overall number of people who are allowed to influence the requirement-setting process and of those who define the requirements, should be dramatically reduced and strictly limited. (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NzdwtgtbR6c)
41) To prevent a repeat of the “Ill Wind” procurement scandal, the DOD and the Congress should: 1) criminalize insider information trading by DOD employees; 2) prohibit use of contract specifications to favor one contractor over others; and 3) prohibit collusive bidding by contractors while creating incentives for contractors not to make collusive bids. (http://www.defense.gov/specials/secdef_histories/bios/carlucci.htm)
42) Economies of scale need to be implemented in weapon programs through large weapon orders.
43) The DOD (and all other governmental departments) should always sign fixed-price contracts (they don’t do that now, the grim result being that contractors hike prices after contracts are signed). Furthermore, the DOD should always include maximum prices in contracts for everything it buys, enforce these maximum prices, and have contractor company CEOs and CFOs sign guarantees that these price ceilings won’t be breached. (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y-AIWDCqS3k)
44) The DOD and weapon manufacturers must never ignore the basic laws of physics and chemistry, and must never develop weapons that consist of dissimilar metals, because such metals, when they meet, tend to corrode. An example is the F-22.
45) The DOD should adopt competitive acquisition strategies across the board, including for components and subcomponents of weapon and non weapon systems throughout the entire lifetime of a vehicle, plane, or ship. Air Force estimates indicated that this type of competition could render up to $2 billion in savings annually when applied to sustainment of Air Force commercial derivative aircraft engines alone, yet the Department has not embraced this competitive approach. (http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/press-releases?ContentRecord_id=98c8b6cf-0f86-4151-a9db-e89ecd020788)
46) Fines for contractors who defraud the federal government (including the DOD) should be raised to a maximum of $20 mn, and the database of contractors who have defrauded the federal government should be accessible for all government officials, all members of Congress, and (with the exception of classified program contractors) for the American public. All fraudsters should be publicly named and shamed. There should also be stiff prison penalties for the CEOs of those companies which defraud the federal government of billions of dollars, and those of their employees who are directly involved in defrauding the DOD.
47) The DOD should adopt the recommendations of the Congressional Defense Acquisition Reform Panel, which is supposed to save $135 bn over the next 10 years, or $13.5 bn per year. (https://www.uspirg.org/uploads/f8/be/f8be7eca1a2e8c5%204bda936d992b680ab/defense%E2%80%90panel.pdf; http://defense.aol.com/2011/09/15/good-government-groups-detail-429b-in-dod-cuts-kill-f-35-mead/)
48) As Hobbes Wayne has rightly suggested, the DOD should drop the Agile Development environment (accommodates change but not manage it) and move back to Program/Project Management that details the requirement based on threat, risk, cost benefit and contingency plans (in case assumptions are wrong). If our major adversaries gear up, we already have the plans and a trigger in the DoD and Congress to move ahead in a short window. Right now, they have nothing that even reaches parity with our technology. Develop the top of the line technology but reduce the numbers (cost) to meet the risk but keep R&D, production and maintenance to match the threat.
Someone needs to tell the leadership, “Yes, this would be nice to have, but what is the risk of keeping our existing technology and skills to meet the threat and what is the trigger event that would indicate we need to move to the advanced technology and skills?” (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/aug/12/ig-says-f-35-cost-cant-be-tamed/?page=all#pagebreak)
49) Nothing should be bought from China, not even the most primitive items, let alone weapons, equipment parts, or other sophisticated technology. (http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2012/03/the_high_cost_of_chinas_low_prices.html)
50) In any competition between unionized and nonunionized companies, nonunionized companies should be preferred.
51) Any companies which sell any military or dual-use equipment to any hostile country (including China) should be severely fined and be permanently ineligible for any US government contracts. No waivers.
52) The costs of the DOD’s satellite programs and spending on them should be significantly reduced. The DOD should rely to a much smaller degree on satellites and to a much larger degree on aircraft (both manned and unmanned) and humans for intelligence data.
53) The DOD should implement the procurement reforms proposed here. Specifically: “let’s have just a few capable contracting people from the front lines devote themselves to a true FAR rewrite that covers only the essential buying procedures, with no interference. They must be ground-level professionals, the ones who perform the real work. A true FAR rewrite has to eliminate the numerous supplements that add layers of regulation to the main FAR. Not just DoD supplements; all of the federal agencies use the same script. (…) Next, end the daily changes while demanding why we don’t know what’s required at any given time. The bureaucracy should get one season a year to implement shifts in a somewhat organized way. If we got by this long without someone’s pressing need for another policy, surely it can wait until the next open season.” Moreover, there should be one set of procurement rules – for all stage of the procurement process – for the entire DOD. Moreover, the vast majority of FNOs, reviews, and approvals and other documents required to be filled out should be abolished. The DOD-wide set of rules needs to be slimmed down from 4,200 pages to no more than 100 pages. (http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120701/DEFFEAT05/307010007/DoD-Must-Untangle-Mind-Boggling-Buying-Process?odyssey=mod_sectionstories)
54) The DOD should also implement all procurement reforms suggested by the Hadley-Perry panel, including assigning responsibilities as follows:
- a) for identifying gaps in capability and other requirements – Combatant Commands, supported by the force providers (the Services and DOD agencies) and the Joint Staff;
- b) for defining executable solutions to capability needs – the force providers;
- c) for choosing and resourcing solutions – OSD supported by the force providers and the Joint Staff representing COCOMs;
- d) for delivering the defined capabilities on schedule and within cost ceilings – a selected force provider (for multi-agency/service programs, there should be a lead Service/agency responsible and held accountable).
55) All recommendations of the GAO’s 2012 report, “GAO-12-400SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs”, must be implemented. (http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589695.pdf)
56) The DOD should indefinitely suspend all of its procurement (but none of its export) regulations (except for those the administration specifically decided on a case-by-case basis to reinstate) to reduce the cost of goods (including weapons). The cost of doing business with the fed. govt. adds 20% to the cost of any good (including any weapon), compared to their price on the commercial market. (http://defense.aol.com/2012/07/18/ceos-in-crossfire-at-sequestration-hearing?icid=rfy/)
57) The Navy should: a) always check inspection records to make sure they are never falsified; b) regularly check ships under construction to detect any flaws and ensure that they are reported and handled ASAP; c) never sign any contracts for anything that would result in any cost overruns being passed onto the Navy or any ship reconstruction costs for which the Navy is not to blame; d) not allow shipbuilders to dismantle and rebuild any almost-completed ships; e) not provide any insurance to any shipbuilders. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyman_G._Rickover#Forced_retirement)
58) Any official who orders the destruction of any reports that produce conclusions that he doesn’t like must be sacked and barred from ever receving a clearance. The culture of destroying such reports, persisting in using expensive, ineffective systems while refusing to buy much cheaper and much better systems, rejecting findings that one doesn’t like, and producing only findings that would satisfy your boss must be ended. (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jul/22/army-destroyed-report-that-favored-software-that-d/?page=all#pagebreak)
59) The following acquisition system reform proposals of the DBB should be implemented:
- All federal (not just DOD) acquisition regulations should be sunset unless a specific reg is proved to be deem worth keeping.
- Uniformed military leaders should have a voice in how weapon programs are run, not just how they are budgeted for. Currently, only DOD civilians have a voice in this matter.
- Uniformed military personnel should be reinstated into the acquisition process/system at all levels, from the service chiefs down. Acquisition officers should not be ghettoized nor promoted at an early time/rank, and they should be required to achieve significant field experience before becoming acquisition officers. The DOD should also reinstate the old “dual-track” system whereby promising officers and NCOs would alternate between acquisition and command assignments.
- Bring in the best managers and acquisition officials from the private sector into the DOD. They should be confirmed by the Senate, and all executive regulations limiting their eligibility to serve, or otherwise hindering their appointments, should be repealed, except those prohibiting a conflict of interest.
- The WH vetting process should be modified; its executive obstacles should be removed.
- The acquisition workforce needs to be better trained and educated and more experienced, and thus capable of dealing with the industry on its own, without contractors. Government officials should replace contractors in this role. Civil servants should not have to rely on contractors to evaluate new technologies.
- Acquisition officials – military and civilian alike – should be allowed to have proper conversations with the industry, and these conversations should be recognized and protected by the law. (http://defense.aol.com/2012/08/30/put-a-match-to-it-and-scrap-dods-buying-system-top-pentagon/?icid=apb2#page2)
- Norm Augustine agrees with these proposals. He says that the US should:
- a) stop adding regulations and remove unnecessary regulations to allow DOD acquisition officials to take risks; manage the acquisition system with competent people rather than with regulations;
- b) delegate authority, delegate responsibility (both to a handful of really competent officials), and hold people accountable; routinely fire and replace those people who do their job badly;
- c) exempt highly important programs from normal oversight and bureaucracy, thus enabling their faster development and fielding (this, IMO, should apply to the next-gen bomber, the next-gen ICBM, the SSBNX, the next-gen cruise missile, the ACV, the GCV, and the JLTV); these programs should enjoy support and funding from the highest echelons of the DOD, their managers should be allowed to run them freely, and few people should be allowed to dabble; eventually, this should be done for all programs other than the F-35. (http://defense.aol.com/2012/09/10/take-risks-norm-augustine-urges-hill-dod-on-acquisition-excl/?icid=related3)
60) The following acquisition reforms, meant to reduce acquisition costs by 10% (suggested in the “Cutting Fat without Cutting Substance”, published in the Contract Management industry journal in May 2012) should also be implemented:
- Using “relational” contracting, where buyers and suppliers make long-term commitments that bolster trust and cooperation, rather than treating each contract as a one-time event.
- Where appropriate, monitoring suppliers’ outcomes rather than their behavior. “The buyer focuses on ‘what’ and allows the supplier to decide ‘how,’” said T. Russell Crook, one of the study’s authors.
- Using “best value” they way it is done in the private sector, instead of just focusing on cost or speed.
- Retaining knowledgeable workers who work with suppliers. “Turnover has the potential to create major performance problems within buyer- supplier relationships,” Crook said.
61) The budgeting, requirements, and acquisitions processes, as depicted on this chart displayed by Sen. Inhofe, must be dramatically simplified. The entire current budgeting, requirements, and acquisition processes and systems should be completely abolished. The requirements and acquisition process should be as simple as follows: 1) Combatant Commanders identify requirements; 2) the OSD, together with the Joint Staff and the JCS, determines the solution to that requirement; 3) A specific Force Provider (service or agency) is selected to affordably develop and procure that solution (i.e. that weapon system) and bears responsibility for that R&D and acquisition program; 4) requirements are clearly defined in an RFP; 5) after a competition, a vendor is selected and is being held accountable for delivering the required weapon ontime and on budget, with a firm price ceiling. (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l1eMPNr6Xmg)
62) When designing and building weapon systems, the DOD and the defense industry should use this method to save time and money. (http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130107/DEFFEAT01/301070013/From-Paper-Projection?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|FRONTPAGE)
It should also use early prototyping and build military aircraft prototypes early on to reduce costs AND to keep aerospace enginneers employed during the current economic downturn. (http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=1123)
Now, regarding specific weapon programs:
63) The DOD should slow down production rates for F-35s for the next several years (or until LM demonstrates that the F-35 design is mature and that all design flaws have been resolved, and demonstrates the F-35′s basic flying qualities) to no more than 30 aircraft per year, and preferrably only 24 aircraft per year (or, the DOD could halt production for the next several years). Of these, the majority of aircraft should be A-model (Air Force variant) fighters, because the USAF needs these aircraft ASAP. All other F-35 program reforms proposed by former Deputy SECDEF Gordon England (including devolving most responsibility for the F-35 program to the Services and giving foreign program partners more influence over the program) must be implemented. All cracks on A and B model aircraft must be addressed, and all problems raised by the QLRs and by Bill Sweetman (including problems with the fuel dumping system, the helmet-mounted display, latency, the IPP, the lagging sensors, the buggy electrical system, and with the arresting hook on the C model) must be resolved, before the F-35′s production rate becomes higher than 24 planes per year. To fix hook problems, the DOD should use hooks from existing carrier aircraft, such as the Super Hornet, or placing the hook elsewhere than where it currently is. The QLR reports’ recommendations (including those of the newest QLR) must all be implemented. All future tranches of F-35s (and all other weapons) must be bought under fixed price contracts. The ban on F-35s flying within 25 nm of predicted lightning should be abolished, and most tests should occur at NAS Patuxent River and Edwards AFB rather than Eglin AFB. The lightning protection system must be tested ASAP. All further decisions about F-35 concurrent production must be event-driven, i.e. based on how the planes do during tests. Furthermore, the degrees of concurrency for all three variants should be considered separately because they have substantially different designs and expectations for when they will be developed, tested, and produced. In the future, excessive concurrency must be avoided in all weapon programs. Also, IOC dates should be set for all three ASAP variants ASAP (for the F-35A, it should be July 4th, 2016). (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/in-focus-f-35-concurrency-reaches-turning-point-366056/; http://bit.ly/Khq7a0; http://www.pogo.org/resources/national-security/f-35-jsf-concurrency-quick-look-review-20111129.html) All other problems with the F-35′s design must also be resolved. (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/in-focus-f-35-concurrency-reaches-turning-point-366056/) The F-35′s B and C variants must undergo more frequent testing than before in order to catch up with the schedule (the C variant is only 5 test flights behind schedule, but the B variant is 30 test flights behind schedule). However, after all testing is completed, the production of F-35s should be dramatically ramped up, and additional 590 F-35s (572 F-35As and 18 F-35Bs) should be ordered. Alternatively, a competition for the order for the 481 additional fighters could be staged between the F-35 and other offers. (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/lockheed-finds-new-structural-weakness-on-two-f-35-variants-361687/;http://defensetech.org/2012/01/05/uk-concerned-about-f-35-slowdown/; http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120507/DEFFEAT05/305070006/Change-Course-Protect-F-35) Furthermore, the F-35 must have at least some basic cyber protections. Today’s aircraft need a switch that shuts off all the electronic apertures through which they can potentially receive transmissions, lest electronically savvy enemies hack into them. That rule must also apply to all future aircraft programs, including the NGB and the F/A-XX. Furthermore, Lockheed’s F-35 manufacturing plant should be militarized and de-unionized, and any strike should be treated as a desertion, punishable with the maximum penalty allowed by the UCMJ. The F-35′s lightning protection system must be sufficiently tested, including flying the aircraft in real storms. (http://defense.aol.com/2012/05/15/cartwright-savages-f-35-airsea-battle-warns-of-250-billion-mo/?a_dgi=aolshare_twitter; http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/25/us-lockheed-strike-idUSBRE83O04520120425) If these reforms do not result in flaws being fixed, or at least being put on their way to being fixed, and cost overruns are not stopped and at least slightly reversed, the annual LRIP rate should be reduced to only 10 aircraft per annum or LRIP should be suspended altogether until all design flaws are resolved and until testing is complete.
Last but not least, the F-35 program should be put on a two-year probation. If, during that time, most problems of the F-35 program are not fixed or at least put on the way to solution, the F-35 program should be cancelled and F-22 production should be revived. F-22s for the USAF, the USMC, and the USN could be procured at a fraction of the F-35′s program cost. The Marines could also develop and procure a Super Harrier, while the Navy could navalize the F-22 or procure more Super Bugs and hasten UCAV development.
61) To reduce the cost of carrier construction, the USN should employ the cost-reduction methods proposed by RAND in its 2005 study, namely a) building ships in pairs; b) learning of the routine by the shipyard workforce (i.e. doing the same stuff over and over again, i.e. repeated production tasks) (repetitive production usually leads to efficiencies as a workforce becomes more experienced with a particular product); c) reducing the crew requirement (compared to the Nimitz class) by an additional 200 men in addition to the 800 men that the Ford class is already designed to cut (so the total crew requirement cut would be 1000 men); d) outsourcing of some of the work (e.g. fitting the ship out) to contractors other than NGNN; however, the Navy should not skip the RCOH of any carrier and should not agree to RAND’s proposal to build carriers at 2-year intervals or to replace Nimitz class vessels with CVN-21 class vessels faster than the current plan is. If the Navy does, it should opt for a 30-month interval and refuel CVN-72, but not CVN-73; the USS Kitty Hawk should, in that case, be recommissioned in 2016. In that case, the replacement for CVN-73 should be ordered together with that for CVN-68 and commissioned in 2020. (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448400&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) The Ford class must be sufficiently tested, including tests of its survivability and defensibility against ASBMs such as the DF-21 (a test of the SM-3 against a target simulating the DF-21 should also be conducted). (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-09/navy-delays-carrier-s-combat-tests-weapons-tester-says.html) The USN should buy materials for two carriers simoultaneously and order two such ships simoultaneously, thus adopting a block buy strategy, starting with CVN-79 and CVN-80, or with CVN-80 and CVN-81. The wider the gap between carrier acquisitions, shipyard engineers lose more efficiencies between the two. Lengthening the interval between ships almost always ensures that the downstream ship will be more expensive. The interval between the carriers should therefore be reduced, not lengthened. (http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2012/september/Pages/BudgetCrunchCouldJeopardizeNewCarrierProcurement.aspx)
The costs of aircraft carrier development and procurement must be dramatically reduced, e.g. with multi-year procurement contracts, commercial off the shelf technology, less ambitious designs, less expensive materials, and so forth. (http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120221/DEFREG02/302210002?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter)
62) All ship cost-cutting reforms proposed here should be implemented, except laying off workers or making them part-time employees, because that would only further damage the industrial base. Annual ship orders must be significantly increased (and under this plan, they would be) if the shipbuilding industry is to survive. It is nonsense to claim that the Navy can’t devote more than $15 bn per year to shipbuilding when the DON’s annual budget is ca. $170 bn and the DOD’s annual core budget is $526 bn. $15 bn is just 2.85% of the core defense budget. Even doubling the shipbuilding budget would mean it would amount to just 4.7% of the core defense budget. Radical cuts of bureaucracies, HQs, noncombat units, and fuel costs (as well as other savings proposed herein) should be used to pay for increases for orders for ships (and other weapons). (http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=646#.TxcRW21BrOw.twitter) All materials for all future ships, not just aircraft carriers, should be procured long in advance of the beginning of these ships’ construction. Also, there must be firm price ceilings and schedules for all ship programs and all individual ships. (http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=909)
63) The cost of a Virginia class submarine must be reduced down to $1.8 bn – $2 bn per boat and preferrably even lower. This can be accomplished partially by implementing the reforms already planned by the program office and the ONR, partially by using commercial off-the-shelf technology wherever possible (there are still many unexploited opportunities to do so), and partially by significantly increasing the orders for these subs and purchasing them with MYP authority under fixed priced contracts. They’re cheaper to buy in larger numbers. They should be bought at a pace of at least 3 per year, and no FY should be an exception to that rule. The Virginia class sub slipped out of the FY2013-FY2017 FYDP must be reinstated to it. The Navy should eventually buy 60-70 of them. (http://www.onr.navy.mil/en/Media-Center/Fact-Sheets/Cost-Reduction-VA-Class-Subs.aspx;http://www.youtube.com/HASCRepublicans#p/u/2/pXx2THxszsM; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virginia_class_submarine#Construction_and_controversy; http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/nssn/)
64) The cost of one San Antonio class LPD must be reduced to no more than $1.282 bn, and preferrably even less (preferrably as little as one Mistral class LPD costs ($420 mn - $600 mn) to make this class competitive with the Mistral class). Cost reductions should be negotiated with builders on the promise of additional orders, and competition should be used to reduce costs further. The class should be built on a MYP basis. Orders for this class should be sought abroad.
65) The New SSBN (SSBNX) program should use a modified Virginia class hull design or the Ohio class design, not an entirely new design, thus cancelling SSBNX design development (and its costs), saving the USN $26 bn on every submarine, and reducing the cost down to just $2.4 bn per boat (and even less if economies of scale are realized). This means that the USN’s future submarines should be derivatives of the Virginia class, which is one of the quietest submarine classes on the planet, or the Ohio class.
66) The USDOD should create a Strategic Weapon Programs Fund and finance the SSBNX program from it to protect other ship programs. The fund should receive money exclusively from the sales of exquisite equipment of the DOD and obsolete warships. These monies should be devoted exclusively to that fund. (http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/lynn-rejection-of-need-for-strategic-programs-fund-neglects-key-concerns?a=1&c=1171)
67) Because the EFV program has been cancelled, the USMC should modernize its existing AAVs and receive amphibious M113 APCs that would be retired from the Army as a result of further Stryker APC purchases before the ACV is introduced in 2014. The Marine Personnel Carrier program should be cancelled; additional ACVs (enough to replace all AAVs one-for-one) should be procured instead.
68) The DOD must standardize on only one electronic warfare weapon in each category, thus consolidating or closing duplicative programs. In terms of EW aircraft, that should be EA-18G Growlers, and after EA-18G production is completed, by F-35 aicraft (both of which should be equipped with Next Generation Jammers). These two aircraft types should serve side by side. (http://bit.ly/GIVVaU) The DOD must negotiate a reduction of the per-plane price of an F/A-18E/F plane to $40 mn with the producer of that planetype (Boeing). (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ALHwrfRsPNE)
69) The USAF’s crucial CSAR-X program (which was supposed to yield replacements for the USAF’s Combat Search And Rescue Helicopter Fleet) was cancelled in April 2009 by Bob Gates. I have developed an alternative way to replace the USAF’s vintage CSARH fleet: buy 141 (or more) casual H-60 Black Hawk helicopters and modify them for the CSAR role (as was done with the USAF’s first MH-60 helicopters – they weren’t purpose-built CSAR aircraft, but rather modified H-60 helicopters). Black Hawks (not CSAR helicopters) are currently being procured by the US Army and the USAF anyway, and have been procured for many years. As interim helicopters, the 27 H-1 Iroquis helicopters currently parked at AMARC, all H-34 helicopters currently parked at AMARC, all H-46 helicopters parked at AMARC, and all H-53 helicopters currently parked at AMARC, should be recommissioned and modified for the CSARH role. These helos should also become available to the governors of Gulf Coast states.
70) The USAF should replace its UH-1 Iroquois utility helicopters and its UH-1N Huey utility/SAR helicopters with the same type of aircraft that will replace the USAF’s obsolete MH-60 CSAR helicopters. Such a common type of replacement helicopters would mean significant savings. For the USAF alone, it would mean a one-time saving of $600 mn.
71) The contract for “the continued development, production, test, training, operations, and sustainment” of the MDA’s Ground-Based Midcourse BMD system should be submitted to a bid. Both Boeing and LM want to bid for it. It would be worth $4.2 bn over seven years. (http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1566818820101215?pageNumber=2)
72) No missile defense systems that haven’t been sufficiently tested should be rushed into production and deployment. They must all be sufficiently tested before deployment; and for the time being, the DOD should rely on existing, proven systems such as SM-3 Block IA/IB/IIA, the Aegis System, the GBI, THAAD, and PATRIOT. The MDA must deploy better radars than those planned for Romania and Turkey; be able to distinguish real warheads from decoys, and develop faster interceptors, such as 2-stage GBIs; deadlines to deploy missile defense systems in Europe should be significantly changed if need be to ensure that systems are thoroughly tested before deployment; the DOD shouldn’t commit to any unproven technologies and shouldn’t commit any money to them. Aegis Ashore systems must not be deployed anywhere until they are developed and sufficiently tested and proven to work. Missile defense deployment plans must be tailored to these programmatic realities. The DOD should furthermore develop, and ultimately field, the Air and Missile Defense Radar and stop procuring Aegis radars, and avoid any expensive changes to BMD systems’ design. The DOD should fully fund the SM-3 Block 2B while also fully funding, and completing, the development of the Block 1B and make it capable of intercepting ICBMs and ASBMs of any kind. Furthermore, the Block 1A should also be tested against ICBMs. (http://militarytimes.com/news/2012/04/ap-military-europe-missile-defense-reports-cast-doubt-042112/; http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/PS_SASC_Oreilly_042512.pdf)
73) To reform the Ground-Based Midcourse Interceptor program, the DOD should avoid excessive concurrency between development and deployment. The deployment of any further GBIs should be delayed until all problems with the GBI program are fixed and the interceptors and EKVs are sufficiently tested. Sufficient funding must be provided for GBI and EKV testing (which cannot be done if funding for the GBI is frozen or troubled). An additional test, against an IRBM such as the SS-20, should be conducted. After such testing is complete, however, and if it yields positive results, dozens of additional GBIs need to be procured and deployed. GBIs should be smaller, lighter, and faster and consist of 2 stages, not 3. The DOD should also cancel the SM-3 Block 2B missile and build an East Coast missile defense site instead. (http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public//index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=77c257a6-adc8-4e38-87a5-85c86d7ed4a5)
74) All space launch programs and rocket programs contracts (and all contracts for everything else) should be bid competitively and the cheapest offer should always be chosen. For space launches and boosters, a Californian company is offering its products and offering to reduce the cost per booster from $420 mn to $60 mn. The USAF should stop always choosing big space companies. (http://appropriations.senate.gov/webcasts.cfm?method=webcasts.view&id=781d53ad-7931-458d-b5f9-6ba888b4f475) Furthermore, competition would break the United Launch Alliance’s monopoly and open a chance for other potential contractors, such as the SpaceX company (which has already significantly reduced costs at NASA), to obtain DOD contracts and save DOD money. At all times, the cheapest offer should be chosen.
75) The cost overruns that plague the SBIRS program must be ended and the program must be completed on budget.
76) The Army and the Marines need to make sure that their future vehicles (including those that will be procured under the GCV program) will be air-transportable by a C-17, a C-130 (mid-weight vehicles), or a CH-47 (light vehicles). They must not be too big or too heavy. If not, they may need to reconceptualize these vehicles.
77) The Stryker program should be cut and eventually closed (in FY2015), and any resulting savings should be used to upgrade M1 tanks to the M1A2 SEP TUSK standard (all M1 tanks should be upgraded to this standard); the Lima production plant must NEVER be closed; closing it would cost $380 mn, and restarting production 3 years later would cost $1.3 bn, a total cost of $1.68 bn, an utter waste of money; instead, the Army should keep the production plant open indefinitely, continue to produce M1 tanks, and continue to modernize existing M1 tanks to the M1A2 SEP TUSK standard; the GCV program should be delayed or cut if necessary to provide further funding to upgrade M1 tanks; other programs, such as a “battlefield network”, should also be cut if necessary to provide funding for M1 tanks (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lima_Army_Tank_Plant;http://www.dodbuzz.com/2011/04/21/the-tank-at-the-end-of-history/#ixzz1KFgG9QisDoDBuzz.com;http://www.supportabrams.com/; http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=7184244&c=FEA&s=TEC; http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20110715/FREE/110719927#;http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120424/DEFREG02/304240006/Support-Strong-Capitol-Hill-Continued-Abrams-Buys?odyssey=mod|nextstory) The saving resulting from keeping the Lima Production Plant open permanently would be at least $1.68 bn over the FY2013-FY2016 period, and all of it should be reinvested in the modernization of all Army and USMC M1 tanks to the M1A2SEP TUSK standard.
78) The Services need to coordinate and consolidate their UAV programs, and they all should be managed by the USD for ATL and the USD for Intel; the OSD should establish a JIEDDO-style office, reporting to the USD4ATL’s, to manage all of these programs. Also, as the GAO’s February 28th, 2012 report rightly says, “the undersecretary of defense for intelligence as well as DoD’s ISR Task Force need to develop a roadmap that outlines what UAS and sensor capabilities need to be maintained and what systems can be eliminated post-Afghanistan.” The USD for Int. needs to determine what systems can be eliminated after 2014. (http://bit.ly/GIVVaU)
79) The Alternative Jet Engine Program (the F136 jet engine program) should be revived as a competitor to the F135 engine type. The short term cost of this program would be small; the long-term savings would be large, as is always the case when a competition is staged. The producer of F135 engines must not be granted a $130 bn dollar monopoly. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F-35_Lightning_II#Engines;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Electric/Rolls-Royce_F136)
80) At NAVSEA, the Navy should create a Director of Naval Shipbuilding with a long tenure measured in many years (e.g. 8 years), just like the Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion. He should be held accountable for all Navy shipbuilding programs, including any delays and cost overruns. (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nLYDyTIC3Hc)
81) The Army needs to speed up the development of its Warfighter Information Network – Tactical (WIN-T) system after its significant delays. (http://defense.aol.com/2012/08/03/senate-appropriators-keep-global-hawks-flying-air-force-navy-g/?icid=related1)
82) When designing future aircraft, the military and the industry need to maximize the use of light weight, high strength metal alloys, such as Ti, Al, and AlBe alloys, and the use of composite technologies and the associated materials, both of which provide a stiffer, stronger airframe with an even further reduction in the air vehicle’s relative structural weight, as has been done with the PAKFA by the Russians. (http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2010-01.html)
83) The DOD should immediately allow US troops and commanders to buy the Palantir IED detection system and buy it itself. It should be standard issue for the US military. This would make the Distributed Common Ground System totally unneeded. (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jul/16/military-has-to-fight-to-purchase-lauded-ied-buste/)
84) The US military should have a two-service CSAR helicopter program (instead of a single-service CSARH program) and should conduct it together with allied militaries in order to 1) reduce unit costs (and total program costs) and 2) ensure the commonality of American and allied CSAR helicopters.
85) The USN should limit the crew of each additional Burke class surface combatant it orders to 200 personnel, 100 fewer than on the Burke class vessels built so far; forego plans to equip such warships with a new fuel-efficient “hybrid” powerplant derived from the DDG-1000’s electric motors; and equip it with bow bulb, located just above the sonar dome protrusion on the existing generation of warships. According to internal Navy studies cited by the CRS and defensetech.com, the second bow bulb would improve the ships’ fuel efficiency by about 4 percent and lead to slightly better speed and range. No new guns should be installed aboard these warships. Tomahawks should handle the CAS task. The DOD should promote competition between the two shipyards which build these ships to reduce costs. The cost of one Burke class vessel should be reduced from $1.843 bn – $2 bn to $1.4 bn or, preferrably, to $0.932 bn. That is to say that the cost of an Arleigh Burke class vessel should be reduced to $932 mn per ship, as is the case of the cost of a single King Sejong the Great class vessel, which is larger, heavier, and more heavily armed than an Arleigh Burke class vessel. UPDATE: The costofwar.com website says that the unit cost of a single Arleigh Burke class vessel is just $1 bn, but its cost should be still reduced further nonetheless. (http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/08/old-destroyer-g/; http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3655903&c=AME&s=SEA) In addition to all of these reforms, the USN should use multi-year-procurement procedures to achieve maximum possible savings on any Burke class warships it may purchase, and significantly reduce the crew of every new Burke class warship. Moreover, every year, the USN should be procuring the same number (at minimum two, and preferrably four) of such warships. The cost of one such warship must be reduced to no more than $932 mn, down from the current cost of $1.843 bn. Moreover, the following reforms of the DDG-51 program should be implemented:
- The Navy should reconsider whether to develop and build Flight III DDG-51 vessels or whether to build additional Flight IIA ships or additional Ticonderoga class cruisers, or to resume the DDX or CGX program, or buy a license to build Korean King Sejong the Greatclass vessels. Irrespective of that, the 7 cruisers that the Navy planned to retire as of April 2012, and the 3 remaining Baseline 0-1 Ticonderoga class cruisers, should be repaired and fitted with BMD capability, as well as armed with lasers and railguns.
- The Navy should not waste money on any radars that will provide only a marginal increase in capability insufficient to meet the Navy’s demands, but neither should it make any radical changes to DDG-51 design or install a radar larger than 14 feet in height. (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/dti/2012/04/01/DT_04_01_2012_p36-438270.xml&headline=Next%20Gen%20U.S.%20Destroyers%20Already%20Questioned&next=10)
- If necessary, and if it decides to build more Burke class ships instead of cruisers, it should plug such ships.
- The Navy should forego plans to install expensive hybrid electric engines on new Burke class ships. Instead, it should install natural-gas-derived-fuel-propelled engines, or ones that can run on Fischer-Tropsch fuel.
- Realistic cost estimates, as well as realistic, achievable cost and schedule baselines, need to be made, not rosy ones.
- No more VLS cells should be added to DDG-51 ships.
- If necessary to accomodate lasers and railguns on board, and if removing traditional ship guns would not make enough room for them, the Navy should lengthen the DDG-51 hull design or build Zumwalt class vessels or cruisers instead. Lasers and railguns will be absolutely necessary and ships must be designed and built with that assumption in mind. However, to accomodate them, the Navy may try removing other weapons (e.g. conventional guns) from the Burkes.
- Contracts for Burke class ship orders must be bid competitively and must call for lower prices than those currently estimated; in other words, to win, a bidder must offer superior capability at a lower cost than his rivals.
- Any contracts for Burke class ships or their related equipment and materials must be fixed price contracts.
- Burke class ships (and most other weapons) must be bought on a MYP basis.
- The Navy should assess whether it can safely operate ships with a gravity point lower than required and with other ship stability requirements waived, try to remove some older weapons such as 5-inch guns and some VLS cells to make room for newer weapons, and make all other possible attempts to accomodate better engines, coolants, and radar on the Arleigh Burke class (whether redesigned or not). If it can’t, or if such attempts produce ships with insufficient capabilities, Burke class construction should be ended in FY2016.
The DDG-51 class should be put on a two-year probation. Under no circumstances shall the cost of a single Burke class vessel exceed 2.1 billion dollars. If DDG-51s are found to be too expensive to build or redesign (to accomodate the AMDR and hybrid-electric motors), their production should be ended at DDG-115 and the production of the Zumwalt class, the CGX class (which was designed for missile defense missions), or the Ticonderoga class should be resumed. (http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32109_20120302.pdf)
86) F-35s should be produced in bulk, not across the whole country in a piecemeal manner, which would, by itself, save $38.8 bn over the lifetime of the program.
87) The Army’s and the USAF’s purchases of obsolete or surplus spare parts should be significantly reduced.
88) In the presidential helicopter modernization program, the DOD should set a price ceiling of $67 mn per unit, in CY2011 dollars.
89) The DOD should not buy radios that it will have to replace within the next few years with new ones. It should buy only ones that can last for long and will cost little. (http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2012/8/dr.%20coburn%20urges%20colleagues,%20the%20army%20to%20put%20troops’%20safety%20first,%20modernize%20ineffective%20&%20outdated%20service%20rifles)
90) The following reforms should be implemented: integration of the DOD’s supply chain and “Customer Pay” (http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/the-value-of-integrating-dods-supply-chain?a=1&c=1171); this boneheaded proposal needs to be stopped: http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/pentagon-proposal-on-buying-commercial-items-will-hurt-military-and-economy?a=1&c=1171.
91) The Army should delay the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program until it reduces the weight of both designs (GD’s and BAE’s) submitted for the competition without significantly reducing the vehicle’s armor. In other words, when making difficult tradeoffs between weight reduction (and thus cost reduction) on the one hand and armor on the other hand, the Army needs to reduce weight and costs, but not excessively so as not to end up with a poorly protected vehicle. The Army should select GD’s GCV, which weighs only 64 tons empty and 74 tons with all the armor, but replace its conventional diesel engines with hybrid diesel-electric or LPG-propelled engines, which would reduce vehicle weight by 3 tons. The GCV’s full weight must not exceed 70 tons. If the GCV program cannot resolve its weight issues, it should be cancelled, and for the next 5 years, it should be put on probation. (http://defense.aol.com/2012/11/08/bradley-offspring-gcv-may-top-84-tons-hheavier-than-m1-tank/?prev=1; http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43699-GroundCombatVehicles.pdf) Competition must continue into the program’s production phase. (http://%20http//insidedefense.com/Inside-the-Army/Inside-the-Army-10/29/2012/armys-ground-combat-vehicle-in-the-crosshairs-as-budget-debates-rage/menu-id-78.html; http://defense.aol.com/2012/03/06/spread-of-smart-weapons-undercuts-case-for-army-ground-combat-ve/). Alternatively, the Army could simply cancel the GCV program and, per GAO recommendation, buy Puma IFVs (thus saving $14 bn) or modernize its existing Bradleys (thus saving $9 bn). (http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130402/DEFREG02/304020015/U-S-Army-8217-s-Top-Vehicle-Program-Gets-Another-Black-Eye?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|FRONTPAGE)
92) The Army must conduct comprehensive acquisition reform and enforce its “seven commandments”. (http://defense.aol.com/2011/10/11/army-acquisition-must-change-to-survive-says-general/)
93) The DOD needs to a) increase the salaries of well-performing acquisition officials; continue competition well into the production phase; rely only on mature, proven technologies (with minimal exceptions); fully resource the Technology Demonstrator phase, during which risk must be reduced to a minimum and technologies must mature; and reward those acquisition officials who succeed while punishing those who fail. (http://www.dodbuzz.com/2012/11/14/pentagon-unveils-latest-acquisition-crusade/)
There are only a few procurement programs which should be closed. Here are those programs:
C) PROGRAM CLOSURES
1) Any further purchases of M16 and M4 rifles, 9mm Beretta pistols, and rounds for them should be cancelled. They should be sold and replaced with M14 rifles (and ultimately, a next generation rifle; the German Army’s standard rifle should be considered, as should be the OICW, the PAPOP, and the SA80) and with .45 caliber pistols, respectively. The next gen rifle competition should be sped up and contract awarded before 2014. (http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2012/8/dr.%20coburn%20urges%20colleagues,%20the%20army%20to%20put%20troops’%20safety%20first,%20modernize%20ineffective%20&%20outdated%20service%20rifles)
2) The DOD should immediately cease purchases of RG-31s and MATVs.
3) The purchases of other MRAP vehicles should be reduced and ended in FY2016. The military already has enough of them.
4) As recommended by the GAO, the DOD should standardize on a single type of mine rollers – either the Army type or the USMC type, whichever offers better protection. Likewise, it should standardize on a single type of long range ISR drones – either the Global Hawk or the BAMS.
5) The T-X trainer aircraft competition should be cancelled. Instead of developing new trainer aircraft, the USAF should buy aircraft of an existing type, e.g. T-6 Texan II planes, and recommission the trainer aircraft parked at AMARC.
6) The Predator and Reaper programs. All orders for Predators and Reapers should be cancelled. The total number of Predator/Reaper Combat Air Patrols should be reduced to 40. If the Congress passes any bill with funding for any additional Predator or Reaper drones, or prohibiting the retirement of existing drones, the President should veto it.
7) The Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) program should be terminated. It has already cost $3 bn. It is over budget, 5 years behind schedule, and can’t perform even basic tasks. It should be replaced with the Palantir. All Army and Marine divisions deploying to combat should be equipped with the Palantir. (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jul/22/army-destroyed-report-that-favored-software-that-d/?page=all#pagebreak)
(8) The Navy should terminate the LCS program immediately. LCS ships are nonstealthy, unstable, unsurvivable, unable to defend themselves, particularly vulnerable to air and missile attacks, and lack any offensive capabilities. The cost of a single LCS is $440 mn (2 times what it was originally supposed to be) without even counting the cost of LCS modules, without which LCS ships are incomplete. These ships are also suffering from serious corrosion problems – both the monohull and the trimaran. They are also suffering other hull problems, and it is unlikely that any of these problems will be resolved anytime soon, if ever. As Adm. James Lyons suggested, “The program should return to its original target of $220 million per ship and combine with the U.S. Coast Guard to build a dual-purpose ship with a credible integral combat system that can meet limited warfare requirements. This very different ship should be built in large numbers as part of the coming Ocean Patrol Cutter Program. Such a change would achieve huge savings for both the Navy and the Coast Guard tied to large production numbers. The funding saved from canceling the LCS could be used to procure the most capable high-end combatant ship with margins enough to allow future modernization.” Alternatively, the DOD could purchase 55 Holland class ships (which are cheaper than LCSes), Roussen class Fast Attack Craft, Hamina class boats, French-produced avisos (e.g. D’Estienne D’Orves) or Norwegian Skjold class boats (and Fridtjof Nansen class frigates) or British-produced offshore patrol vessels. Building Roussen class FACs would be the best option, as they are the best armed vessels of all the classes listed here, and far better armed than both LCS classes. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roussen_class_fast_attack_craft; http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/08/future-warship-ran-aground/all/1; http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/may/18/cruising-for-a-bruising/; http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jul/05/why-we-need-better-ships/; http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/01/ship-shopping-list/; http://blog.al.com/live/2010/12/navy_seeking_deadline_extensio.html;
The savings resulting from this cancellation would run into tens of billions of dollars. Some of them will have to be used to meet the requirements of the 2011 BCA, but some can and should be used to build large warships, and some to properly maintain existing warships (20% of the USN’s ship fleet is unfit for combat, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/07/over-a-fifth-of-navy-ships-arent-ready-to-fight/).
9) The Army’s D6A program, a multi-billion-dollar intelligence program, should be cancelled and replaced by the intelligence program that all other services, as well as PayPal, use at a total cost of just $25 mn per year, as suggested by Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA). (http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=YYdc2sVuOpA#t=5051s)
10) The MEADS program. In lieu of MEADS, the Army should develop (alone, not with foreign countries) the next generation of the PATRIOT system, including a radar with 360-degree coverage. This radar should work in the L-band and be capable of tracking BMs, CMs, and aircraft alike. The next generation of PATRIOT missiles, capable of shooting down all three of these, should also be developed and called PAC-4. (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/apr/27/us-army-needs-meads-not-patriot/)
11) The Army should complete the procurement of CH-47 Chinook heavy lift helicopters in FY2013. The Army already has enough of them, and these helicopters are not fit to serve as anything other than heavy lift platforms and troop transports. For CSAR and MEDEVAC missions, the Army should procure Blackhawks.
12) The SM-3 Block 2B missile should be cancelled and the funding intended for it should be shifted to the Block 1B and Block 2A missiles, including the procurement of enough SM-3s to satisfy combatant commanders’ requirements and upgrading the Block 1B (and the Aegis system’s command-and-control functions to become capable of intercepting ICBMs). UPDATE: The DOD has already cancelled SM-3 Block 2B. (http://townhall.com/columnists/kenblackwell/2012/05/02/obamas_dangerous_approach_to_missile_defense)
14) The DOD should terminate the PTSS program and build a ballistic missile defense system in accordance with the recommendations of the relevant September 2012 report of the National Research Council, including ordering AN/TPY-2 radars instead of PTSS satellites. Doing so would save billions of dollars in comparison with current US policy. (UPDATE: Reportedly, the latter two policies have been adopted by the DOD.)
D) BUREAUCRACY REDUCTION
1) The US military should transport only the necessary WH staff (e.g. the Secret Service), medical staff and military staff during official tours; only such staff should be allowed to make tours on any DOD-owned aircraft; all in all, an American delegation for a summit should number no more than 100 people.
2) The staff of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs should be reduced by 50%.
3) Reduce both the staff of the Office of the SECDEF and the budget of the OSD by 75%. This should include a reduction of the SECDEF’s salary by half, and a reduction of the salary of the DOD spokesman ($165,000 per year) by 25%.
4) The DOD Police should be merged with the Pentagon Police, and should become responsible for the Pentagon in Arlington (VA). It should also be merged with the PFPA, and inherit all of their rights and duties. (http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/510568p.pdf)
5) The Office of the Under SECDEF for Policy should be abolished. The “Defense Prisoner of War/MIA Office” should report to the USD for Personnel; the Offices of “the ASD for Intl Security” and “the ASD for Global Security” should be merged and should report directly to the SECDEF and the Deputy SECDEF. The five Under Secretaries of Defense reporting directly to the SECDEF shall be: USD (Comptroller), USD for AT&L, USD for Personnel and Readiness, USD for Global Security Affairs, USD for Intel. Alongside them, the Director of A&M at the OSD, the General Counsel of the DOD, the DOD’s IG, the SECDEF’s Assistant for Public Affairs (who should replace the ASD for Public Affairs), and the chiefs of some DOD agencies should also report to the SECDEF. The Director of Program Assessment and Evaluation, the Director of Net Assessment, and the ASD for Network Information & Integration should all be subordinated to, and work at the office of, the USD for AT&L. Thus, there would be only 5 USDs reporting to the SECDEF, and their title would be the same: “Under Secretary of Defense for …”. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Under_Secretary_of_Defense_for_Policy; http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/3/33/DoD_Structure_Jan2008.png)
6) The number of Naval Districts should be reduced from 10 to 7 by: a) merging the DC Naval District with the 5th Naval District; b) merging the 13th Naval District with the 17th Naval District (and the HQ should be in Juneau); c) merging the 8th Naval District with the 7th Naval District. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_district)
7) The CIA should be abolished because it pointlessly duplicates (and rivals with) the DIA. All of its personnel, equipment, and buildings should be given to the DIA. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defense_Intelligence_Agency)
(8) The Pentagon Task Group on Climate Change should be dissolved.
9) The number of paperwork doers in the Pentagon must be reduced by at least 25% (http://www.bens.org/our-work/signature-issues/defense-reform/tail-to-tooth-commission/why-t2t.html). The number of lawyers employed by the DOD should be reduced by at least 10%.
10) The office of Deputy Under Secretary of the Army and the office of the Chief of Public Affairs of the Army should be dissolved. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Organization_of_the_Department_of_the_Army_Headquarters.png) The office of the Chief of Naval Information should be merged with the office of the Chief Information Officer of the Navy.
11) The cost of overhead must be reduced as a share of the DOD budget from 40% now to no more than 20%, and ideally 10%.
12) The DOD must review all of the “positions” it maintains and consider how many of them could be merged or abolished.
13) The number of command tiers/ bureaucracy tiers separating the SECDEF from a line officer must be reduced from 30 to 9.
14) All contractors who only supervise other contractors, all bureaucrats who only supervise other bureaucrats, and all secretaries who only supervise other secretaries should be sacked.
15) The USMC’s Combat Development Command (MCCDC), which is responsible for training and similar roles, should be merged with the USMC’s Training and Education Command.
16) The cost of the administration of the Department of the Army must be reduced by 25%, from $13.786 bn to $10.3995 bn.
17) The number of Presidential appointees (incl. Assistant Secretaries, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and Under Secretaries) employed by the DOD must be reduced by at least 50%. The number of Under Secretaries of Defense should not exceed 5 (plus one Assistant to the SECDEF for Public Affairs), and they should be: USD for ATL, USD for Personnel and Readiness, USD for Intelligence and Counterintelligence, USD for Global Security Affairs, and USD (Comptroller).
18) All unneeded boards and commissions in the DOD must be abolished. Their number must therefore be halved from the current level (65), as must be their cost ($75 mn per year). One of the boards that should be dissolved should be the Defense Policy Board. (http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=13782)
19) The number of the internally-demanded reports and studies generated every year must be reduced by at least 25% from the level to which Robert Gates proposed to reduce them. The DOD should also work with the Congress to reduce the number of Congressionally-directed reports (no fewer than 905 per year as of 2011) by at least 75%. Likewise, the number of the intel reports generated by the DOD’s intel agencies and the rest of the USIC should be reduced by at least 25%. (http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=13782; http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/93/2001-06-25%20re%20The%20DoD%20Challenge.pdf)
20) The DOD should review if every single building it owns is truly needed, and sell all unneeded buildings.
21) At the DOD, there should be only one agency (and only one military command, subordinated to it) responsible for information operations (influencing foreign populations to like the US); and only one agency (and one military command, the US Cyber Command) responsible for cyber wars.
22) The General Counsels of the AF, the Navy and the Army should be laid off; their duties should be assumed by their service JAGs, who, like all JAGs, must be admitted into the bar of at least one state.
23) The Air Force District of Washington should be abolished. The USAF Honor Guard, Andrews AFB and Bolling AFB should be subordinated to the Air Mobility Command.
24) The Sixteenth Air Force should be deactivated, as should be the AFRICOM. All USAF units based in the continent of Europe, from Lisbon to the Urals, should all be subordinated to the Third Air Force, and through it, to the EUCOM. The 5th Air Force should be merged with the 7th Air Force; their HQ should be based at Yokota, the current HQ of the 7th AF.
25) Eventually, the three military departments should be abolished as Sen. Stuart Symington proposed in 1961; the four Services should be subordinated directly to the SECDEF and the Military Departments’ functions should be assigned to the four Services and to the OSD.
26) The office of Senior Military Assistant to the SECDEF should be abolished. The Chairman of the JCS should perform that function. The offices of Vice Chairman of the JCS and Director of the Joint Staff should be merged – the Vice Chairman of the JCS should be, ex officio, the Director of the JS.
27) The cost of the amalgam of DOD bureaucracies, agencies, and commands (known by the DOD employees as the 4th Estate) must be reduced from $63 bn per year to $21 bn per year, i.e. by a factor of three. The resulting savings would be $42 bn per year. (http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1570)
28) Also, the current apparatus for managing people and money across the DoD enterprise is woefully inadequate. The agencies, field activities, joint headquarters, and support staff functions of the department operate as a semi-feudal system – an amalgam of fiefdoms without centralized mechanisms to allocate resources, track expenditures, and measure results relative to the department’s overall priorities. This must end. All DOD agencies, field activities, joint HQs, and SSFs must be subordinated directly to the OSD and forced to report, every year, how much money they spend annually and how many people they employ. (http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1570)
29) These amendments should be adopted to reduce the size of the DOD bureaucracy: http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=h2011-363; http://www.govtrack.us/congress/amendment.xpd?session=112&amdt=h328
30) The number of DOD committees that must approve requirements for every weapon program must be dramatically reduced from the current number (40), ideally to only one per each Service Department approving all weapon requirements of that Service Department, and absent revisions by the SECDEF or the USD for AT&L, all decisions of such committee should be final. (http://www.youtube.com/user/securefreedom#p/u/27/cDLQFIyjB-g)
31) NAVSEA/Bureau of Ships should employ no more than 4,000 people, which it was employing during the 1980s, when it was buying 28 ships per year; and ideally to 1,000 people, which it was employing during WW2, when it was buying 1,000 ships per year. The Bureau of Ships should instead bet on the quality of personnel – it should employ engineers, businessmen, MBAs, and MIT and VT graduates. (http://www.youtube.com/user/securefreedom#p/u/27/cDLQFIyjB-g)
32) The vast majority (if not all) report requirements and statistics requirements imposed on squadron commanders must be abolished. Military personnel should be allowed to use salty language in non-official conversations; anonymous complaints should no longer be accepted; alcohol infractions, unless they cause a disaster, should not be career-enders; neither should be views about sexual orientations, risque jokes, speech likely to offend favored groups, or mere SUSPICIONS of sexual harrassment, and any allegations of such missteps must be reported by name, not anonymously via a hotline. Military literature must not favor any group nor emphasise the achievements of historically-discriminated groups. The military’s politically-correct culture must be ended. (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/sep/18/lehman-rocks-navy-complaints-about-political-corre/?page=all)
33) The DOD should not be micromanaged by the Congress, and should be debureaucratized. Specifically:
The Congress should allow the DOD to consolidate its three Post Exchange systems, thus repealing the law that currently prohibits the DOD to do so. (http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/93/2001-06-25%20re%20The%20DoD%20Challenge.pdf)
The DOD should not be required to ask the Congress for permission to build a $500,000 building. (http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/93/2001-06-25%20re%20The%20DoD%20Challenge.pdf)
The DOD’s policies should stop bouncing officers and their families from assignment to assignment every 2-3 years and then easing them out to retirement between the ages of 45 and 55, while they’re still fit to serve. (http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/93/2001-06-25%20re%20The%20DoD%20Challenge.pdf)
The DOD should be allowed to move any amount of money up to $20 bn freely from one DOD account to another, without prejudice to other provisions of the DRPP.
Uniformed people should perform only military jobs.
The number of pages of justifications the DOD must submit every year to the Congress (26,000 as of 2005) and the number of reports the DOD must submit to the Congress annually (800 as of 2005) must be radically reduced (by at least 75%).
The time it takes to develop a new weapons system must be significantly reduced.
A National Defense Authorization Act should number no more than 20 pages. The FY2005 NDAA numbered 534 pages. The NDAA for FY2012, as passed by the House, numbers 920 pages.
The Congress should significantly reduce the number of changes it makes every year to existing RDT&E programs.
Not only should the retirement age be significantly increased, but also military officers should be encourage to serve with the military until they’re really too old to serve. These days, military officers retire when they’re 45-55 years old.To quote Secretary Rumsfeld: “We spend millions of taxpayer dollars training top-notch officers and senior enlisted, giving them experience-and then we shove them out the door in their 40s and early 50s, when they are at the top of their game — and we will be paying 60% of their base pay and providing them with comprehensive healthcare for the rest of their lives. The loss in talent and experience to the Department and the country is sizable.“
The Congress and the DOD should establish more flexible military retirement rules, so that those who want to serve longer have the option of doing so-so we can retain talent instead of automatically pushing it out the door.
The Congress should establish sunset procedures for the hundreds of required reports so that we can discontinue those that have outlived their usefulness. We simply must find better ways to exchange data between DoD and Congress, so that the Congress gets the information it needs to assess performance and the DOD does not have to employ armies of personnel and consultants preparing information members of Congress no longer need.
The DOD should stop transferring officers from one assignment to another during a period of just 16 months.
The DOD should reduce its huge number of inspectors, auditors, and investigators.
The DOD should, if possible, reduce the number of people who develop and justify the DOD budget, and ensure that all remaining budget developers and justifiers ensure that the DOD budget is spent effectively and produces the desired results.
34) “The DoD’s fiscal year 2012 budget proposed spending $87.6 billion on contracted services, a $23.7 billion (38 percent) increase from the previous year.” The DOD needs not merely to freeze the cost of contracted services, but to immediately reduce that cost in real terms from the FY2011 level or only slightly above, which would be $63.9 bn in FY2011 dollars, and then down below its FY2001 level. They must be bought for a lower price, some can be discontinued, and others can be performed by government employees. The number of contractors should be reduced down to its FY2001 (pre-Afghanistan) level. All critical government functions should be performed by troops or civ. govt. employees, not by contractors, and nonessential ones should not be done at all. The DOD nowadays spends more money on buying contracted services than on buying goods (such as weapons). Update: the FY2012 NDAA, if signed into law, would freeze this spending at FY2010 levels, a necessary first step; however, merely freezing it will not suffice. It needs to be reduced to $63.9 in FY2013 and then reduced significantly in successive years. (http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/speeches/speech/floor-statement-on-the-national-defense-authorization-act-for-fiscal-year-2012/?section=alltypes) Salaries for contractors should never exceed the salary of an Army 2nd LT. (http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ContentRecord_id=259cdec5-e035-43af-991e-d99c1026332a&ContentType_id=d741b7a7-7863-4223-9904-8cb9378aa03a&Group_id=7a55cb96-4639-4dac-8c0c-99a4a227bd3a)
35) Government employees, including civilian DOD employees, must earn no more than the average pay of a private sector worker. For starters, their pay should be cut.
36) The Air Force should consider closing the Air Force Materiel Command (the buying department of the Air Force) and assigning its acquisition functions to other Air Force Commands (and establishing new task-specific commands for that purpose if necessary); for example, the ACC would be responsible for the acquisition of fighterplanes, drones, and B-3s; the Global Strike Command would be responsible for the acquisition of ICBMs and post-B-3 bombers; the Airlift Command would be responsible for buying cargoplanes, tankers, CSAR aircraft, and other such aircraft; the Air Force Space Command would be responsible for buying all space-related systems (including rockets and satellites). When the Navy Material Command was closed in 1985 by SECNAV John Lehman, many bureaucrats were laid off and much money was saved.
37) The job of Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion should be a two-star job, not a four-star one. Army and Air Force Service Commands should be led by 2-star officers, not 4-star ones. Service Chaplain Chiefs should be one-star officers. The commander of the Fleet Forces Command should be a 3-star admiral. The jobs of Commander, Naval Forces Europe, and Commander, Sixth Fleet, should be combined and held by a 3-star officer. The jobs of the Directors of Service Intelligence Agencies should be 2-star, not 3-star, billets. The jobs of Vice Commander and Deputy Commander of the 5th fleet should be merged. The job of Director of the NSA and commander of the Cyber Command should be a three-star billet. The directorship of the MDA should be a 2-star billet.
38) The total number of civilian DOD workers must be reduced, through layoffs and attrition, by at least 15% (as proposed by the DBB), and ideally by more than that. Former DOD Comptroller Dov Zakheim reports that according to the DOD itself, 110,000 civilian DOD employees could be laid off without doing any harm to the DOD. These reductions should go even deeper than that and need to occur concurrently with a significant reduction of the number of contractors. Federal rules need to be amended to allow the DOD to lay off workers, not just refuse to replace them. Likewise, the DOD should dramatically reduce the number of contractors it employs. The pay of DOD contractors and civilian employees should be dramatically reduced, to a level no higher than the annual salary of the DOD’s spokesman. The number of DOD spokespersons must also be dramatically reduced. (http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/02/15/the_budget_is_policy; http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/may/6/defense-budget-casualties-light-on-civilian-side/?page=all#pagebreak)
39) The Director of the Navy History and Heritage Command should be a civilian historian, not a military officer. The same should apply to the director of the Army Historical Center.
40) At all UCCs and across the entire DOD, travel and representation spending must be cut by 50%. All nonessential travel must be ended.
41) The DOD’s command structure (or at least its middle and upper echelons) must be radically simplified and flattened, like private sector corporations’ structure.
42) The cost of operating one presidential plane must be radically reduced, from $179,000 per hour to no more than $50,000 per hour. The two B747s that currently serve as AF1 should be replaced not with new B747s but with B787s or B777s. (http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2012/05/gannett-air-force-one-airfare-costs-179750-per-hour-052212/)
43) The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, established solely to wage the Iraqi and Afghan wars, should be disbanded after CY2014. (http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-07/rethinking-naval—heresy-or-fiscal-imperative)
44) The DOD must ensure that all mistakes and problems that plagued the US military during Operation Rolling Thunder, including a lack of a clear, unified chain of command, are resolved (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Rolling_Thunder#Problems).
45) The following levels of command should be abolished, along with all of their general officer billets: divisions, Corps, numbered Armies, and numbered Air Forces.
46) Overall, overhead should account for no more than 5%, of the entire defense budget.
47) No more DOD conferences should be held. Teleconferences should be conducted instead. (http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2012/4/dr.%20coburn%20urges%20senate%20to%20end%20wasteful%20conference%20spending,%20hold%20agencies%20accountable)
48) The DOD should implement all of the CNAS’s recommendations on bureaucracies, command structure, duplication, and Professional Military Education, but not on platforms or the force structure (except the F-35 and the LCS). (http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_SustainablePreeminence_BarnoBensahelIrvineSharp_1.pdf)
49) The DOD should reduce the number of personnel assigned to overseas and CONUS headquarters and replace some of the military personnel currently performing some support functions with civilians (budget options 050-16 and 050-17). (http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/102xx/doc10294/08-06-budgetoptions.pdf
50) The perks enjoyed by, and the staff assigned to, generals and admirals should be dramatically reduced.
51) The 4th and 10th Fleets should be disestablished. Navy Cyber Forces (which are led by a Rear Admiral) should take over exclusive responsibility for Navy cyber operations and should be reporting to the USCYBERCOM, not to the Fleet Forces Command. The boundaries between the AORs of the 7th and 3rd Fleets should be the same as those between the PACOM and the NORTHCOM. The job of the Commander of the PACFLT should be dual-hatted with that of the Commander of the 7th Fleet. This would result in the elimination of 3 three-star (Vice Admiral) billets. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Navy_Cyber_Forces)
51) These recommendations of Robert Kozloski (except eliminating service theater commands and replacing them with one Forces Command for each service and changing STRATCOM’s structure and responsibilities) should be implemented: http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/05f44720-70ce-4e7d-be2b-6cc189fc719f/Building-the-Purple-Ford–An-Affordable-Approach-t; http://defense.aol.com/2013/03/28/what-congress-can-do-to-trim-pentagon-overhead/
52) All 340,000 troops performing noncombat, commercial-style activities should be assigned to combat duty instead, thus increasing the end strength of the force that can partake in combat.
53) Ships should have “nucleus crews” (as in the early 20th century Royal Navy), conduct sea swaps of their crews, and many more of them should be forward deployed, especialy in Japan, the Philippines, Guam, and Singapore.
54) The number of personnel at the Joint Staff and defense agencies (over 81,000) and at the Combatant Commands (98,000, including over 10,000 contractors) should be significantly reduced. (http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/defense/shrinking-bureaucracy-overhead-and-infrastructure-why-this-defense-drawdown-must-be-different-for-the-pentagon/) The Joint Staff and the OSD should only supervise military operations and design the nation’s global defense strategy
E) FUEL COST REDUCTION
The DOD spends $15 bn per year on “energy” and is responsible for 80% of the federal government’s annual rate of consumption. 75% of that energy consumed annually is spent operationally. Unfortunately, the DOD’s Energy Strategy of June 2011 doesn’t even begin to address this issue. Here are the solutions:
1) The entire “green fuels” scam in the DOD must be ended IMMEDIATELY and all persons involved in it, including Navy Secretary Ray Mabus, fired and prosecuted. All “alternative fuel usage” and “alternative energy sources usage” mandates and goals, and all “alternative fuel” programs and purchases, must be ended immediately. The military should NOT buy ANY “alternative fuels” except Fischer-Tropsch fuel. It should never buy any kind of fuel which costs more than JP-5 or JP-8 fuel. It must always buy the cheapest possible fuel. Naval aircraft should be propelled SOLELY by pure 100% JP-5 fuel, which costs less than $4 per gallon, while algae-derived fuel costs $15-$26 per gallon. ONLY fossil fuels and nuclear fuel should be used by the DOD, and nothing else. (http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=48175; http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/12/05/navy-agriculture-departments-to-purchase-biofuels-for-fleets/; http://news.investors.com/article/594703/201112131558/navy-biofuel-gate-latest-obama-green-scam.htm; http://hotair.com/greenroom/archives/2011/12/10/navy-buys-biofuel-for-16-a-gallon/; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jatropha;http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings?ContentRecord_id=790b0fed-12a0-4705-b5d6-bee09c0c435b&ContentType_id=14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d35-56cc7152a7ed&Group_id=13e47ffa-0753-47a7-ad5e-1ba7592015c9; http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/feb/13/algae-solve-pentagon-fuel-problem; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algae_fuel; http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2010/09/o_algae_save_us_from_big_oil.html; http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123196846; http://www.redstate.com/badkarma6/2011/12/18/propping-up-the-green-industry-via-the-military/)
2) Require that all US military installations (except Nellis AFB) be powered only by nuclear reactors and coal electric plants.
3) The DOD should not finance any nonmilitary-related projects, including any nonmilitary-related energy or technology projects. This includes spending on any noncompetitive energy source, any noncompetitive civilian technological device, or any other non-military-related thing. Moreover, catalyzing a commercially viable alternative energy industry is not within the military’s purview. Even it if were, the federal government has a horrible track record of developing products for commercial use. In most cases, governments fund things that have no market value—hence the need for government support. No such money should be provided by any government agency, including the DOD, to any things that lack any market value. (http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/06/Capability-Not-Politics-Should-Drive-DOD-Energy-Research)
4) The US military should encourage the construction of synthethic fuel factories around the country, ignore environmentalists’ protests, and deny that global warming is happening.
5) All future Amphibious Assault Ships of the US Navy should be propelled by nuclear reactors rather than diesel engines if this would produce net savings over the lifespans of these ships. This would cost only 4% more than conventional propulsion, and only on the basis of an optimistc assumption that during the next 3 decades the price of oil will not grow by more than 1% per year above inflation (a dubious, rosy assumption). If the price of oil grows annually by at least 1.7% per year above inflation rates from now until 2040, nuclear propulsion will become economical for Amphibious Assault Ships. As a response to high oil prices ($110/bbl as of 24/1/2012), all ships of the America class after the USS America should be nuclear-propelled.
6) The US military should start recycling nuclear fuel.
7) All civilian employees of the DOD should use laptops rather than stationary PCs (laptops are 11 times more electricity-efficient than stationary computers).
(8) The Army’s solar electric plant project should be cancelled, as should be all other DOD solar EP projects and solar panel purchases.
9) The DOD should stop trying to “green” the US military. (http://bigjournalism.com/lfairchok/2010/02/16/condition-red-obama-attempts-to-turn-the-defense-department-green/)
10) No flyovers, except by the Blue Angels or the Thunderbirds, or when the flight will occur anyway when it is a training flight.
11) People who are not members of the Executive Branch (including the Speaker of the House) should fly commercial airliners, not military jets. Military VIP jets must be reserved exclusively for members of the Executive Branch. The fleet of Gulfstream-V jets should be reduced from 9 to only 6 jets. Any orders for any additional VIP jets (excluding three large VIP jets to replace SAM28000 and SAM29000) must be cancelled. (http://www.ntu.org/news-and-issues/multimedia/new-jets-ordered-for-congress.html)
12) The USAF should use Fischer-Tropsch fuel for 100% of its North America based aircraft by 2040. To enable the US industry to produce large quantities of FT fuel, the USAF (or the Dept. of the Interior) should donate land to FT fuel producers, if they build FT fuel factories on it. All environmental restrictions on the US military must be abolished. All US military aircraft must be capable of flying on a 50/50 blend of FT fuel and conventional kerosene by 2020 and on pure FT fuel by 2040. (http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,340923,00.html)
13) All civilian cars owned by the DOD must meet a 78-mpg CAFÉ standard. Simoultaneously, the fleet of civilian cars owned by the DOD must be reduced by 50% and the surplus cars should be sold. The SECDEF should stop riding gas-guzzling limousines and SUVs and start riding in highly-efficient cars such as Ford Mondeos.
14) The US military should exploit all unused coal reserves in the US.
15) All algae in the US must be reserved for fuel producers, so that they can produce biofuels for the US military if need be.
16) Winglets should be installed on all civilian aircraft of the DOD (C-40s, Gulfstream jets, C-32s, E-4s, VC-25s, OC-135s, WC-135s, B737s, etc.) and on all KC-10 tankers of the DOD. All future civilian aircraft that the DOD will buy must have winglets. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_757#Winglet_upgrades)
17) The USAF should replace its 4 B757s (C-32s) and its 2 B747s (VC-25s) with 4 B787s. (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/AF1-012809.xml&headline=Boeing%20Only%20Contender%20for%20New%20Air%20Force%20One)
18) WH helicopters should be available ONLY to members of the Executive Branch, and no one else. (http://www.frumforum.com/dnc-donors-paid-for-pole-dancers-plus-wh-helicopters)
19) New engines should be installed on all B737s owned by the DOD to reduce the amount of fuel consumed every year by B737s. This would mean a saving of $125,000 per year per plane. (http://www.boeing.com/Features/2011/01/bca_fuel-efficient_737_01_18_11.html)
20) LV100-5 engines should be installed on all M1 tanks of the US military, and should be made able to run on 100% Fischer-Tropsch fuel and on a 50/50 blend of diesel and FT fuel. New APUs should be installed on all M1 Abrams tanks. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M1_Abrams)
21) C-26 aircraft shall be used only as cargo aircraft, not as antinarcotics aircraft. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C-26_Metroliner)
22) All American military installations, academies, colleges and office buildings (such as the Pentagon building) should be provided with electricity exclusively by nuclear reactors, hydroelectric plants, NG electric plants, and coal electric plants.
23) The statute which prohibits the US government to buy synthetic fuel which emits more CO2 when produced than oil-derived fuels must be repealed. The DOD should not sequestrate the CO2 emitted when such fuel is produced, but it should use biomass as well as coal and natural gas to produce such fuel. Similarly, Section #526 of the 2008 NDAA must be repealed. (http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3969089&c=FEA&s=TEC) Biomass should be used to produce synthetic fuel only when it becomes as cheap as coal. When it does, a sufficient amount of biomass should be reserved for the US military.
24) The US military should use Fischer-Tropsch fuel (alongside petroleum-derived fuels) to propel its tanks, IFVs, APCs, MLRSes, trucks, generators and heaters. (http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3969089&c=FEA&s=TEC) When buying synthetic fuel for any purposes, the US military should not discriminate against foreign synthetic fuel producers.
25) When buying synthetic fuel, the US military should require that synthetic fuel be derived from lignite or other cheap genres of coal. This will guarantee that the US military will always buy the cheapest genre of fuel possible. Other genres of coal are also acceptable, however. (http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3969089&c=FEA&s=TEC)
26) All bases and buildings of the DOD should be thermically isolated. (http://lci.tf1.fr/science/environnement/2010-04/l-armee-americaine-se-met-au-vert-5824550.html)
27) The DOD must not use any foodstock plants as sources of fuel. (http://lci.tf1.fr/science/environnement/2010-04/l-armee-americaine-se-met-au-vert-5824550.html)
28) All of the DOD’s green programs, including those of the Air Force, including all DOD wind turbine programs, must be terminated. As reported by Sen. Coburn in December 2011: “The Air Force attempted a $14 million construction project to convert three Alaskan radar
stations from diesel to wind turbine energy using stimulus funds, but had no assurance the
project was properly planned or would result in any cost savings, the Department of Defense
(DoD) Inspector General (IG) found. As a result, the IG told the Air Force to shut down their construction efforts at one station
altogether, and to consider ending the other two before spending more taxpayer funds on the botched effort. The Air Force undertook the project with stimulus money earmarked for “shovel-ready” projects. But the IG found the turbine idea wasn’t “shovel-ready” when the Air Force committed to it. “[DoD] did not ensure that the three wind turbine projects. . . were adequately planned,” the IG wrote in an October 2011 report. “As a result, DoD cannot ensure that the three wind turbine projects are viable, that [DoD] personnel appropriately selected the projects for Recovery Act funding, and that Recovery Act funds were appropriately used.” As a result of the audit, the Air Force has decided to cancel construction on one of the turbines. But the unspent money from that turbine won’t be saved –– they will use part of it to pay for cost overruns on the other two turbines. If there is any money left over after that, the Pentagon says, it won’t go back to the Treasury, but will be spent on “additional, appropriate. .. project(s) yet to be identified.” (http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=b69a6ebd-7ebe-41b7-bb03-c25a5e194365)
29) The DOD should stop trying to “green” fighterplanes (including F/A-18 jets). (http://lci.tf1.fr/science/environnement/2010-04/l-armee-americaine-se-met-au-vert-5824550.html; http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2010/04/22/341032/navy-green-hornet-goes-supersonic-with-biofuel.html; http://www.wpafb.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123197414)
30) The DOD should review all of its infrastructure in the US and abroad (including all of its buildings). Those that are not needed and will never again be needed should be dismantled so that they can be taken off the books and so that the DOD will no longer need to maintain them (and to save energy costs). In the case of DOD infrastructure abroad, unneeded infrastructure should be returned to the host countries. (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wVhh8gqXSUA)
31) A military counterpart of the following hydrogen fuel research program should be created at the DARPA. It must be well-funded and made a priority program of the DARPA. http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2010/04/cheap_energy_and_genetic_engin.html; http://www.scientificamerican.com/podcast/episode.cfm?id=engineered-virus-harnesses-light-to-10-04-14
32) All civilian vehicles of the DOD and the rest of the US government must be fit for a 50/50 blend of FT fuel and casual gasoline, as well as for 100% Fischer-Tropsch fuel, or alternatively, LPG engines. Likewise, the DOD’s SUVs, MRAPVs, tanks, APCs, IFVs, and ships should also have flexible-fuel engines capable of running on LPG or its derivatives.
33) Notwithstanding the above policies, the DOD should always buy the cheapeast available fuel, regardless of whether it’s ordinary kerosene or something else.
34) When buying algae-derived fuel (if at all), the DOD should buy only algae-derived fuel produced from an algae fermentor, not from an algae pond (except when the price of oil is above $70/bbl) nor a PBR. It should also produce oil from algae from Kentucky and Florida bogs and from Chesapeake Bay. (http://oilprice.com/Alternative-Energy/Biofuels/5-Issues-with-Algae-Fuels.html)
35) B-52s (including the B-52s from AMARC that will be recommissioned) and E-3s should receive new, fuel-efficient engines.
36) The entire civilian vehicle fleet of the DOD (and the rest of the federal government), and if possible, all light-armored ground vehicles of the DOD (including Humvees and MRAP vehicles) and conventionally-propelled USN ships should have their engines replaced with LPG-propelled engines to wean the DOD off oil-derived fuels. Similarly, oil should not be used to heat DOD buildings – natural gas, coal, electric devices, geothermal devices, and solar devices should be. The federal government’s car fleet (including the car fleet of the DOD) should be reduced by 50%.
37) Economies of scale must be implemented to ensure that alternative fuels are financially viable (i.e. that they do not cost more than regular fuels). (http://www.wpafb.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123197414)
38) The T55 engines of all H-47 Chinook helicopters must be replaced with new engines to reduce their fuel consumption rate by 1/3 and costs by 1/2. (http://www.vectorsite.net/avch47_2.html#m4)
40) All new civilian aircraft bought by the DOD must be equipped with winglets.
41) New engines, ones which will save 19% of the fuel consumed by E-3 aircraft, should be installed on E-3 planes. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E-3_Sentry#Future_direction)
42) When the First Lady travels anywhere, she should never use the USAF’s VC-25s (B747s); instead, she should use smaller aircraft such as B757s or Gulfstream jets. Similarly, the President of the United States should, whenever possible, use one of the USAF’s 4 B757s or Gulfstream jets rather than B747s. (http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/nilegardiner/100050002/the-obama-presidency-increasingly-resembles-a-modern-day-ancien-regime-extravagant-and-out-of-touch-with-ordinary-people/)
43) All tents of the US military should be foam insulated and have solar batteries; the US military should buy tents that have solar batteries en masse to equip all of its infantry units. All buildings of the DOD which the DOD does not plan to close or sell should be thermally-isolated. (http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=61265)
44) The US military should immediately stop fueling its ground vehicles and conventional ships with regular diesel and start fueling them with Fischer-Tropsch fuel (or a blend of FT fuel and regular diesel), which should be derived from coal, peat or wastewood.
45) This equipment should be standard gear for all US Army and USMC units. (http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/01/afghanistans-green-marines-cut-fuel-use-by-90-percent/; http://www.usmc.mil/unit/1stmardiv/Pages/RenewableenergyvitaltoMarinessuccessinAfghanistan.aspx)
46) These fuels and policies should be implemented: http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2011/01/fueling_the_future_british_sci.html; http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2011/01/the_energy_technology_breakthr.html
47) The mandate on the DOD to derive 25% of its electricity from renewable sources by 2025 (codified in Section 2911(e) of Title 10 of the United States Code) must be repealed IMMEDIATELY. If the Congress refuses to repeal it, the President and the DOD should announce that they will refuse to abide by it. (http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/06/Capability-Not-Politics-Should-Drive-DOD-Energy-Research) Similarly, Secretary Mabus’s mandate that the Navy must derive 50% of its energy from “renewable sources” by 2020 must be repealed. (http://spectator.org/archives/2012/02/20/tar-and-feathers-for-ray-mabus)
48) The Army should designate further “pilot net zero installations”, and the other Services should designate their first such installations.
49) Any alternative energy sources should be used only if they reduce costs or increase military capabilities. (http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/06/Capability-Not-Politics-Should-Drive-DOD-Energy-Research)
50) No long-term contracts based on price floors for anything, fuel or anything else, shall be signed by the DOD. (http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/06/Capability-Not-Politics-Should-Drive-DOD-Energy-Research)
51) As the Heritage Foundation recommends, “Establish a capabilities-based determination on the best way to ensure secure domestic base energy supplies. An over-reliance on the U.S. electricity grid is emerging as a concern for some military planners. An attack on the civilian grid could leave domestic military bases without power. While this fear may be legitimate, by itself it does not justify alternative energy investments.” (http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/06/Capability-Not-Politics-Should-Drive-DOD-Energy-Research)
52) No greenhouse gas emissions limitations should be imposed on the DOD. Any such limitations must be repealed. (http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/06/Capability-Not-Politics-Should-Drive-DOD-Energy-Research)
53) The DOD should recycle all of its metal, plastic, and paper waste.
54) Neither the White House nor the DOD nor the Congress should mandate any expensive alternatives to fossil fuels. (http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/06/Capability-Not-Politics-Should-Drive-DOD-Energy-Research)
55) The DOD shall buy only traditional lightbulbs (which are much cheaper than fluorescent bulbs). (http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/01/green_follies_escalate_in_the.html)
56) In the CONUS, in Japan, and in South Korea, for heavy ground vehicles, and cargo, the DOD should use trains rather than road transport or aircraft transport, wherever possible.
57) DOD officials should significantly reduce their travel budgets and the distance, number, and frequency of the trips they make.
58) Solar-energy-generators and solar batteries should be used en masse not only at forward bases in Afghanistan, but also in Baghdad’s Green Zone, Australia, Djibouti, Qatar, Bahrain, Turkey, Italy, CA, AZ, NM, TX, and NV.
59) The DOD should look at what ISR units, air traffic control centers, and bases to merge.
60) The USAF needs to dramatically reduce its fuel bill by all available means, including reducing some operations, greater use of economically-viable alternative fuels (including those derived from natural gas, coal, wood waste, algae, and other plants), installing new, more efficient engines on aircraft, thermal insulation of needed buildings, and razing unneeded buildings. The DOD must NEVER raid procurement or R&D accounts to pay for fuel costs. (http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2012/July%202012/0712fuel.aspx)
61) The DOD should use the new, under-development, more fuel efficient jet engines currently under development for all of its future fighter and strike aircraft if they would be as capable as current engines. (http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/event.cfm?eventid=4524091e5e23bac1de879989501622ee&autostart=true, 97:00)
62) LED lights should be used wherever possible, including at all DOD buildings. (http://defense.aol.com/2012/09/12/marines-navy-march-into-fiscal-valley-forge/?icid=related1)
63) The Navy’s program of producing JP-5 fuel from seawater must be capable of producing that fuel at the same or lower cost as conventional fuel. If seawater-derived fuel cannot be made competitive, the program should be terminated.
F) PERSONNEL REDUCTION
1) Reduce the aggregate number of civilian employees of the three service departments by at least 50%; the number of DOD speechwriters must be reduced by 50%; the number of DOD advisors must be reduced by 25%.
2) Radically reduce the number of generals and admirals, to no more than 776 (the pre-9/11/2001 number) from the current number (876), and preferrably to 700. Also, reduce the number of DOD civilian employees to the CY2000 level. This means that the growth of the number of generals, admirals and DOD civilian employees since 2000 must be completely reversed. (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/ranks.htm;http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=13782) Furthermore, the military should cancel and revoke its plans to lay off (pinkslip) captains, majors, and colonels, and instead radically reduce the number of generals and admirals, to no more than 700. Retiring OF-3 to OF-6 rank officers, who are at their prime, makes no sense. Analyst Kerry Payton estimates this number to be 919, not 876, as of 11-5-2011. It should be reduced, in any case, to no more than 700. The number of Navy admirals should be reduced from 336 to no more than 250, i.e. by 86. (http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2011/11/dod_mismanages_its_force_reduction_program.html; http://spectator.org/archives/2012/02/20/tar-and-feathers-for-ray-mabus)
3) The annual cost of military personnel (which was $170 bn in FY2010), on the whole, must be radically reduced, by no less than $40 bn, and its inflation-adjusted growth must be stopped. Salaries and privileges must be reviewed. The DOD must also invent a system that will be generous enough to recruit and retain high-quality people, but not one that will cause the DOD to collapse under the weight of personnel costs like GM and Chrysler did. (http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1508)
4) Dual-hat some commands and merge others (e.g. the US Army’s FORSCOM should be merged with the Army’s SDDC, and the Army’s Materiel Command should be merged with the Army’s AASC);
5) Replace the 3 Seawolf-class SSNs with 3 Virginia-class submarines when the Seawolf-class retires;
6) Cap the salaries of all civilian employees of the DOD.
7) Require that every new ship program reduce the number of personnel required for 1 ship in comparison to the ship program it is replacing (the Gerald R Ford class is supposed to require 25% fewer crewmen than the Nimitz class); and
(8) On the whole, the number of the DOD’s civilian personnel (800,000 people as of September 2011) should be reduced, on the whole, by at least 20% through attrition (replacing only 50% of retiring civilian DOD employees), even taking hirings of significant numbers of civilian DOD personnel for tasks such as acquisition into account. The system of salaries and pensions for these civilian employees must be reformed so that its cost will be reduced in real terms. (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304584004576416271311589238.html?mod=googlenews_wsjv)
9) The posts of the Vice Chairman of the JCS, and the Administrative Advisor of the SECAF should be abolished as should be the entire Environmental Division of the CNO’s Office the AFIS and the AFPS; the military bands of the USAF, of the USMC, of the USN and of the US Army (except their central bands) should be dissolved.
10) The Honor Guards of the four services of the DOD should be reduced by 50%. The 3rd Infantry Regiment of the US Army should be reduced to 1 battalion.
11) The Army’s PSYOPS group, the 4th PSYOPS group, should be disbanded. It’s a useless propaganda unit. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4th_Psychological_Operations_Group)
12) The aggregate number of Soldiers and Marines should be initially capped at the 2009 treshold and then reduced further.
13) The US Army’s NASCAR team should be abolished. (http://www.army.mil/-images/2009/07/13/44751/army.mil-44751-2009-07-14-070737.jpg)
14) The US government should abolish the CIA and assign its functions to other intel agencies (e.g. the DIA). It should also create a dedicated counterintel agency at the DOD.
15) Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Asian part of Russia should be added to the AO responsibility of the USPACOM. The US Africa Command should be disbanded; Africa should become an AOR of the US Central Command. Israel and the rest of Asia Minor, should be added to the AOR of the USCENTCOM, too.
16) The presidential helicopter fleet should be replaced with 14 VH-60 helicopters. No separate program for that purpose is needed, these 14 VH-60s should be derivates of H-60s.
17) The Naval Historical Center and the Army Historical Center shall be abolished, and all historians employed by the DOD except the historians at military universities shall be retired and not replaced.
18) The Joint Staff’s personnel should be reduced by at least 25%; the Air Staff’s personnel and the Naval Staff’s personnel should both be reduced by 10%. The personnel of the Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy of the JCS should be reduced by at least 25%. (http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bioID=6545)
19) The US Strategic Command’s Center for Combating WMDs should be abolished. The Civil Affairs Commands of the US Army should be merged to form 2 commands, one on the East Coast and the other one on the West Coast (in CA); their personnel should be reduced by 50%. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Army_Civil_Affairs_and_Psychological_Operations_Command)
20) The staff of every Marine and Army division should be reduced by at least 10%, as should be the number of personnel at each geographic AF command and at each Numbered Air Force except the 18th AF. Even better, Army divisions and numbered AFs should be abolished entirely.
21) The staff of each task force should be reduced by at least 10%. The JFCOM (including the personnel the Strategy and Policy Directorate) and the AFRICOM should be dissolved. The HQ personnel of every other unified combatant command (the geographic and functional commands alike) must be reduced to pre-2001 levels. This means laying off 694 employees of the OSD, 30 employees of the Joint Staff, 1405 employees of the Dept. of the Army, 517 employees of the Dept. of the Air Force, 2,007 employees of the CENTCOM, 1,391 employees of the EUCOM, 9 employees of NATO, 37 employees of NORAD, 776 employees of the PACOM, 1831 employees of the SOCOM, 881 employees of the SOUTHCOM, 1581 employees of the Strategic Command, and 341 employees of the TRANSCOM (11,500 people in total). In the case of the NORTHCOM and the AFRICOM, which did not exist in 2000, the number should be reduced by 50% (by 745 people and 742 people, respectively). That would be a total of 12, 987 DOD HQ employees. Unfortunately, these numbers have grown at all DOD commands since 2000, even at the EUCOM, even though since 2000 the DOD has withdrawn tens of thousands of military personnel from Europe. Gates would only freeze the number of HQ personnel. The total HQ personnel numbers and post-2000 HQ personnel growth rates for each command and Military Department are available at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/43794546/DoD-HQ-Staff-Comparisons-2000-2010
Complete data on HQ personnel of each command and each Military Department as well as the Joint Staff should be provided to the Congress, and Sen. Webb’s questions should be answered. (http://webb.senate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/11-24-2010-01.cfm)
22) The number of officers should be reduced if it can be done in a way that would ensure that this policy doesn’t weaken the US military. The current number of American military officers who are not generals or warrant officers is 209,878. The total current number of American military officers is 226,565. (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/ranks.htm)
23) Replace all C-130E-Hs with Super Hercules planes, because according to the USAF’s website, “The C-130J is the latest addition to the C-130 fleet and will replace aging C-130E’s. The C-130J incorporates state-of-the-art technology to reduce manpower requirements, lower operating and support costs, and provides life-cycle cost savings over earlier C-130 models. Compared to older C-130s, the J model climbs faster and higher, flies farther at a higher cruise speed, and takes off and lands in a shorter distance. The C-130J-30 is a stretch version, adding 15 feet to fuselage, increasing usable space in the cargo compartment.
C-130J/J-30 major system improvements include: advanced two-pilot flight station with fully integrated digital avionics; color multifunctional liquid crystal displays and head-up displays; state-of-the-art navigation systems with dual inertial navigation system and global positioning system; fully integrated defensive systems; low-power color radar; digital moving map display; new turboprop engines with six-bladed, all-composite propellers; digital auto pilot; improved fuel, environmental and ice-protection systems; and an enhanced cargo-handling system.” – http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=92
24) The next generation of attack submarines should be as automated as the Russian Graney class, so that the crew of one submarine will be reduced to only 50 crewmembers. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graney_class_submarine)
25) On top of the above reductions, the DOD should retire the 14,650 Air Force personnel (but not the 2,477 Navy sailors) hired in 2009 (under the FY2010 budget), and completely reverse the Bush expansion of military by 100,000 men (the “Grow the Army Initiative” and the “grow the USMC program”). Update: Sec. Panetta has proposed to cut the military by some 95,000-100,000 personnel; this is not sufficient.
26) On top of the above reductions, the increase of the number of military personnel proposed by Sen. Joe Lieberman in 2009 should be reversed. (It is supposedly scheduled to expire in FY2013, after FY2012.)
27) On top of the above reductions, the USN, the USAF and the US Army should review whether they can afford to reduce their officer-to-enlisted-man ratio to 1:9 (the USMC’s ratio) and their civilian-to-military-man ratio to 1:15 (the USMC’s ratio). (http://www.marines.mil/unit/hqmc/cmc/Documents/090515%20–%20Gen%20Conway%20at%20CSIS.pdf)
28) On top of the above reductions, the USAF should reduce its current number of personnel from 335,000 to 331,700 (the authorized number), and resume its 2002 plan to lay off additional 40,000 airmen. (http://www.stripes.com/news/air-force-to-cut-2-300-officers-from-its-rolls-1.133672)
27) On the whole, the number of military personnel (counting Guardsmen, Reservists and AC personnel together) should not exceed 2.2 million. The number of Army combat personnel should be reduced to its pre-2008 level, but not lower. The Marine Corps should likewise reduce its end-strength, but not to fewer than 182,100 men (6,100 Marines above its normal active-duty size before 2008), and must always retain its basic force structure (3 active duty MEFs, each one including a Marine Division, a MAW, and logistical units). 175,000 active-duty Marines is the absolute minimum.
28) The number of contractors must be significantly reduced; the annual cost of contractors and the annual cost of contractors must be frozen at the FY2011 level (in real terms) and then reduced significantly every year for the next 10 FYs – eventually down to the FY2001 level. The resulting annual savings would be $23.7 bn per year in FY2012 dollars. In Iraq and Afghanistan, in the past decade, contractors wasted $12 mn per day. Additionally, DOD personnel, military and civilian, should perform most of the tasks now performed by DOD contractors.
G) SHIP AND PLANE RETIREMENTS
1) Retire all obsolete aircraft as soon as their replacements arrive. By “obsolete aircraft” I mean aircraft that can neither fly nor fight. For example, the USAF’s entire Hercules fleet of the non-Super-Hercules variants should be replaced by Super Hercules planes (as should be the Hercules planes of the non-Super-Hercules variants owned by foreign AFs); the USMC’s KC-130 tanker fleet should be replaced by tankers derived from Super Hercules planes. The USAF’s obsolete CSAR helicopters should be replaced with new MH-53 or new MH-60 helicopters, or other CSAR or multi-purpose helicopters, but these must be new. All E-3 AWACSes should be replaced with E-10 jets. The Army should reclaim all H-57 helicopters parked at AMARC for spare parts or recommission them and modify them for the CSARH role.
2) Offer the aircraft carriers USS Constellation and USS John F Kennedy to India (or any other country) if India (or any other country) pays for these ships and refits them. If not, scrap them.
3) Strip the two remaining reserve battleships of the USN, the USS Iowa and the USS Wisconsin (and two decommissioned battleships, USS Alabama and USS Massachusetts) of their guns, then sell the 2 reserve battleships (Iowa and Wisconsin) to scrappers. The guns themselves should be used to arm two monitors that should be ordered.
4) All KA-planes, A-4 jets and F-4 planes parked at AMARC should be sold to the IAF, the Luftwaffe, the Argentine AF, the Japanese AF, the Turkish AF, or the ROKAF. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F-4_Phantom_II_non-U.S._operators) All SH-2 helicopters parked at AMARC should be sold to the RNZAF. All C-9 and DC-9 planes parked at AMARC should be sold to Third World airlines.
5) The Spruance class vessel still moored in a reserve fleet should be sold, not sunk; USS Barry should be scrapped; CG-47-49 and CG-51 should be recommissioned and upgraded with the Aegis BMD system; no American ships should be sunk by the USN; the USN must not donate any ships as museum ships.
6) All obsolete ships in American reserve fleets (i.e. all ships in those fleets except modern ones like those of the Ticonderoga class and Los Angeles submarines, which should all be recomissioned except those LA class submarines whose lives have ended) should be sold or scrapped to earn money for new weapons. All 4 Forrestal class aircraft carriers and the ex-Kennedy should be scrapped. Alternatively, the USN should implement James Brinton’s plan for a Great White Fleet of 3 decommissioned, demilitarized aircraft carriers (funded by private charities and foreign governments,manned by civilians) that would conduct humanitarian operations in lieu of USN ships (thus saving the DOD and taxpayers money, time, and equipment). (http://spectator.org/archives/2011/03/18/a-great-white-fleet-for-the-21/1#commentcontainer) The USN’s reserve fleets (mothballed fleets) currently number 251 ships. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghost_fleet; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Navy_reserve_fleets#List_of_USN_reserve_fleets; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_River_Reserve_Fleet)
7) All F-16s, F-15s and F/A-18s that are too old to fly or cannot fly for any other reason must be cannibalized for spare parts. All F-15s and F-16s that are flyable should be recommissioned as interim aircraft to replace retiring F-15s and F-16s. This means that all F-15s and F-16s which are not too old to fly should continue to serve the USAF. All F/A-18s which are flyable should be recommissioned as interim aircraft to replace retiring F/A-18s.
All S-2s parked at AMARC should be sold to Taiwan, as should be some S-3s parked at AMARC. (Alternatively, all S-2 planes should be sold to the Government of California. (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X721NfyQTQo)
All T-2s parked at AMARC should be sold to Greece.
9) The USS Tarawa (LHA-1) should be recommissioned, not sunk. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Tarawa_(LHA-1) )
10) All 7 C-20s (i.e. Gulfstream-III jets) should be retired and sold to private owners. All C-32 (B757) aircraft of the USAF should be retired and replaced with 2 B787 jets. 3 of the 9 Gulfstream-V jets of the USAF should be mothballed at AMARC.
11) The Pentagon should give 12 of the Hercules planes parked at AMARC to the RAF; it should then reclaim (i.e. use for spare parts) all other aircraft (incl. B-1s, B-52s, C-5s and A-10s) parked at AMARC (except F-15s, F-16s and A-6s, which should be recommissioned and kept in service as interim aircraft until additional F-35s are ordered, if they are ever ordered) to keep the US military’s aircraft flyable. (Note: the currently planned Pentagon figure of 2443 F-35s for the entire military is woefully inadequate, as was the previous DOD figure of 2543 F-35s.) At the same time, the DOD should continually buy spare parts and upgrades for F-15s and F-16s, taking advantage of the still-open F-15 and F-16 production lines, and continually modernize F-15s, F-16s and A-10s to keep them flying for as long as possible (to prevent a “fighterplane gap”).
12) Old ships and planes (e.g. old C-130s, F-4s and A-4s from AMARC) should be sold, as weapons or as spare parts, to foreign countries to raise money for the procurement of new weapons. Likewise, excess Predator and Reaper drones should be sold to foreign countries.
13) The DOD should sell all of its decommissioned, obsolete C-130s except those that can be used for cannibalization (reclamation). It should also sell some of its F-111s to Australia to help it recover the capability lost when its F-111s were retired. The DOD should also see if it can sell some of its helicopters parked at AMARC to foreign countries or private customers.
14) The DOD should sell its remaining C-9 and its sole remaining C-22 (Boeing 727) to Sun Country Airlines or some other airline. When 4 replacement aircraft for the DOD’s B757s are delivered, these B757s should also be sold to Sun Country Airlines. The DOD’s fleet of ANG troop transport and non-Gulfstream VIP transport aircraft should be consolidated into a fleet of B737s and B787s and operated like a no frills airline.
15) Congress should give the USAF the authority to retire any obsolete aircraft.
16) Some A-10 and F-16 aircraft should be retired and replaced by less expensive platforms. The DOD should consider ordering ground attack drones to replace A-10s. In Afghanistan and other COIN environments, A-10s and drones rather than expensive-to-operate manned aircraft like the F-15 and the F-16, should be used. Obsolete fighters such as the F-15 and the F-16 should be retired as soon as they reach the end of their operational service lives and these lives cannot be prolonged.
17) Buying and maintaining firefighting aircraft should be the exclusive responsibility of state governments. When they acquire such aircraft, the DOD should sell or retire its firefighting C-130s or use them only for cargo-carrying purposes.
18) EC-130 aircraft should be retired.
H) BRAC POLICY
1) A new BRAC round should be implemented (Fort Devens, Picatinny Arsenal, Fort Gordon, Bicycle Lake Army Airfield, Heslar Naval Armory, NSA New Orleans, NASJRB New Orleans, Henderson Hall, Camp Kilmer, Navy Broadway Complex, NSF Anacostia, NSF Thurmont (AKA Camp David), the Naval Observatory in DC, the 70th Regional RC, the the 96th Regional RC, the 77th RRC, Carlisle Barracks, DC Marine Barracks, Fort Lee, Fort Chaffee, Fort Myer, NIMSF Philadelphia, Pitt US Army Reserve Center, Fort Totten (with the USAFRC), Fort Hamilton, Fort Jackson, Fort Shafter and Gunter Annex should be closed during that round and sold). Fort Gillem was recommended for closure as early as 2005, and Fort Chaffee no longer houses any military units. This article recommends the closure of 1 USAF, 1 USMC, 19 Army and 7 Navy big installations, a total of 28 big military installations, plus 1 small USMC installation (Henderson Hall) and 1 small USAF installation (Bellows AFS), on the condition that these bases would not be occupied by American troopers returning from abroad. This would be the third-biggest BRAC round in history.
2) The US Army, Pacific command (and all other units based at Fort Shafter) should be relocated to Schofield Barracks; subsequently, the DOD should close Fort Shafter.
3) All retired ships mothballed at NIMSF Philadelphia should be moved to other NIMSFs.
4) All units and persons based at Fort Myer should be moved to Fort Belvoir or Fort Meade. Afterwards, Fort Myer should be closed and sold during a BRAC round. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_Myer)
5) The US Army’s Reserve Command, Forces Command and Central Command, and the IMC for the Southeast should be moved to other Forts. Afterwards, Fort McPherson shall be closed during a BRAC round and sold.
6) All units stationed at Cannon AFB should be moved to the Hurlburt base (FL), which should be renamed Hurlburt-Johnson AFB (after Donald Hurlburt and Clarence Johnson). Subsequently, Cannon AFB should be reserved for the USAF wings that will come back from Europe. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cannon_Air_Force_Base#BRAC_2005)
7) The unit stationed at Henderson Hall should be moved to Quantico (VA). Afterwards, Henderson Hall should be closed, together with Fort Myer.
(8) All units and equipment based at Cheyenne Mountain Station should be moved to Peterson AFB. Cheyenne Mountain Station should not be closed, however. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cheyenne_Mountain_Air_Force_Station)
9) The DOD should close Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, Kittery, ME; Relocate the ship depot repair function to Naval Shipyard Norfolk, VA, Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility Pearl Harbor, HI and Naval Shipyard Puget Sound, WA; Relocate the Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning and Procurement Command to Naval Shipyard Norfolk. DOD recommended to close NSY Portsmouth as early as 2005, but the BRAC Commission removed the NSY from the list. The DOD doesn’t need NSY Portsmouth because it has 2 NSYs in the Pacific area (Puget Sound and Pearl Harbor) and 1 on the East Coast (NSY Norfolk).
10) The entire 42nd Airbase wing should be based at Maxwell AFB. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/42d_Air_Base_Wing)
11) The wings which would come back to the US under this plan (including 1 tanker wing from Britain, 1 F-16/A-10 wing from Germany, and 1 fighterplane wing from Italy) should be based at Jacksonville AGS (FL), Otis AFB (MA) and Cannon AFB (NM) (which should remain open).
12) The DOD should distribute the eight C-130H aircraft of the 914th Airlift Wing (AFR) to the 314th Airlift Wing, Little Rock Air Force Base, AR. The 914th’s headquarters moves to Langley Air Force Base, VA, the Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) realigns to the 310th Space Group (AFR) at Schriever Air Force Base, CO, and the Civil Engineering Squadron moves to Lackland Air Force Base, TX. Also at Niagara, distribute the eight KC-135R aircraft of the 107th Air Refueling Wing (ANG) to the 101st Air Refueling Wing (ANG), Bangor International Airport Air Guard Station, ME. The 101st will subsequently distribute the remaining 8 tankers to Bangor AGS, and 16-17 new C-130Js should be ordered and parked at Niagara, and a new Airlift Wing should be established at that base.
13) The 77th Brigade of the US Army and the AFRC (Reserve Center) should be relocated from Fort Totten to Fort Dix. Subsequently, Fort Totten should be closed.
14) The 2nd Battalion, 228th Aviation Regiment, of the 244th Aviation Brigade of the US Army should be relocated from Horsham (PA) to Fort Eustis (VA).
15) The Pitt US Army Reserve Center should be relocated to Fort Dix (NJ).
16) The 416th Theater Engineer Command should be relocated from Illinois to Vicksburg (MS). (http://www.usar.army.mil/arweb/organization/commandstructure/USARC/OPS/Pages/default.aspx)
17) The 80th Training Command (TASS) should be relocated from Richmond (VA) to Fort Lee or Fort Pickett. (http://www.usar.army.mil/arweb/organization/commandstructure/USARC/TNG/Pages/default.aspx)
18) The 70th Regional RC (based in Seattle, WA) and the 96th Regional RC (based in SLC, UT) should be relocated to Los Alamitos (CA) and merged with the 63rd Regional RC based in Los Alamitos. The 77th RRC should be relocated to Moon Township (PA) and merged with the 99th RRC based there. The 88th RRC should be relocated from Fort Snelling (MN) to Fort McCoy (WI). (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Army_Reserve_Regional_Readiness_Commands)
19) NB Point Loma, which is located in San Diego, should be merged with NB San Diego.
20) The tenants of NSF Anacostia should be relocated as follows:
a) Commander, Naval Installations; the Naval OSC; the Naval Media Center; and the Naval Research Laboratory – to the DC Navy Yard;
b) the DOD Inspector General and the Office of Chief of Information – to the Pentagon;
c) the Marine Helicopter Squadron (HMX-1) and the Marine FRC – to USMC base Quantico;
d) the DC Army National Guard – to Fort McNair (DC);
e) the WH Communications Agency – to the WH, Fort Meade or Andrews AFB;
f) Construction Battalion Unit 422 of the Navy – to the closest naval base or USMC base (preferrably USMC Base Quantico).
Subsequently, NSF Anacostia should be closed.
21) NSF Thurmont (AKA Camp David) should be closed during a BRAC round and subsequently transferred to the Executive Office of the President.
22) The former Fort Missoula and the former Camp Lockett should be sold.
23) Bellows AFS should be closed, and instead, NAS Key West should become the military’s holiday resort.
24) The HQ of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing should be relocated to NAS Key West (the wing’s units are scattered throghout the US). The Commander of the NF Reserve Command and the Commander of the NAF Reserve should also relocate to NAS Key West. The USMC Reserve should relocate to Camp Pendleton, as should the HQ of the 4th Marine Division (whose units, like the units of the 4th MAW, are scattered throughout the US). Subsequently, NSA New Orleans should be closed. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_Pendleton; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSA_New_Orleans)
25) All units based at NASJRB New Orleans should relocate to NAS Pensacola, NAS CC, NAS Mayport or NAS Corpus Christi. Subsequently, NASJRB New Orleans should be closed. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Air_Station_Joint_Reserve_Base_New_Orleans
26) The US Army Installation Management Command for the Northeastern Region should be relocated from Fort Hamilton (an administrative installation) to Fort Drum (also located in NY state). Subsequently, Fort Hamilton should be closed. (http://www.hamilton.army.mil/)
27) The Naval Operations Support Center Indianapolis, Marine Corps Reserve Center Indianapolis, and Naval Recruiting Station Indianapolis, as well as the United States Naval Sea Cadet Corps Cruiser Indianapolis (CA 35) and all the equipment stored at HNA, should be relocated from Heslar Naval Armory to the Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane Division (70 miles south of Indianapolis). Subsequently, the Heslar Naval Armory should be closed. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heslar_Naval_Armory; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Surface_Warfare_Center_Crane_Division)
28) The US Army Chaplain School and the US Army Drill Sergeant School should be relocated from Fort Jackson (SC) to Fort Leonard Wood or Fort Leavenw. Afterwards, Fort Jackson should be closed. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_Jackson_(South_Carolina) )
29) NAS Jacksonville and NS Mayport (located in the city of Jacksonville) should be merged.
30) All commands based at Fort Lee (VA) should relocate to Fort Eustis (VA), which is the principal logistics installation of the US Army. Subsequently, Fort Lee (VA) should be closed. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_Lee_(Virginia) )
31) The 11th Wing of the USAF and all ceremonial units should be assigned to Andrews AFB and leave Bolling AFB (as should all other agencies based at Bolling AFB except the DIA). Bolling AFB should be separated from NSF Anacostia (which should be closed) and become a base for a new CSAR helicopter wing that I would create. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bolling_AFB)
32) The Army War College should be relocated to Fort Leaven. Subsequently, Carlisle Barracks should be closed and should become a historic landmark.
33) The Navy Broadway Complex in San Diego should be closed. All institutions based there should be relocated to NS San Diego. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Navy_Broadway_Complex)
34) The SIGINT brigade currently stationed at Fort Gordon should relocate to Fort Bragg, where it was previously stationed (until 2007). All other units and agencies currently stationed at Fort Gordon, except the Eisenhower Medical Center, should be relocated to Fort Huachuca or Fort Meade. Subsequently, Fort Gordon should be closed.
35) The USMC’s Mobilization Command should relocate to San Diego; the Army’s Richards-Gebaur Army Reserve Center (MO) should be relocated to Fort Leonard Wood (MO); United States Army Reserve’s 308th Tactical Psychological Operations Company should relocate to Fort Leonard Wood or another installation. Consequently, the DOD should stop Rusing the already-closed Richards-Gebaur AFB. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richards-Gebaur_Air_Force_Base; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marine_Corps_Mobilization_Command)
36) All units based at Bicycle Lake Army Airfield should relocate to Los Alamitos Army Airfield. Subsequently, Bicycle Lake Army Airfield should be closed, but retained by the DOD as its property. (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/bicycle-lake.htm)
37) Both Navy Air Test and Evaluation Squadrons based at NAS Point Mugu (Squadrons #9 and #30) should relocate to NWS China Lake.
38) The National War College should be relocated to Fort Leaven. and merged with the Command and General Staff College. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Defense_University#National_War_College; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command_and_General_Staff_College)
39) The Marine Corps Institute should be relocated from the Washington Navy Yard to MCB Quantico; the Naval Systems Command HQ, the Navy JAG Corps HQ, the NCIS and the Naval Reactors HQ should be relocated from the WNY to the Pentagon. The CNO should relocate from the WNY to the DC Naval Observatory (the residence of the Vice President of the United States). The WNY should serve only as a museum. Eventually, the WNY should be closed as a military installation and ceded to the Department of the Interior.
40) NS San Diego should be merged with NAB Coronado (which is on the opposite side of the SD harbor and is connected to SD by a bridge) and MCAS Miramar (which is just a little far from the city of San Diego). Hurlburt field should be merged with Eglin AFB, which it serves and to which it was subordinated before 1955. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurlburt_Field#History) NS Mayport should be merged with NAS Jacksonville.
41) The ex-USS Barry and all other museums located at the WNY should be relocated to NS Great Lakes, IL. Subsequently, the WNY should be closed. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Station_Great_Lakes)
42) All tenants of the DC Marine Barracks should relocate to Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA, located in the Prince William County, which shares a boundary with DC (the Potomac River). Subsequently, the DC Marine Barracks should be closed. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marine_Barracks,_Washington,_D.C.)
43) Dobbins AFRB and NAS Atlanta (a Georgia National Guard facility) should be merged (the two installations share runways). (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dobbins_Air_Reserve_Base)
44) Some closed bases and bases slated for closure should be used as locations for new nuclear electric plants if they’re suitable. Usually, it is difficult to find a location for a new NEP. The DOD should identify and designate those military bases and former military bases which would be good locations for NEPs. (http://www.americansolutions.com/solutionsacademy/wiki/index.php/Nuclear_Energy)
45) Hurlburt Field should be merged with Eglin AFB, which it serves. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurlburt_Field)
46) Fort Drum should be merged with Wheeler Army Airfield.
47) Fort Devens should be closed; all troopers and vehicles stationed there should be relocated to Camp Edwards. During the 1930s, the National Guard recognized that the then-Camp-Devens was too small. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_Edwards)
48) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, any base closure policy or base realignment policy must at least be cost-neutral, if not produce net savings. The mistakes of the 2005 BRAC round, which so far has produced net costs rather than net savings, must not be repeated. (http://blog.heritage.org/2011/05/23/defense-spending-hold-the-line/)
49) All unused DOD land and office property, including all unused former military bases, should be sold to the highest bidder.
50) Fort Ord should be sold to a real estate developer who will build something on that property. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_Ord)
51) The entire BRAC process needs to be reformed. The SECDEF should not start it by certifying that he knows that savings can be accrued through a new BRAC round. Instead, the SECDEF should request that the Congress authorize a new BRAC round and establish a BRAC commission; the Congress should be required to vote on such a request within 30 days of its receipt; Congress should then establish a BRAC commission to investigate if a BRAC round would indeed bring about savings and what specific bases should be closed; and when the commission publishes its findings, Congress should have 60 days to vote on it (accepting or rejecting it completely), and if it doesn’t vote, the findings shall automatically become law.
51) NASJRB Willow Grove, PA, and other unneeded bases in PA should be closed.
I) POLICY ON VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULTS
1) All reported perpetrators should, if there is sufficient evidence after an Article 32 procedure, be tried by a court-martial, but not if there’s insufficient evidence. “According to DoD statistics, only 181 out of 2,212 subjects investigated for sexual assault in 2007, including 1,259 reports of rape, were referred to courts-martial.” – http://harman.house.gov/2008/09/9-30Hill.shtml
2) The superiors of the alleged perpetrators may use “nonjudicial punishment”, but must always refer these alleged perpetrators to a JAG to conduct an Article 32 investigation and, if there is sufficient evidence, to courts-martial.
3) Every sexually-assaulted servicewoman shall have the right to relocate to another base.
4) Sexual assault victims should never be subjected to “investigations for disciplinary violations”, nor to restrictions. (http://www.defense.gov/news/Sep2003/d20030922usafareport.pdf, page #33)
5) Every victim who reports her sexual predator to the appropriate authorities should be rewarded with an amnesty. (http://www.defense.gov/news/Sep2003/d20030922usafareport.pdf, page #33)
6) Besides any punishment that a court-martial orders, all convicted sexual assault perpetrators should also be deprived of their entire salaries and of all medals and demoted to the lowest officer rank or the lowest enlisted rank, depending on whether the perpetrator is an officer or an enlisted trooper. (http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/03/17/eveningnews/main4872713.shtml)
7) Client-attorney privilege should be guaranteed to every victim of sexual assault who reports a sexual assault.
(8) Every reported sexual assault should be investigated and, if sufficient evidence is found during an Article 32 investigation, referred to a court martial. However, no case should be referred to court martial if there is insufficient evidence, and NO ONE shall be punished without bulletproof, irrefutable evidence that he did commit a sexual assault.
9) The DOD should not hire any additional lawyers, but should instead enlist (at no cost to taxpayers) volunteer organizations that provide legal counsel to victims of sexual assaults. These victims should have unlimited access to these organizations.
10) During Basic Military Training, trainees should be prohibited from using the Internet and cellphones. Fraternization should be severely punished, as should be sexual harassment/assaults.
11) The epidemic of sexual assaults that occurred in 2012 at Lackland AFB should be investigated as an entire issue and in terms of the individual sexual assaults perpetrated by the USAF JAG Corps and the USAF Office of Special Investigations. All victims of sexual assaults should be encouraged to report these crimes and their perpetrators.
12) The power of the convenining authorities to overturn guilty verdicts in sexual assault cases should be removed.
14) Personnel convicted of sexual assault should be automatically fired from the military with a dishonorable discharge.
15) Victims of sexual assaults who report such crimes should be legally protected from any reprisals. (http://www.dodbuzz.com/2013/05/08/lawmakers-grill-officials-over-sex-assaults-nukes/)
16) At the Air Force and Army Departments, their respective sexual assault prevention offices should be reporting directly to their respective Service Secretaries. Moreover, the Convening Authority should not have the power to overturn a guilty verdict.
J) REFORM OF THE INTEL COMMUNITY
1) The number of intel agencies, the size of their administration and their armies of civilian workers (janitors, chefs, etc.), and the amount of money they spent on their buildings must be significantly reduced.
2) All commands and agencies (of the DOD and other departments) which perform the same tasks should be merged. The 51 federal agencies and commands which track down terrorist funds should be merged into 1 agency at the DHS and 1 military command at the DOD. A Goldwater-Nichols Act for the entire federal government should be written and approved by the Congress. (http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/)
3) Rather than produce a great quantity of intel reports which no one reads or needs, the intel community should start producing only reports which federal officials truly need, on all issues which might interest them. Intel reports must be prioritized according to how important they are, and how important the issues they describe are, and the most important reports shall always be the first reports delivered to, and read by, federal officials.
4) The range of government executives who are entitled to know about all government intel programs (including all DOD intel programs) (the so-called “Super Users”) should be extended to include the personnel of the WH Military Office, the DNI, the leaders of all combatant commands, and other leaders that the President or the SECDEF may designate.
5) All intel agencies must share info with each other on request of one of the agencies. Whenever one agency receives word that a terrorist attack is plotted, it must alert the other 15 intel agencies.
6) The US government must designate the ODNI as a small, lean, efficient agency which will coordinate all the intel agencies, programs, operations, databases and budgets of the USIC (as well as its contractors). The DNI must, by statute, be given wide legal and budgetary prerogatives (including prerogatives over the entire intel budgets of all federal agencies) to command and coordinate the 16 intel agencies of the US. A statute should make it clear that the ODNI controls the entire intel community. He shall meet monthly with the SECDEF, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General and the DHS Secretary to coordinate all agencies of the USIC.
7) At each department, there shall be only one agency to collect threat tips, one agency to track WMMs, and one agency to coordinate counterterrorist policies. The 263 agencies created or reshuffled after 9/11/2001 must be merged with each other to significantly reduce this number, because multiplication of agencies/bureaucracies/departments doesn’t make the US government more capable to collect intel data and protect America from terrorists.
(8) The ODNI, including the National Counterterrorism Center, must be allowed to view all classified information, including the most secret information, of all intel agencies, including the CIA (which should be merged with the DIA).
9) The size of the ODNI must be radically reduced, ideally to its pre-2008 size.
10) All intel agencies must employ enough analysts and translators to translate and analyze the information they receive, but they must also make sure that they obtain only relevant data, and only on those issues which the US government is interested in or should know about. The NSA should stop wiretapping everyone. The volume of data obtained and stored by the USIC should therefore be reduced.
11) All intel databases of the US government should be connected to each other and viewable for all “Super Users”.
12) The USIC should never hire inexperienced analysts. Instead, it should hire only those analysts who are at least somewhat experienced in terms of the subject they work on. No fresh college graduates should be hired. Analysts must speak the languages of the countries they work on.
13) Reports must not simply “reslice” the facts that are already known by the USIC. They must tell the USIC something new.
14) The ODNI must continually eliminate redundant intel programs, policies and agencies and must ensure that everyone doesn’t produce the same reports.
15) The number of senior executives at DOD and non-DOD intel agencies should be significantly reduced – not merely freezed as Bob Gates has done. (http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=13782)
16) Whenever warnings about intra-Army terrorists are sounded, they should be directed to the Army’s 902nd Military Intelligence Group (the Army’s counterintel group), which shall immediately warn all 16 agencies of the USIC; it should also stop trying to assess general terrorist affiliations in the United States, because the DHS is already doing so.
17) The President, the Vice President, the DNI, the SECDEF, the Deputy SECDEF, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the DHS Secretary, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the WH Military Office should be authorized to view all Special Access Programs (SAPs) of the US government.
18) Military commanders must be allowed to view everything their subordinates are authorized to view. The “laws of secrecy” must never undermine the military chain-of-command.
19) The SECDEF and the DNI should review all intel programs and policies and abolish all of them which are ineffective.
20) On all databases of the USIC, information shall be strictly hierarchized and prioritized according to how important it is. Information about Yemen and Yemeni terrorists must be prioritized above all other information for as long as Yemen remains a sanctuary for terrorists.
21) A statute should clearly delineate all the “lines of responsibility” of all intel agencies, DOD agencies, DOS agencies and DHS agencies.
22) At the NCTC, there must be analysts who will put all bits of information together and send warnings, as should have been done with warnings about Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.
23) The flood of information into the NCTC must be reduced and controlled.
25) The USIC must stop expanding its new offices and stop building new offices.
26) The US government should assess whether the DHS needs its own research arm, its own command center and the kind of large fleet of armored vehicles that it currently has.
27) The Marine Corps intel arm should be merged with the Navy’s and subordinated to the ONI and its Director; the National Reconnaissance Office and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) should be merged with the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillaince and Reconnaissance Agency, since the USAF is already responsible for launching satellites and for satellite intel. Under this DRPP, the number of DOD intel agencies would be reduced from 8 to 5, and the total number of agencies in the USIC would be reduced from 16 to 12. Further mergers of DOD intel agencies should be considered. The top-heavy DIA must be significantly slimmed down. (http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=45718)
28) The Defense Clandestine Service should be merged with the Defense CI and HUMINT Center and with the DIA. It should be reporting directly to the DIA’s Director and to the SECDEF. Across the Department, all duplicative intelligence services, commands, and centers should be merged. (http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/04/the_pentagons_new_defense_clandestine_service.html)
29) China should be reinstated as a Tier 1 Priority target for the USIC.
30) The USD for Intel should select a number of ISR systems that can operate only in permissive and moderately-permissive environments for termination.
31) The intel business should be conducted strictly in accordance with the advice in Chapter XIII of Sun Tzu’s Art of War. This means, inter alia, converting enemy spies with bribes and housing; hiring local residents and government officials in enemy countries to act as America’s spies, and deceiving enemy spies in the US with false information.
32) The USIC should prioritize HUMINT above all other means of gathering intel data.
K) ELIMINATION OF OTHER WASTEFUL SPENDING ITEMS AND REFORM OF DOD MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES; EFFICIENCIES
1) The DOD’s management structures should be further trimmed, and should be reorganized along the lines of management structures of private corporations like ABM and Google. Executives from such corporations should be brought into the DOD to advise the DOD on the implementation of this reform. (http://www.newt.org/news/cnbc-video-gingrich-balance-budget-by-cutting-taxes-and-government)
2) The DOD’s Human, Social, and Culture Behavior (HSCB) Modeling program and the Humanitarian Assistance Program should be abolished.
3) The Congress must not include any earmarks in defense budgets nor in Supplemental Appropriations Acts, and must eventually ban earmarks altogether. Earmarks included by the Congress in the DOD’s budget cost the DOD $4 bn per year and don’t pay for any personnel, equipment or fuel, but rather for pork projects that are useless for the DOD. The DOD should refuse to execute any earmarks, and the President should be given a line item veto (by Constitutional Amendment, if necessary) to eliminate earmarks from the defense budget.
4) All 48 “projects to celebrate service and recreation on public lands” of the DOD should be abolished. (http://coburn.senate.gov/public/?p=washingtonwaste)
5) The DOD should privatize its mail service, as suggested by Herman Cain. (http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/270724/herman-cain-person-brian-bolduc?page=2)
6) The DOD should apply the Lean Six Sigma method to eliminate wasteful expenditures, speed up the production rates of weapons, make DOD depots and America’s weapon factories more efficient, and deliver weapons to troopers faster. However, all savings resulting from this method (and any other method) should be reinvested in the DOD, not diverted to deficit reduction. (http://strongamericanow.com/plan/case-studies) Moreover, all DOD employees should learn the Lean Six Sigma method.
7) The US military should stop making photos of aircraft, regardless of whether a landmark serves as the background of a photo or not. It should also stop flying aircraft for the purpose of photographying them. (http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/10/50-Examples-of-Government-Waste)
(8) The US military needs to adopt a written Joint Concept of Operations, as suggested by retired General John Jumper, to eliminate duplicative programs and ensure that each service has delineated tasks and is buying equipment for that task before a war starts. (http://www.youtube.com/user/HASCRepublicans#p/u/0/5QgCOQBNaMU)
9) The allegations that the DOD buys $20,000 toilet seats must be investigated and, if found true, the responsible parties must be punished and the DOD must stop buying such toilet seats.
10) The DOD’s annual printing costs should be reduced by 97%, from $1.4 billion to $0.042 billion ($42 mn) per year. The DOD should print only those documents that cannot be printed, must be printed, and cannot be stored electronically. Everything else should be written, sent, and stored electronically.
11) The SECDEF’s travel budget must be reduced by at least 50%, and the SECDEF must stop using the USAF’s jet fleet as a private taxi service and stop imposing large costs on taxpayers. The SECDEF’s party fund must be abolished. (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/nov/21/panetta-gets-vip-flights-at-coach-cost/?page=2)
12) GWOT spending: All nationbuilding/development projects should be immediately cancelled. Any future GWOT/war theater projects (if pursued at all) must not only be completed on budget, they must also be sustainable, i.e. useful for many decades to come, instead of becoming useless. After 2014, the ANSF must be sized right, so as to be big enough to stave off the Taleban threat but also not too big to become unaffordable for Afghanistan. There must be no white elephants. Any unsustainable projects must be cancelled immediately. (http://armed-services.senate.gov/Webcasts/2011/06%20June/06-09-11%20Webcast.html, ca. 148:00) All unneeded COIN projects, construction projects, infrastructure projects, and energy projects in Afghanistan must be cancelled; the budget for DOD contractors in Afghanistan must be dramatically reduced; the report cited by Sen. McCaskill (at ca. 195:00) must be the basis for a comprehensive reform and for the elimination of all unneeded projects; all unneeded COIN projects cited in that report must be cancelled. (http://www.senate.gov/fplayers/jw57/urlMP4Player.cfm?fn=armed021412&st=1590&dur=17150)
13) The USAF Space Command’s Space Extra Terrestrial Intelligence (SETI) programs, whose goal is to find aliens on other planets, should be terminated permanently. (http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news?ContentRecord_id=dd783527-3825-4c2a-8572-902087a5efae&ContentType_id=abb8889a-5962-4adb-abe8-617da340ab8e&Group_id=2b5f5ef9-5929-4863-9c07-277074394357&MonthDisplay=1&YearDisplay=2012)
14) The Department of Defense should auction new, unused, or excellent condition excess inventory to the highest bidder rather than transfer it at no cost to federal and state agencies. The savings resulting from this would be measured in billions of dollars per year.
15) The President should receive a Constitutional prerogative of a line-item veto to abolish unnecessary expenditures such as additional VIP jets. At minimum, the Congress should pass a Line Item Veto statute.
16) The Humanitarian Assistance Program of the DOD should be abolished or shifted to the DOS. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paraguay_%E2%80%93_United_States_relations)
17) The DOD should institute a 4-year moratorium on the purchase of all non-military items, including coffeemakers.
18) All entertainment projects for detaineees and all soccer fields should be cancelled. (http://dailycaller.com/2012/02/29/defense-sec-panetta-unaware-of-750000-gitmo-soccer-field/)
19) All recommendations of the March 2012 GAO duplicative programs report and all recommendations of the DOD’s IG should be implemented.
20) The DOD should stop shipping washers over great distances, stop shipping them from one distant base to another, and stop wasting money on doing so. (http://origin.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/50-examples-of-government-waste#_edn3; http://www.mygovcost.org/2012/03/13/another-day-another-taxpayer-waste/)
21) All services should have one common program for language and cultural expertise training. There needs to be a Department-wide guidance to integrate the existing programs and training products. (http://bit.ly/GIVVaU)
22) The DOD must consolidate its IT infrastructure and merge all of its networks and IT infrastructure into one, and dramatically reduce the number of IT systems it uses and thus dramatically reduce the IT system overlap. Annual IT costs (now running at $37 bn per year) must be dramatically reduced. The Navy’s $50 bn NGEN program must be ended and replaced by a much less expensive one. (http://bit.ly/GIVVaU)
23) The DOD needs to collaborate much more extensively with NASA and with the SpaceX company on space launches and space launch contracts in order to reduce costs and the number of contractors. (http://bit.ly/GIVVaU)
24) Many of the Air Force’s individual contracts for dining facilities need to be consolidated to produce savings. (http://bit.ly/GIVVaU)
25) The DOD must have a list of all of its counter-IED programs. All of these programs must be consolidated at the JIEDDO, which should be the sole DOD agency responsible for them.
26) The DOD should implement all savings proposed by Mackenzie Eaglen and Julie Pollack in April 2012, some of which were listed here long before then. It should be noted, however, that these cuts would collectively save only $17.2 bn per year. (http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=50868)
27) All Congressionally directed medical science programs at the DOD should be terminated.
28) The DOD needs to implement “performance-based logistics”, i.e. ones that deliver troops and goods not from point A to point B and measure it on that basis, but rather measure logistical performance based on how many goods are delivered, and how quickly, to the warfighter.
29) All of these reform proposals should be implemented: http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/01/how-to-save-money-reform-processes-and-increase-efficiency-in-the-defense-department
30) Any purchases by any Service or DOD agency of ANY fuels that cost more than traditional fuel must be ended and cancelled; this includes, but is not limited to, the $59 per gallon jet fuel purchased by the USAF, the $26 per gallon jet fuel purchased by the Navy, and the “green” ship fuel purchased by the Navy; likewise, any purchases of any materials that cost more than their equivalent, same-quality, cheaper materials (e.g. for helicopters) must be ended and cancelled; members of Congress should be legally barred from instituting such pork into defense budgets (http://video.foxnews.com/v/1752340858001/air-force-jet-fuel-uproar/; http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/07/19/military-spending-fight-hits-foreign-oil-biofuel/#?intcmp=trending).
31) All research into making beef jerky with processed meat, and all other spending on jerky, must be ended. This will save only $700,000 per year, however. (http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public//index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=77c257a6-adc8-4e38-87a5-85c86d7ed4a5)
32) All DOD agencies overseeing preventing bioterrorism should be merged into one and placed under the aegis of a single department (e.g. the Department of the Army). It should be headed by only one presidential appointee; other agency executives should not require presidential appointment. The current arrangement allegedly costs $6.48 bn per year. (http://dailycaller.com/2011/03/10/the-federal-budget-is-full-of-waste/)
33) The unrequested $660 mn – $770 mn for unspecified “facility upkeep and overhaul” activities that House authorizers and appropriations have inserted into the NDAA and the Defense Apropriations Bill for FY2013 must be excised from them. It’s a slush fund. (http://csis.org/files/publication/121003_US_New_Strategy_FY13_Budget.pdf, p. 46).
34) All DOD programs funding breast enlargement should be ended.
35) The DOD should consolidate and privatize all mess halls and all of its commissaries, military exchanges, grocery stores, other retail activities, schools, and housing programs. (http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/102xx/doc10294/08-06-budgetoptions.pdf)
36) The DOD and the Congress should eliminate all of the wasteful and non-military items identified by Sen. Coburn in this report from the DOD budget. This includes, as proposed above, privatizing all mess halls, commissaries, military exchanges, grocery stores, other retail activities, and schools. The savings would be $6.79 bn per year. (http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public//index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=00783b5a-f0fe-4f80-90d6-019695e52d2d)
37) Every future SECDEF should be required to live in or near Washington, DC, so that he/she will not have to travel home and back to his workplace by plane.
38) The DOD should conduct all of its infrastructure construction and and repair programs competitively and in the same manner that the private sector does, as recommended by Rep. Randy Forbes.
39) The DOD should alter the pricing structure for repairs performed at the military’s maintenance depots, which would encourage greater usage of less expensive services at central facilities. (http://defense.aol.com/2011/09/15/good-government-groups-detail-429b-in-dod-cuts-kill-f-35-mead/)
40) The cost of DOD reports, including those provided to the Congress, must be dramatically reduced. That, however, cannot be done through reducing the length of these reports. The 2012 Report to the Congress on China’s military prowess cost $85,000 to prepare, $12,000 more than the 70-page-long last year’s version of the report. Reports to the Congress must be as long as they need to be and contain all the information the Congress needs to receive, especially regarding China. (http://images.politico.com/global/2012/07/page_limit_letter.html)
41) The DOD needs to implement all reforms suggested here, including a) creating a single command to manage all DON installations, a single analogous command for the Dept. of the Army, and a single similar command for the Dept. of the AF; most military billets from base-management activities should be eliminated; b) merging overlapping or duplicatory educational programs and schools, and, as Robert Kozloski rightly proposes, “a Naval Educational Committee should be formed by merging existing committees into a single entity and provide management and oversight of all educational institutions and programs within the department. This committee should be tasked with integrating the best practices of civilian educational intuitions and emulating civilian programs, particularly in naval concentration areas; service war colleges should also be merged. The Naval War College, with additional Marine Corps representation, can provide professional military education (PME) for both services. As all officers in the Navy and Marine Corps are inherently naval, they should be educated through a common system. A single graduate military-education institution could provide the overhead functions, curriculum development, and research support for both services. Also, the Naval War College has a vigorous distance-education capability that could better support PME. Minimally staffed war-college satellite campuses could be used in naval concentration areas for resident PME, reducing the cost of frequent permanent change-of-station moves.”; c) Per Kozloski, “the Marine Corps should attempt to relinquish the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield-explosive (CBRNE) consequence-management mission and attempt to transfer it to the Army or National Guard. If combatant-command requirements prevent this from occurring, the Navy could assume this mission, as it inherently possesses the same skills found at the Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), with the exception of infantrymen. Infantrymen at the CBIRF are primarily used as physically fit casualty-extraction personnel, and through careful screening the Navy could replicate those skill requirements. The CBIRF lifesaving mission is better aligned with the Navy’s “Global Force for Good” approach than it is with the Corps. The Marines should use the extensive CBRNE expertise resident at CBIRF and support the counter weapons of mass destruction mission. This would be a valuable asset to the nation and more aligned to U.S. Special Operations and U.S. Strategic Command missions.”; d) again, Kozloski rightly proposes that “The naval services cannot afford unnecessary duplication of capabilities in any single mission area. The Naval Special Warfare Command should serve as the Naval Executive Agent (NEA) for all naval special-warfare/special-operations capabilities, including those of the U.S. Coast Guard. This agent could develop naval operational concepts, indentify and coordinate operational requirements, identify capability gaps, recommend organizational realignment, and develop integrated career roadmaps for the entire naval special-operations community. The NEA concept could be applied to emerging mission areas common to the naval services. Having an NEA for intelligence, cyber operations, information operations, force protection, and/or irregular warfare, for example, could streamline organizational structures and ensure cohesion across service programs.” (http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-07/rethinking-naval—heresy-or-fiscal-imperative)
42) All unused flight tickets bought by the DOD should be refunded and the money spent on them saved and invested in equipment. (The saving would be $100 mn per year.) The DOD also needs to be more careful about how many flight tickets it buys, to ensure it doesn’t buy unnecessary flight tickets in the first instance. (http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/10/50-Examples-of-Government-Waste)
43) The DOD should use, whenever possible, electronic messages and computers rather than paper.
44) All “recreational” spending should be ended.
45) The DISA should stop spending money on its new IT system which will be more expensive and less secure than those provided by private companies (http://armedservices.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=156) (02:36).
46) Public-private partnerships between the DOD and private companies (including weaponmaking companies) should be significantly expanded, and more depot work should be contracted out to these companies to reduce costs. The DOD only does this on a small scale at present; it should contract out almost all depot work to private companies (including those that produced its aircraft). Furthermore, DOD officials must learn about, and finally understand, the private sector. (http://blog.heritage.org/2012/08/10/public-private-partnerships-offer-smart-alternative-to-sweeping-defense-cuts/; http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/mcnerney-is-right-about-administrations-lack-of-business-experience-understanding?a=1&c=1171) The DOD should make it easier to contract for depot maintenance. (http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/102xx/doc10294/08-06-budgetoptions.pdf)
47) Civilian-crewed auxiliaries should be built in lieu of military-crewed auxiliaries because the former are cheaper (http://www.msc.navy.mil/factsheet/t-aoe.asp).
48) The DOD should adopt the strategy (proposed by Sen. Brown at ca. 80:00-81:00) which would save the USAF $1 bn in F-22 sustainment costs; it should also adopt the GAO’s recommendation to treat one of the F-22 sustainment programs as a separate program and separate it from the others (82:20) (http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/event.cfm?eventid=4524091e5e23bac1de879989501622ee&autostart=true; http://armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2012/05%20May/12-36%20-%205-8-12.pdf).
49) Until more 5th generation stealthy fighters are delivered, the USAF should fly F-16s rather than F-15s.
L) VARIOUS OTHER REFORMS
1) All regulations that delay or making it impossible for MEDEVAC helicopters to be dispatched to wounded US and coalition troops must be abolished. US MEDEVAC helicopters must not be marked with Red Cross pictures (which make them easy targets) and they should (although not necessarily must) be armed and/or escorted by attack helicopters (in the case of an emergency, however, MEDEVAC helicopters should be allowed to fly to LZs without escort and unarmed; and all H-60 helicopters should always be armed with at least a few missiles or have a machinegunner aboard). MEDEVAC helicopters of all services should be available for the rescue of the personnel of all services, not merely their own service. The US military should not adhere to the Geneva Conventions vis-a-vis enemies who don’t adhere to them. US compliance with these Conventions should be contingent on the opposing combatants’ compliance. Military helicopters (except those specifically suited for VIP transport missions) should never be used as VIP transport helicopters nor as taxis or limousines by DOD officials, nor should they be used for any PR “gigs”; they should be used for strictly military purposes (in the case of MEDEVAC helos, solely for MEDEVAC missions) (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jan/16/bureaucracy-killing-us-troops-in-afghanistan/)
2) The USCG should be permanently subordinated to the DOD and should standardize its equipment with the USN to the largest extent possible to save money. (http://www.randpaul2010.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Overview-500-billion-cuts-2.pdf)
3) The military’s Female Engagement Teams and the program that finances them should be abolished. Moreover, female servicemembers must never wear any Islamic veil and must never trade helmets for hijabs. (http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/afghanistan/a-woman-s-touch-1.121249;http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/02/are_us_servicewomen_trading_th.html)
4) The Army gun ban shall be abolished. All members of the US military should be allowed to bring weapons (including their personal weapons) on DOD land and at US military bases, and everywhere else.
5) Global Military Posture Reform:
a) The DOD should immediately withdraw all American troops from Afghanistan.
b) Except the F-15E wing stationed in Britain, missile defense personnel, and the personnel of the Landstuhl hospital, Moron AFB, Sembach Annex and Ramstein AFB, all American units stationed in Europe should be brought back to America and stationed at American bases. Their bases in Europe should be given back to the host countries. Specifically, the fighterplane wing stationed at Spangdahlem AFB (Germany), the F-16 wing stationed at Aviano AFB (Italy), and the F-16 wing stationed at Chievres AFB (Belgium) should be brought back to the US (to Duluth Airport and Cannon AFB). All US Army troops stationed in Germany and Italy (incl. members of the V Corps, including the 172nd Brigade), all Marines stationed in Europe, all Army troopers stationed in Kosovo, Bosnia and other European countries/territories, all American troopers stationed in Haiti, and ALL American troopers from the Persian Gulf (except the 5th Fleet) should be brought back to the US. All of their facilities abroad should be closed. The F-15 wing stationed at Bitburg AFB, Germany, should be relocated to Otis ANGB, should be redesignated Otis AFB. The F-15 squadron stationed at Soesterberg AFB (in the Netherlands) should be relocated to Adak Airport, Alaska. The tanker wing stationed at RAF Mildenhall should be moved to Djibouti, Diego Garcia, Izmir, or Incirlik. The Europeans should be forced to provide their own tanker capabilities for themselves. All DOD construction projects in Germany other than at Landstuhl should be cancelled. American tactical nuclear weapons should be consolidated in Britain and Turkey, and America’s European allies should always have access to them.(http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/webcasts.cfm?method=webcasts.view&id=08e51d6c-4a32-4fa4-b09c-a006fa63c976) No new bases, facilities, or buildings should be built in Western Europe except hospitals.
c) The original Guam Plan is now unaffordable and must be changed, and the withdrawal of 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam should be cancelled. The entire plan to move 9,000 Marines off Okinawa must be cancelled, because it is both dangerous and unaffordable (it would cost more than the$10.6 bn the DOD says it would cost). The Marines should cancel the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility and moving the 1st MAW to Kadena AFB; the tankers and AWACSes of 18th Air Wing should be moved from Kadena to another Japanese base or airport (e.g. Osaka Airport, Sendai Airport, or Yokota AFB) to make room for the 1st MAW and reduce the US military footprint on Okinawa. At the same time, ALL Marines of the III MEF must remain on Okinawa. They must have all of their units and air, ground, and logistical assets on Okinawa. US Marines should never be sacrificed for the sake of Japan’s domestic political concerns. The plan to relocate 9,000 Marines and their 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam, Australia, and Hawaii should be cancelled, and replaced with a plan to relocate them to Kadena or mainland Japan, unless this is necessary to reduce their vulnerability to preemptive Chinese attack. Also, regarding American troops in Eastern Asia, all SASC recommendations (including the proposal to move the Futenma Marines to Kadena and the proposal not to send servicemembers’ families with them to South Korea) should be implemented. (http://defense.aol.com/2012/11/29/okinawa-move-key-to-pacific-pivot-will-cost-more-than-10-6b/)
d) The Misawa fighterwing should move to the CONUS, Yokota’s 374th Airlift Wing should move to Iruma AB (or another base in eastern Japan), and an F-22 wing should move from the CONUS to Yokota. The USN base in Sasebo should be closed and the ships stationed there move to Yokosuka. All bases in western Japan except Kadena should be closed, and American units currently stationed there should be moved to bases in eastern Japan (or outside Japan) instead. The 8th US Army (except its PAC units) should be withdrawn from Korea, and instead, nuclear weapons, an F-15E wing, and a few ABL planes should be deployed to Osan AFB to replace the F-16 wing currently deployed at Osan. The wing currently stationed at Kunsan should be withdrawn from it and redeployed to Poland. The DOD should also consider deploying Marines to Korea. Overall, US military units should be dispersed throughout a much greater number of bases in the Pacific Rim, and no American units should be stationed at bases within the range of China’s DF-15A/B SRBMs (926 km), except Kadena. This means a much greater number of smaller units and smaller usage per base, and returning Misawa, Iwakuni, and Sasebo to Japanese control.
e) The DOD should also cease funding Naval Station Rota, Spain, and ask Spain to start fully funding it; if Spain refuses, the DOD should move its Marine FAST elsewhere, e.g. to Gaeta, Italy, or Constanta, Romania (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Station_Rota,_Spain). As for the 4 BMD warships currently stationed there, they should be moved to Yokosuka, Guam, and/or Subic Bay.
f) All American troops stationed in Kuwait (13,000) should be brought home.
g) On top of that, in all cases, US troops should be rotated, not stationed, abroad, i.e. deployed there without their families, in order to reduce costs. These troop withdrawals will significantly reduce the stress on the military, prevent the lengthening of tours, and increase “dwell time”. They would also remove a thorny issue poisoning Japanese-American relations, improve America’s relations with many countries, improve America’s ability to cooperate with its allies, close hundreds of unneeded facilities abroad, and save taxpayers much money. American tactical nuclear weapons should be based at RAF Laken. or at Incirlik AFB. (Turkey wishes to keep American tactical nukes in Europe.)
h) All Cold War era relics must be trashed, and the DOD must resume the reduction of America’s military footprint abroad and the repositioning of American troops from Cold War era garrisons to smaller forward bases, and the replacement of static units with mobile units. As many American bases abroad as possible should be consolidated. Similarly, bases in the US should be consolidated (merged), too. (http://webb.senate.gov/issuesandlegislation/foreignpolicy/Observations_basing_east_asia.cfm?renderforprint=1; http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304584004576416271311589238.html?mod=googlenews_wsjv; http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=45718)
These withdrawals should be cancelled only if their costs would exceed the savings they’d produce.
(http://www.therealitycheck.org/?p=10657; http://www.examiner.com/examiner/x-2684-Law-Enforcement-Examiner~y2010m1d22-Haitian-rescue-US-forces-in-Haiti-to-number-33000; http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304584004576416271311589238.html?mod=googlenews_wsjv; http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=45718; http://blog.heritage.org/2012/01/20/japan%E2%80%99s-inability-to-make-decisions/; http://www.youtube.com/HASCRepublicans#p/u/2/pXx2THxszsM)
6) The DOD should assess whether any of the troopers currently working at the Defense Logistics Agency could be replaced by civilians (thus freeing troopers for military tasks). If so, they should be replaced by civilians. The DLA currently numbers 21,000 employees. Similarly, the DOD should conduct an entire tail-to-tooth review across its entire structure, because there are reportedly still 300,000 military servicemembers performing civilian jobs.
7) The DOD and the US military must adopt the metric system and discontinue using the US customary system.
(8) The requirements of the budget calendar should never marginalize the defense policy-making process.
10) The DOD must significantly toughen its rules against conflicts of interest. Such cases should be investigated, even if that means threatening competition; reviews should not be limited to large-scale defense programs; the ability of defense corporations to obtain lucrative contracts should be limited; there must be stiff penalties for violators; the ability of the DOD to “hold contractors accountable for failing to disclose an actual or apparent conflict of interest”; the law forbidding the federal government to hire current or former lobbyists must never be waivered; the right of the president to waiver the law should be abolished. (http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/01/pentagon-issues-ethics-memo-before-gutting-conflict-of-interest-rules/)
11) Every USS Arizona veteran should have the right to be buried in the wreck of that ship if he wants to be; his family members should have such a right, too, if they want; but the spill of oil from Arizona’s tank must be stopped and the oil must eventually be pumped out of the tank of the USS Arizona.
12) Other than classified projects, budget gag rules should be banned.
13) The DOD must ban any no-bid contracts, except contracts for aircraft carriers (and that’s only because nowadays, there is only one corporation in the US that can build aircraft carriers). It shall cancel no-bid contracts for Mil Mi-17 helicopters and open a competition for helos.
14) The war on drugs should be ended. All DOD expenses related to it (estimated to be $1.2 bn – $1.5 bn per year) should be abolished and reinvested in military equipment.
15) The DOD should immediately discontinue “diversity training” and stop paying attention to or underlining diversity. (http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66348)
16) The 37 billets identified by a certain DOD report (http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1467) should be downgraded to a lower rank than the flag rank.
17) The US Cyber Command, which groups together the 4 cyber groups of the 4 armed services, should be made an independent functional command (currently, it is a unit subordinated to the US Strategic Command). As many IT specialists as possible (including foreign IT specialists) should be hired by the US Cyber Command. A USAF Cyber Command (which should be subordinated to the US Cyber Command) should be established as a “major command”, as a replacement for the 24th AF. It should be established at Lackland AFB. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Force_Cyber_Command_(Provisional); http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Cyber_Command)
The Cyber Command should partner with NATO’s Cyber COE. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied_Command_Transformation#NATO_Centres_of_Excellence)
18) B-1 bombers and F-111s (which should be recommissioned) should be subordinated to the USAF’s Global Strike command (just like B-2s, B-52s and ICBMs are).
19) American nuclear weapons, and the funding for them, and the role of the caretaker of nukes, should be given to the DOD. All of the DOE’s defense-related programs should be moved to the DOD. All nuclear weapon programs should be funded and run EXCLUSIVELY by the DOD, not by the DOE, and exclusively through one piece of legislation per year. Only the Armed Services Committees of the Congress should have oversight responsibilities over these programs (along with the Budget/Appropriations Committees). As DefenseNews rightly says, “The U.S. Air Force must modernize its aging arsenal of B-61 and B-83 thermonuclear freefall bombs if the nation is to maintain its deterrence, especially against emerging atomic powers, service officials said. But the weapons are funded partly by the Department of Energy and partly by the Pentagon, which has complicated modernization efforts. ”The B-61 [life extension program] is funded in two different parts,” said Bill Mullins, the Air Force’s associate assistant chief of staff for strategic deterrence. “And they go through separate appropriations committees.” If the funding is not synchronized, that can lead to problems, he said. ”We’re watching what’s going on both sides and asking for the defense committees to get with their energy counterparts and make sure they are all on the same page,” Mullins said.” (http://www.randpaul2010.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Overview-500-billion-cuts-2.pdf; http://defensenews.com/story.php?i=8383473&c=FEA&s=CVS) Never again should the DOD be forced to transfer any money to the DOE without being able to hold the DOE accountable.
20) The DOD should never pay the Taleban to escort American convoys or protect American supply lines; instead, it should hire private contractors or local militias (or ask NATO allies) to provide escorting troops. (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/13/us-trucks-security-taliban)
21) Japan must increase its funding for the American troops stationed on its soil. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Forces_Japan)
22) The DOD should rely on contractors for all nonessential services and tasks, and lay off thousands of bureaucrats. Contractors are less expensive than government employees, because they don’t enjoy the same salaries and benefits as government employees.
23) The four-star rank should be reserved only for the Chairman of the JCS, Service Chiefs (and their deputies), commanders of Combatant Commands, commanders of geographic fleets/armies/marine corps groups/fleets (e.g. the US Pacific Fleet), the commander of American troops in Afghanistan and the commanders of American troopers in whatever country America might invade in the future.
24) All of Mackenzie Eaglen’s reform proposals listed in the Politico website should be implemented (http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0612/77761_Page2.html).
25) Arms reduction treaties should be rejected; the START-2, New START, SALT-1, SALT-2, SORT, CFE-1, CFE-2, TTBT, and CTBT treaties should be repealed. The DOD must immediately stop implementing the New START Treaty, thus eliminating compliance costs.
26) Personnel of the US military should never be given government-funded credit cards, which they use to spend money on strip dancers and prostitutes. (http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/10/50-Examples-of-Government-Waste#_edn31)
27) The Congress should authorize, and the President should appoint, an “Undersecretary of Defense for Management”.
28) The following ship naming standards should be adopted: 1) Ship names should not (with exceptions granted by the SECNAV) repeat themselves, so if a ship name has already been used once, it should never be used again. 2) Ships should, with few exceptions, be named only after American figures and American cities. 3) Ships should receive the names of American figures or American cities regardless of what ship category they represent, but one class of ships, if possible, should receive names only of one kind; for example, any LPDs should be named only after American towns (e.g. Stonycreek Township), and surface combatants should be named only after distinguished Sailors and Marines, while America class LHAs should be named only after famous American battles, landings, and crossings (e.g. the battle of Remagen and the battle of Aachen).
29) The USS Utah (BB-31), sunk by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor, should be raised and scrapped. The dead sailors who are still aboard that ship should be transported from that ship to a military cemetery and buried there with military honors. Thus, the harbor will be cleared, because the wreck of the USS Utah will no longer clog it. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Utah_(BB-31))
30) All DOD and USCG aircraft shall be banned from participating in air shows.
31) All B-52s parked at AMARC should be reclaimed to provide spare parts for the rest of the B-52 fleet before B-3 replacements arrive. The same applies to B-1s parked at AMARC. Enlarging the bomber fleet should be done solely by buying new bombers (e.g. B-3s).
32) Cannibalising any aircraft not retired by the DOD shall be banned. There is an abundant supply of spare parts at AMARC – use that supply.
33) Denying spare-parts from AMARC to in-service planes when in-service planes need spare parts can result in either the grounding and mothballing of those in-service planes which need spare parts but lack them, or the cannibalizing of some in-service planes for spare parts, both of which is unacceptable.
34) The only solution to prevent the disasters spoken of in #33 from happening is to maintain an adequate supply of spare parts at AMARC or other aircraft maintenance centers.
35) America should guarantee a total transfer of technology whenever bidding for Indian, Brazilian, and British contracts.
36) As many scientists as possible should be allowed to immigrate to the US and recruited to work in American governmental laboratories – a total mobilization of the global scientific workforce should be conducted. One of the tools that should be used to conduct such a mobilization should be the SKIL Bill. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SKIL_Bill)
37) The DOD should not employ any unionized workers.
38) All exquisite pictures on the Pentagon’s walls, all luxury furniture items, all luxury lamps, all sculptures and all luxury carpets at the Pentagon should be sold and replaced with non-luxury, cheap items (http://www.defenselink.mil/dodcmsshare/photoessay/2006-12/hires_061215-D-7203T-041.JPG).
39) The NSA and the Defense Logistics Agency should, like agencies of the USDOD, sell their exquisite equipment, including exquisite cars. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Fort_Belvoir_DLA_building.jpg)
40) Like the Schwarzenegger Administration of California, the DOD should organize a garage sale of all of its exquisite civilian equipment (e.g. furniture, cars and lamps).
41) All contracts – even small contracts – must be competitive, that is, contractors must compete for it. (http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/politics/2009807689_apusstimulusfactcheck.html)
42) “Supervising America’s participation in conventional arms control treaties” (which treaties should be repealed) shall be removed from the DTRA’s list of responsibilities.
43) Those who defraud the DOD shall forever be ineligible for DOD contracts and for clearances. The DOD shall stop issuing contracts to, or paying, any individuals, companies or organizations that have ever defrauded the federal government; stop rewarding companies suspended for fraud; suspend any companies guilty of fraud; and collect reparations after every won lawsuit. (http://www.allgov.com/Top_Stories/ViewNews/Pentagon_Paid_285_Billion_Dollars_to_Contractors_that_Defrauded_Government_110204; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/02/AR2011020204922.html;http://sanders.senate.gov/graphics/Defense_Fraud_Report1.pdf;http://www.allgov.com/Controversies/ViewNews/Pentagon_Keeps_Rewarding_Company_Suspended_for_Fraud_101213;http://www.allgov.com/ViewNews/Kuwaiti_Company_Indicted_for_Fraud_in_Supplying_Food_to_US_Troops_91119;http://www.allgov.com/Where_is_the_Money_Going/ViewNews/Northrop_Settles_Largest_Ever_Defense_Fraud_Suit__But_Loses_Nothing_90405)
44) American nuclear weapons stockpiled in Europe should be consolidated in Britain and Turkey.
45) The DOD should stop writing and conducting Nuclear Posture Reviews, and should start issuing annual reports on the North Korean, Iranian, Russian and Venezuelan militaries.
46) A new National Defense Strategy – one that will treat conventional and irregular warfare equally and reject the numerous ridiculous notions (such as the claim that there will never again be a conventional war involving America) that the Pentagon subscribes to today – should be issued. The Joint Doctrine For Operations (which wrongly says that “that irregular warfare in the later phases of a campaign could require a level of military effort as great as—and perhaps greater than—what is needed for so-called major combat operations”) should be amended accordingly.
47) The National Security Council shall be stripped of its right to issue directives binding on the DOD.
48) M9 pistols should be retired and replaced with M1911 pistols; M16s should be replaced with M14s; M240 SAWs should be replaced with Ma Deuce machineguns.
49) The DOD should merge its prisoner transport plane fleet with the JPATS.
50) The number of annual reports to the Congress required by law must be reduced from 719 by more than 50%, and their annual cost ($350 mn) must be halved (http://www.defense.gov/news/d20100914acquisitionprocurement.pdf).
51) The DOD shall resume the pursuit of information on all Americans who went missing during the Vietnamese war and haven’t been found yet (deceased or alive). (http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/pmsea/Stats2009/Stats20091209.pdf)
52) All public DOD directives must be listed on the DOD’s website in chronological order, with the first DOD directive at the top of the list (currently, they’re listed chaotically).
53) The Uniformed Health Sciences University should be closed.
54) The Army and the Navy should, like the Air Force send messages down the chain of command, even to battalion and squadron commanders, about the importance of auditing their books. All services must become audit-ready by CY2017.
55) Some billets, such as the offices of service JAGs, intelligence agency directors, DLA Director, and MDA Director, should be downgraded to the two-star rank. Currently (as of January 2011), they are all three-star offices. Chiefs of Chaplains should be one-star officers. Similarly, service commands should no longer be four star commands. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jack_L._Rives)
56) The tenure of the Director of the Joint Staff must be long (at least 4 years); the Director should be, ex officio, a member of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Defense Acquisition Board.
57) All affirmative action programs at the USNA must be abolished. (http://www.commentarymagazine.com/blogs/index.php/category/%7B0C878C86-B160-4496-A319-FFAC00CC4F5F%7Dmid://00000042/!x-usc:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/02/AR2009070202588.html)
58) The US should not build any new bases in Germany except hospitals. European countries must contribute 100% of NATO’s military construction budget.
59) Vietnam, Lebanon, Mexico, India, Pakistan, Colombia, Thailand, Afghanistan, Uruguay, Paraguay, Peru and Brazil should join the PSI.
60) After it is merged with the DIA, the CIA, which has established a special CIA station whose sole target is OBL, should establish special CIA stations dedicated to tracking down Ayman al-Zawahiri, Adam Gadahn, Mulla Omar, KSAAZ, and Zakariya Essabar (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zakariya_Essabar, http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zakariya_Essabar). Special US military SOCOM groups should be established from among the current SOCOM troops to capture or kill Ayman al-Zawahiri, Anwar al-Awlaki, Adam Gadahn, Mullah Omar, Zakariya Essabar and Khalid Saeed Ahmad al Zahrani. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khalid_al_Zahrani)
61) Training courses must never be duplicated; each service must recognize and honor the training courses, qualifications, certificates, documents, diplomas and graduates of every other service; each service must permit the members of all other services to use secure computer networks even if they had been trained (or cleared) by other Armed Services; members of one service shall not be forced to duplicate training courses or qualifications. (http://www.frumforum.com/a-gay-officer-at-war)
62) The entire federal government, including the DOD, should be computerized and should adjust to the information age. As Newt Gingrich correctly writes, “Moving government into the information age is absolutely vital if the military and intelligence communities are to be capable of buying and using new technologies as rapidly as the information age is going to produce them.” (http://newt.org/tabid/102/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/2835/Default.aspx)
63) Celebrating same-sex “marriages” on military installations or at base chapels should be prohibited.
64) Although the DOD should not contract core military or departmental missions (e.g. military training, acquisition, and warfighting) to civilian contractors and should reserve them for government employees, it should entrust all nonmilitary, nondepartmental missions to them (e.g. mowing the grass). (http://www.cohengroup.net/news/op_ed/op_ed09072011.cfm)
65) The USN should stop using medium-sized helicopters for every task (by doing so, it is overusing them and thus wearing them out too fast), and should stop trying to standardize on them. It should buy helicopters of different kinds: MH-60s as well as MH-53s, and also V-22 VTOL planes. (http://defensenews.com/story.php?i=3548400&c=AME&s=SEA)
66) The DOD’s IT program must be reformed so that it will be on budget (i.e. its cost must be reduced). As of 29th September 2010, it was $6.9 billion over-budget. (http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r111:1:./temp/~r1115hCgtK:e23213
67) Atheists must no longer be allowed to impose their diktats on believing members of the US military and must be ignored. Any servicemembers wishing to celebrate any Christian feasts on military installations should be allowed and even encouraged to do so.
68) The federal government must establish a clear chain of command for first responders and rescuers. The chain of command shall include all the relevant institutions, including local governments, county governments, state governments and all relevant agencies of the federal government (the WH, the DOD, the DHS, the FEMA, the DOT, and the DOS). FEMA should become an independent cabinet-level agency and its Director should be designated as the national coordinator of all relevant agencies. All these agencies and their relevant assets shall be subordinated to him during a response operation. The chain of command shall be as follows: the President – the director of FEMA – federal departments and state governments – county governments (subordinated to state governments) – local governments. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane_Katrina_disaster_relief#Confusion_over_chain_of_command)
69) The Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marines should adopt a common battle utility uniform (for all four services); the Army and the Marines should also consider adopting a common gala uniform and a common physical training (physical fitness) uniform. Similarly, the Navy and the USCG should consider adopting a common gala uniform. Further uniform standardizations should be considered as well, and should also be achieved across NATO and other alliances. (http://www.youtube.com/HASCRepublicans#p/u/13/JmPAueb5-Vk)
70) The DOD’s Comptroller should draft a complete roadmap of how all services and agencies of the DOD (i.e. all components of the DOD) will become audit-ready. The DOD must also produce financial statements reliable enough for an audit to occur. Furthermore, the DOD should: a) standardize all of its business systems across the department; b) use only one system for doing the same task; and c) make it possible to copy data from one system to another instead of having to put it manually into a system. The DOD systems environment must be highly centralized, very simple, and not easily error-prone. The number of financial management, human resource management, logistics, real property and installation, and weapon acquisition management systems the DOD uses must be dramatically reduced from the current total number of these systems (2,258). The DFAS must have jurisdiction over all aspects of DOD financial management, not just most, and it should not be done on an installation-after-installation basis. Also, to achieve audit readiness, the DOD needs an effective institutional approach to managing information technology (IT) investments and a well defined enterprise architecture. Furthermore, all DOD components must provide FIPs on time and comply fully with the FIAR. Moreover, the DOD should rely as least as possible, or stop relying altogether, on Enterprise Resource Programs (ERPs). Subsequently, the entire DOD should be audited, as should be the rest of the federal government. (http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2012/04%20April/Khan%2004-18-12.pdf)
71) All savings made by the DOD on anything must be devoted EXCLUSIVELY to the force structure and to equipment – not to personnel accounts or unneeded units. (http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=59658)
72) The DOD budget must not be used to finance abortions under any circumstances. A ban on DOD funding for abortions must be instituted by a DOD Directive or, even better, by Congressional legislation. (http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=37622)
73) Pornography-blocking software should be installed on all computers of the DOD.
74) All obstacles for small and medium-sized businesses to doing business with the DOD must be removed. (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xvvfM_VzRA4&feature=g-all-u&context=G285a48cFAAAAAAAACAA)
75) The US should stop contributing anything (currently it contributes $50 mn per year) to NATO Special Operations HQ; European countries should pay the full cost of maintaining it; they should also bear a much larger part of the financial burden of the cost of the EPAA.
76) The CERP program should be halved, and the resulting savings should be devoted to paying bills for fuel.
77) The Blue Angels and the Thunderbirds must surrender their F-18s and F-16s (which should be given to combat-duty squadrons) and should start flying A-7s (which the Blue Angels have previously flown), F-4s, and F-111s (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A-7_Corsair_II)
78) The personnel of the DOD (including military personnel) must stop wasting their time on PPT and its computer-generated charts, graphs and bullet points; the personnel of the DOD must stop obsessing with PPT; officers of the military must stop preparing any PPT slides; the DOD must learn to cope without PPT; PPT should be used only for press conferences. The justification: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/world/27powerpoint.html?_r=1&src=me&ref=general
79) The DOD should post online Financial Performance Reports for every completed fiscal year, as well as the Audits and Investigative Reports of the DOD’s Inspector General; and enable every American citizen to report “fraud, waste and abuse” to the DOD via the Internet on the main website of the DOD.
80) The DOD should use the same fraud-busting/fraud-detecting system as the one used by American Express and FedEx.
81) The budget and staff of the DOD’s OIG should be significantly increased to help the OIG audit the DOD. (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/sep/19/watchdogs-headed-for-heavy-budget-cuts/?page=all#pagebreak) The DOD must become able to produce auditible financial statements every fiscal year, and must deliver them every fiscal year to the Congress, the GAO, and the public (by making it available on the Internet) – as it is required by the law and as every Fortune 500 company does every year. The qualification requirements for the USD (Comptroller) and Assistant Service Secretaries for financial matters should be increased. The DOD needs to consolidate its financial management systems. (http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings?ContentRecord_id=3b791d27-87d0-4603-ac3a-68bebbbe0a66&ContentType_id=14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d35-56cc7152a7ed&Group_id=13e47ffa-0753-47a7-ad5e-1ba7592015c9)
82) Every person buried in the Arlington National Cemetery must be registered along with his/her gravesite; the remains of every person buried in the ANC must be identified; any identification problems or questions must be reported up the chain of command; the ANC must be reviewed and audited; the burial records of the ANC must be computerized, but at a lower cost than the cost so far incurred by the government; the ANC should be managed by personnel of the Department of the Army rather than contractors; the ANC must be reserved exclusively to military veterans and their families; all graves at the ANC must be properly marked, and must be properly labeled on cemetery maps. The chain of command at the ANC should run from the superintendent of the ANC to the commander of the MDW and then directly to the Secretary of the Army. Alternatively, the ANC should be transferred from the DOD to the DVA, as some people have suggested. (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38467878/ns/us_news-life/)
83) Except the official website of the DOD, all DOD, DHS, DOJ, DOS, and critical industry websites must be in secure networks (the HTTPS protocol). The operative systems of DOD computers and their anti-virus programmes and “firewalls” must be updated daily. The NSA should establish a partnership with the US Cyber Command and develop active defense programs that will enable military IT specialists to track down and fight enemy hackers. America should forge a collective defense cyber alliance not only with Britain, Australia and Canada, but also with the Czech Republic, Poland, Georgia, Japan, South Korea, Lithuania, Estonia, Colombia, Romania, France, Germany, Spain, Norway, Israel, and the Philippines. The time it takes for an IT program to become operational after it has been funded for the first time must be reduced from 81 months to 6 months. Some protective programs against rogue code, including so-called “logic bombs”, and against remotely operated “kill-switches” and hidden backdoors (which can be written into the chips and physical buses used in military hardware) must be developed and installed on all computers of the DOD. Operators of critical infrastructure, and critical industries such as the defense industry, shall be legally obliged to join secure computer networks, i.e. government-sponsored, government-protected computer networks. (http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1477) The DOD must also develop a strategy of how to prevent hackers from disrupting anything important in the US, and a strategy of what to do if they do manage to disrupt something important. Any cyber attack (no matter how severe and how disruptive) MUST be classified as an act of war, and a military response of any kind is justified for any cyber attack. The DOD should retaliate against anyone who attacks American cyber networks. Also, all defense contractors must be obliged to join the DOD’s protected computer networks, and all of their websites and email accounts must be in the https domain. A wide range of protective programs, including Dr. Web CureIt! and Kaspersky’s Virus Removal Tool, must be tested against a wide range of malware (not just viruses, but also spy devices, backdoors, dialers, trojans, worms, macros, VB scripts, rootkits, exploit tools, flooders, keyloggers, wabbits, etc.) on various systems (various Windows versions, Linux, etc.) and by various means (the Internet, local networks, IRC, email, internet communicators, data storage devices, etc.), and must also all be tested on already-infected computers, as must be malware removal tools such as Malwarebytes’ Anti-Malware. The DOD should avoid using the Q-squared Free, which often makes false alarms. The DOD must also install good firewalls and good anti-spy devices on all of its computers. One of the firewalls that should be considered for installation is Outpost Firewall Pro; there is a good free version of it, and the DOD could also buy a license for an even better version (alternatively, it should use the Comodo Firewall or the complete Comodo Internet Security package). The DOD should test firewalls on its own computers extensively, under extreme assumptions, and review monthly the results of firewall tests on this website. The DOD should, whenever possible, acquire and use free protective programs (including antiviruses, HIPSes, and firewalls), and use non-free programs only if necessary (i.e. if no free programs are available or if free programs don’t offer a sufficient degree of protection). The anti-virus programs must have their “resident protection” mode turned on. The Windows system firewall is useless and protects against nothing and should therefore not be used; other firewalls, such as those mentioned above, should be used instead. In the case of whatever protective programs are installed on computers, DOD personnel should change their configurations to increase detectability and reduce the workload on operational systems. All sensitive issues left unresolved by the DOD must be resolved. The DOD’s Cyber Command must also specifically target, and fight, enemy hackers (governmental and nongovernmental alike), and, in the case of war with another country, attack that country’s computer networks. The recommendations of the December 2008 report by the HF must be implemented. Also, the DOD must make its computer access cards tamper-proof and malware-proof, install malware-from-access-cards-detecting software on its computers (those that require access cards), and install keypads and access card readers on the doors to important rooms at DOD buildings, including all rooms where sensitive information and sensitive technologies are stored. The Chinese virus that targets DOD access cards, called Sykipot, must be diagnosed and purged from DOD IT systems, which should be immunized against it. The DOD needs to install software capable of detecting, blocking, and defeating this virus on its access-card-reading computers and to prevent it (or any other viruses) from infecting access cards. All DOD access cards must contain the card’s holder’s fingerprints and iris scan. (http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2011/05/21st_century_warfare.html;
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304563104576355623135782718.html; http://www.matousec.com/projects/proactive-security-challenge/results.php; http://bigpeace.com/nmachiavelli/2012/01/19/new-chinese-virus-targeting-dod-access-cards/; http://forum.cdaction.pl/Programy-Wirusy-i-inne-szkodniki-jak-sie-zabezpieczyc-i-jak-z-nimi-walczyc-t56765.html; http://blog.heritage.org/2012/04/27/cyber-barbarians-at-the-gates/; http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/12/building-cyber-security-leadership-for-the-21st-century)
84) The USAF should implement all recommendations in Thomas Erhard’s 2009 An Air Force Strategy For the Long Haul, except that:
- UAV operators should have no constituency and should be denied promotions to upper tiers of USAF hierarchy.
- B-52 and B-1 bombers should receive only legacy upgrades.
- Next Gen Bombers should be optionally manned, not exclusively unmanned, and have B-2, not F-35, engines.
- All NGBs must have an unrefueled combat radius of at least 2,900 nm.
- All NGBs must be bombing-capable instead of the last 10 being only ISR aircraft.
- The F-15 fleet should not be cut even nearly as deeply as Erhard proposes.
- The USAF should order far more than 18 additional F-22s.
- F-35 purchases must not be cut unless this is necessary to pay for the NGB or for additional F-22s.
On top of his recommendations, the USAF’s Chief or Vice Chief of Staff, and the Commander of the AF Materiel Command, must always be a scientifically-literate officer with a degree in science or engineering. Therefore, the next Vice Chief or Chief of Staff should be either Gen. Edward A. Rice, Jr. (who should later become CSAF), or Gen. Janet Wolfenbarger. Retired General Donald J. Hoffman, the previous Commander of the AFMC, who also has an engineering degree, should be recalled into service. Also, a USAF general should be nominated for commander of EUCOM in lieu of Gen. Allen, who should be retired.
85) The US military should train all of its personnel by itself, at its own bases, rather than pay private corporations to train them. The DOD should stop staffing and funding think tanks. The DOD should also reduce the retirements of admirals and generals, at least those who are still employed by someone. (http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1321)
86) All websites of the DOD, including the http://www.defense.gov website, and all DOD and USCG accounts and the USCG’s website, should be moved to the .mil domain.
87) As AT has rightly written, “There must be a partnership between the government and industry where they share information capabilities. Since every six months, the cyber industry is evolving, with the infrastructure quickly becoming obsolete, solutions must evolve as well.” Google and key industries must be protected by the DOD’s Cyber Command. (http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/08/the_new_generation_of_security.html)
88) As AT has suggested, the US government should start “expanding the national biosurveillance integration center, established in 2008. This center integrates clinical data, regular intelligence information, and Biowatch data so that decision-makers have an early, immediate, and comprehensive picture of the dangerous pathogens. Since in the U.S. alone, there are approximately four hundred research facilities with 15,000 people approved for working in these labs, there has to be more regulatory oversight. There is ongoing research on microbiological forensics, in which a pathogen can be traced to the user. Some government officials argue that this could be used as a form of deterrence.” (http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/08/the_new_generation_of_security.html)
89) The US should stop leasing any Russian aircraft (to save $840 mn per year) and should resume buying C-17s to do the job Russian An-124 Ruslan aircraft have been leased to do: transport American military equipment to Afghanistan and other theaters. The USAF should buy C-17s (or new An-124s from Ukraine) not only to meet this demand for airlift aircraft, but also to replace its oldest C-5s (C-5As). It should buy at least 4 C-17s every year. This will cost only $800 mn per year, which means a net $40 mn per year saving for the DOD. Similarly, NATO should stop leasing Russian aircraft and should resume buying C-17s. (http://dailycaller.com/2011/05/14/defense-insanity-u-s-military-is-dependent-on-russian-pilots-and-planes/)
90) Every service must establish a TF on troopers’ suicides and implement every policy necessary to prevent troopers from committing suicide; American troopers and veterans should be told that they shouldn’t be ashamed if they’re suffering from TBI or PTSD and should be encouraged to go to DVA hospitals. Social spending on consultations with troopers should be reduced, however, not increased.
91) The role of transporting members of the US government (including the Vice President, Cabinet Secretaries and military leaders) by helicopter should be assigned to a single helicopter squadron, either the USMC’s HMX-1 Squadron or the USAF’s 1st Helicopter Squadron, and the exquisite squadron should be disbanded or transferred to the winning service (together with its aircraft). The total cost of these two squadrons combined must be reduced by 50%; the USAF’s plan to increase the budget of the 1st Helicopter Sqdn must be cancelled. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Force_Two; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_Helicopter_Squadron)
92) To preserve expertise and maintain needed experts, the DOD should establish an Office of the Special Investigator General to supervise contracts awarded in relation to any war or Contingency Op the US might be waging, as suggested by Sen. McCaskill during a SASC hearing on Sept. 28th, 2010.
93) Electoral ballots must be sent to American troopers stationed abroad on the first available plane; if necessary, USAF planes should be reserved for that purpose; all states must be obliged to send ballots to the DOD no fewer than 50 days before the election to which they pertain, and must be returned to the US no later than 2 days before the election; no state’s Secretary of State shall be allowed to certify any putative winner of any election unless all ballots (including all ballots returned by American troopers stationed abroad) are counted; no state should be granted a waiver from the MOVE Act (the legal provision authorizing such waivers shall be abolished); a pilot electronic voting program should be established for American troopers stationed in the US and abroad; the DOD and the DOJ shall sue any state which refuses to comply with this. (http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/10/end_the_military_voting_scanda.html)
94) No less than 40% of every annual DOD budget must be devoted to equipment procurement accounts and to equipment RDT&E programs. Personnel costs and HC costs must not be allowed to grow nor be financed at the expense of equipment programs.
95) At all national cemeteries, concrete walls for cremated remains in place of old chain-link fencing, or where no sites for cremated interrees exist, if fiscally affordable, to allow additional people to be buried at National Cemeteries. The Arlington National Cemetery should be expanded, at the cost of Fort Myer if necessary. The Golden Gate National Cemetery should use lands not yet used for burials, including the hills near its main gate. If necessary, the SF Columbarium should also be used. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_Rosecrans_National_Cemetery; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Golden_Gate_National_Cemetery_main_gate.JPG; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Columbarium)
96) The DOD should greatly toughen the rules that determine who can access classified information, including a minimum age (e.g. 30 years) and a minimum rank (E-6 or O-3).
97) The DOD should create a list of officials, ranked by category, who are authorized to travel on VIP aircraft. Only Executive Branch officials should be allowed to travel aboard DOD aircraft. The categories shall be as follows:
Rank #1: The President, the Vice President. Not more than one official of this rank should be allowed travel on the same aircraft. (This is already an official policy of the US government.) However, they may be accompanied by up to 2 officials of lower ranks.
Rank #2: Cabinet Secretaries and their deputies, service secretaries and their deputies, the Joint Chiefs, the leaders of combatant commands. No more than 2 officials of this rank should travel on the same aircraft, though they may be accompanied by up to 4 officials of lower ranks.
Rank #3: Assistant and Under Cabinet Secretaries and Service Secretaries, Executive Agency directors. No more than 4 officials of this rank should be allowed to travel on the same aircraft, though they may be accompanied by up to 8 officials of lower ranks (Rank #4).
Rank #4: All officials not listed above.
98) All DOD employees and contractors suspected of buying child pornography should be investigated, and those who have indeed bought, downloaded, or otherwise obtained child pornography should be laid off by the DOD and prosecuted by the DOJ.
99) The DOD’s antiquated 18th century grade and rank systems must be reformed to suit the 21st century world. Because grades are determined by the Congress, Congressional legislation is needed to achieve this goal.
100) The federal government should include only one presidential appointee responsible for biodefense – an an Assistant Secretary of the DHS, who should be reporting directly to the chief of that department. That agency should be exclusively responsible for biodefense, and should have the authority, responsibility, and to oversee America’s biodefense programs. A National Strategy to protect the country against bioterrorist attacks must be devised; technological and operational means to protect the country must be established. The DOD should closely cooperate with the DHS on this issue. (http://www.teapartynation.com/forum/topics/gao-details-billions-in)
101) The DOD should establish a mechanism to track “urgent needs funds”. They’re urgent, but how they are spent must be closely monitored by the DOD. There should be only one offfice to which a warfighter can submit requests for “urgent needs funds”.(http://www.teapartynation.com/forum/topics/gao-details-billions-in)
102) All employees of the federal government (including the DOD) must accept a new contract with the federal government: they will enjoy “secure jobs”, but they will have lower salaries than what private sector workers earn and will not have any of the perks they enjoy now.
103) VIP aircraft must not land at any underequipped airports, including airports not equipped with an ILS.
104) The DOD must NEVER finance “must-pay bills” from modernization accounts. Modernization accounts must never be raided; they must be reserved EXCLUSIVELY for modernization programs. If operations and must-pay bills cannot be paid for, they must not be undertaken at all. If operations are to be undertaken, they must be financed from separate accounts, and never at the expense of modernization accounts. (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wVhh8gqXSUA)
105) The USAF must redress all the deficiencies found by the GAO in its state of preparedness of 9/11-style terrorist attacks, including doctrine, strategy, guidance, planning, and funding. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._military_response_during_the_September_11_attacks)
106) Training/Military Academy Reform: Hazing must be prohibited and actually ended, and the perpetrators must be subjected to appropriate punishment. Also, Mahan’s The Influence of Seapower Upon History and Roosevelt’s The Naval War of 1812 should once again become compulsory coursebooks at the Naval Academy. The Black Book of Communism should become a compulsory coursebook at all Service Academies, as well as the VMI, so that all academy students will know the nature of America’s principal enemies. All VMI students should be obligated to complete at least 4 years of military service after they graduate (they are already ROTC cadets, but are not currently obligated to serve with the military after graduation). Military Academies should also offer new majors, such as Russian, Chinese, and Spanish, and abolish useless majors such as Political Science.
107) The DOD must do more to reduce the impact of corrosion (which costs $23 bn). It must invest more to prevent corrosion. (http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/press-releases?ContentRecord_id=98c8b6cf-0f86-4151-a9db-e89ecd020788)
108) USAF depots need to become much better so that much fewer aircraft are in depot at any given time (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2ogoiWk2EX0).
109) To prevent aircraft crashes like the VIP aircraft crash of 1996, in Zagreb, the following rules should be instituted: 1) No USAF VIP plane should be allowed to land at any airport which does not have an ILS, any airport which is in substandard conditions (e.g. has a decrepit runway), any airport where the ground personnel is uncooperative, any one which is in or near a warzone, and one for which American or credible foreign air corridor/air approach route maps are obsolete or unavailable.
110) For all of its deployed ships, the USN should use “sea swaps” of crews so that the ship doesn’t have to go back to its homeport and exchange its crew in its homeport, and thus to save money.
111) Obligatory DOD cyber defense should be extended to all key industries, including the defense, space, aerospace, nuclear, automobile, shipping, high-tech, rare earth mineral mining, and biomedical industry. “Obligatory” means that these industries will be obligated to accept DOD cyber defense and DOD cyberprotection standards.
112) The DOD needs to increase its investments in information technology, catch up with rapid advances in it, promote such advances, and use the latest technology available, because they can offer huge returns on the investment (available computing power doubles every 24 months). And in general, the DOD’s procurement process needs to focus on IT, not on the platforms (planes, ships, vehicles) themselves. (http://defense.aol.com/2012/05/15/cartwright-savages-f-35-airsea-battle-warns-of-250-billion-mo/?a_dgi=aolshare_twitter)
114) When military depots are overloaded, the DOD should out-contract the remaining depot work to be done to save money; the Davis-Bacon Act should be repealed (or at least, the DOD should be exempted from it) to save money; commissaries and other non-inherently-military services should be contracted to the private sector.
115) As former SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld has said, there needs to be a Blue Ribbon Commission to review the entire federal government, including the DOD, and suggest ways to modernize it. Its recommendations should not be open to amendments by Congress, only to a AYE/NAY vote.
118) The DOD should adopt the DARPA’s CRASH program and DARPA’s Mission Oriented Resilient Clouds for all of its computers. (http://defense.aol.com/2012/12/21/darpa-crash-program-seeks-to-reinvent-computers-for-better-secur/?icid=nextArticle; http://defense.aol.com/2013/01/10/cloud-of-iron-darpa-hardens-cloud-computing-against-cyber-attac/)
119) The DOD should be exempted from the provisions of the Davis-Bacon Act and never use PLAs.
120) Something (including investigations of all allegations and disciplinary proceedings if allegations are proven true) must be done to stop hazing in the military. (http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2012/02/military-congress-to-hold-hearings-on-hazing-in-the-military-022312w/)
121) The US military must, whenever possible, detect and stop enemy insurgents who try to plant roadside bombs on roads. The export of explosive substances such as fertilizer ammonium nitrate, and their importation into Afghanistan, must be stopped completely. The government of Pakistan must make a serious effort to stop their flow from Pakistan into Afghanistan. No vehicles which have failed to protect Coalition troops from roadside bombs should be procured, and any existing such vehicles should be sold. All proposals contained here should be implemented. (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/aug/5/armys-vehicles-not-tough-enough-for-bombs/?page=all#pagebreak)
124) The US must never close, withdraw the 65th Airbase Wing from, or cease to be a tenant of Lajes Air Base in the Azores (Portugal), and must work with the Portuguese government to permanently keep the Chinese out of the Azores; China must never be allowed to use the Azores as a base for anything; full funding for Lajes should continue, and spending elsewhere (e.g. in upgrades of legacy fighters or for bases in Europe) should be cut to pay for that (http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/332454/red-flag-over-atlantic-gordon-g-chang)
125) The DOD needs to radically change the PPBE cycle so that requested/planned service capabilities, investments, and inventories are evaluated by the OSD and the JCS from a JOINT perspective at the very beginning of the planning/budget formulation process, not merely at the end. (http://blogs.defensenews.com/saxotech-access/pdfs/Strategic-Choices.pdf)
126) The US Army should limit its usage of the UH-60 and, where possible, use the UH-72 instead, as it is cheaper to fly. If sequestration kicks in, it should ground its UH-60s, NOT its UH-72s. (http://armedservices.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=156)
127) This model designed to aid decision-making should be implemented across the entire DOD: http://defense.aol.com/2013/03/27/air-force-maj-gen-kane-proposes-shake-up-of-how-service-budget/
128) QDRs and NPRs should be ended.
129) The DOD’s NASCAR team should be abolished.
How the numbers add up
It is impossible for me to estimate the total savings that my reforms would yield, but some reforms would certainly yield large financial savings for the DOD. The table below outlines those savings (based on the numbers from the President’s FY2012 budget request (http://www.deathandtaxesposter.com/).
|Item||Annual saving ($ bn) (in FY2012 dollars)|
|Dept. Of the Air Force admin halving||4.1005|
|Dept. Of the Navy admin halving||2.466|
|Dept. Of the Army admin reduction by 25%||3.59925|
|Discharging 100,000 military personnel on top of Panetta’s layoffs||10|
|Closing the UHSU||0.085|
|The merger of the CIA with the DIA||1|
|The new BRAC round||2|
|Reduction of the OSD budget by 75%||3.537|
|Unused flight tickets||0.1|
|Reducing annual DOD printing costs by 97%||1.358|
|Reduction of the JCS budget by 50%||0.2825|
|Closure of the RQ-4 Global Hawk program||1.201|
|Abolition of all DOD anti-drug programs||1.4|
|Merger of all service medical commands||0.324|
Elimination of all wasteful/nondefense items identified by Coburn: 6.79
Implementing performance-based logistics: 32
Total known annual savings: $70.24325 bn.
Almost all of these savings would have to be devoted to meeting the Budget Control Act’s budget cuts requirements and to modernization; some savings should be reinvested in financial auditing and in corrosion prevention.
Any savings resulting from base mergers, from civilian aircraft fleet mergers and sales, and from eliminating funding for Pakistan should be reinvested in corrosion prevention, which saves $57 for every $1 invested.
Any savings resulting from all other reforms must be reinvested solely in the development and purchases of new USAF aircraft and missiles.