The Security Dilemma theory: is it correct?

A cartoon about the Cold War, depicting Uncle Sam (the US) trying to contain the US and the Russian Bear trying to expand its reach. Cartoon source : Mr Rick’s Cold War History Show.

Have you ever wondered why the Cold War escalated into an arms race and why both superpowers often made bold moves to put the other at a disadvantage ? As during the Cuban Missile Crisis ? Want to understand power politics and defense policy?

Obviously, a lot of appealing theories about these issues about, propagated by both the Left and the Right, doves and hawks alike. Sometimes, it may be difficult to separare wheat from chaff.

Today, we’ll subject one such theory to careful scrutiny : the “Security dilemma” theory.

This thesis holds that a country facing adversaries and seeking to increase its security through a military buildup will only make its adversaries feel less secure by that.

This, proclaims the theory, will only lead your adversaries to respond with a military buildup of their own, in order to catch up with you. And so, a never-ending, spiralling arms race will ensue.

Is this what happened during the Cold War? Does this theory apply to the US and China today? And where does this theory come from, anyway ?

 

Military Strength: Warmongering or Common Sense?

Obviously, all of us want to be secure. This is true for both individuals and nations. The only question, then, is how to ensure that security.

Since time immemorial, the two sides of the debate have been pro-defense hawks and pacifist doves.

Pacifists claim that our adversaries are sensible humans just like us (even though may have a different ideology or religion). And just like us, they simply want to live in peace and security on their territory, worship as they like, and govern themselves according to the political system of their choosing.

President Carter’s first Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, even claimed that his boss and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev held “similar dreams and aspirations about fundamental issues.”

Therefore, claim the doves, conflicts between nations are the result of either excessive appetites of some rulers on one or both sides, or, more often, the result of misunderstanding and miscalculation.

And so, they claim, the Cold War was the result of misunderstanding between the US and the Soviet Union.

During that time, doves claimed (as they do today) that if only the US  disarmed itself unilaterally (or cut its arsenals unilaterally, or pursued a unilateral “freeze”), Russia would gladly do the same, and we could then all live in peace.

Hawks beg to differ. They believe that, while their country is righteous, there are (and will always be) evil people in the world: terrorists and potential aggressors ruling over certain countries. These potential foes will not hesitate to attack weak, unprepared victims.

Therefore, say hawks, a strong military is necessary to maintain the peace by deterring potential adversaries. The latter won’t dare attack us if they know our retaliatory response would be extremely painful for them. US President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) was the foremost advocate of this policy.

Enter the “Security Dilemma” theory

But thirty years before Ronald Reagan became President,  a different theory emerged: the Security Dilemma theory, coined by  the German scholar John H. Herz in his 1951 book Political Realism and Political Idealism. At the same time British historian Herbert Butterfield described the same situation in his History and Human Relations, but referred to it as the “absolute predicament and irreducible dilemma”.

This theory, as we noted above, holds that any security increase on the part of one of the superpowers would force the other one to respond in kind, leading to a never-ending arms race.

For example, were the US to build up its nuclear arsenal by 1,000 warheads, the Soviet Union would be forced to respond in kind. Were the US to deploy 10 new ballistic missile submarines, the Soviet Union would have no choice but to follow suit. And so on.

The same theory is now being applied by some scholars with regards to the ongoing Sino-American Cold War.

And so, say the theory’s proponents, it’s better to remain weak and NOT to increase your strength. In total contrast to Reagan’s approach, these people claim military strength is actually dangerous. Better to be weak, they say; that way, you don’t threaten your adversary, and he has no reason to fear you.

 

Has It Actually Worked?

The theory was rejected by President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961) and his Administration. Instead, they adopted a policy of nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union and threatened massive nuclear retaliation in case of Soviet aggression.

This policy ensured that, for the entire Eisenhower era after the Korean War Armistice (1953), there was no confrontation between the two superpowers.

But by the late 1960s, the Soviet Union gained nuclear parity with the US. Civilian political theorists in the West had thus claimed that it was dangerous to be strong, that the two superpowers faced a “security dilemma”, and that any further increase in Western military strength would lead the Soviet Union to respond in kind.

And so, following this theory, the West (and especially the US) embarked on a naïve policy of détente ‘(read: appeasement) of the Soviet Union. And under this policy, the US began to gradually disarm itself and to forego some of its key defense programs, such as the B-1 Lancer bomber.

These peace initiatives, however, were not reciprocated by the Soviet Union. Quite the contrary. During the 1970s, the Kremlin embarked on the biggest peacetime military buildup in history. This put the West at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the USSR.

Yet, the peaceniks who coined (or used) the “security dilemma” theory” never learned from their mistake – because they are utterly incapable of doing so.

And so, when Ronald Reagan re-established strategic balance through his military buildup in the 1980s, the doves claimed that the buildup would present the USSR with a “security dilemma” and force it to pursue a new armament programme. And so, they claimed, this would lead to an escalation of the arms race and ultimately to nuclear war!

Yet, nothing of the sort happened. Ronald Reagan won the Cold War without firing a shot, and the Soviet Union peacefully dissolved in 1991.

 

The Fundamental Difference That Reagan Saw

There’s a good reason why Ronald Reagan succeeded, and why the “Security Dilemma” theory was proven wrong: there was no moral equivalence between the West and the Soviet Union. Consequently, the two camps did not “hold similar aspirations” at all, contrary to what Carter’s incompetent Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, wrongly claimed.

The West (led by the US) was a voluntary grouping of free, democratic states. These countries simply wanted to defend themselves against the threat of Soviet expansion.

By contrast, the Soviet Union was an evil, totalitarian empire which not only denied freedom to its own citizens, but constantly sought to expand its tyrannical rule around the world. The Cold War bloc dominated by Moscow – its satellite states – consisted of enslaved, formally sovereign but actually dependent republics, most of them occupied by the Soviet military. Whenever any of them tried to break free,  or even when their citizens reclaimed their basic rights, the Soviet Armed Forces immediately brought them back in line. Moscow ruled its empire with a grip of steel.

Ronald Reagan, better than anyone else, understood what the root cause of the Cold War really was. It wasn’t the arms race or the city of Berlin.

The root cause of the Cold War was the Soviet Union’s totalitarian nature and its insatiable appetite for expanding its tyrannical rule.

Accordingly, in 1983, the year of his “Evil Empire” speech, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 75, which defined changing the nature of the Soviet regime as the key objective of American grand strategy.

Ronald Reagan clearly understood that there could have been no durable peace between Washington and Moscow as long as the Soviet Union remained a totalitarian state. As he said:

“The real fight with this new totalitarianism belongs properly to the forces of liberal democracy, just as the battle did with Hitler’s totalitarianism. There is really no difference except for the cast of characters.”

And again in 1987, this time at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin:

“We must remember a crucial fact: East and West do not mistrust each other because we are armed; we are armed because we mistrust each other. And our differences are not about weapons but about liberty.”

 

Conclusion: the “Security Dilemma” theory is false

As we conclude, we can clearly see that the “Security Dilemma” theory is false, and was wrong from the start. The root cause of the Cold War (and the arms race that dominated it) was not the military strength of the US or of the Soviet Union; it was the totalitarian and expansionist nature of the latter.

The real question facing Western policymakers today is therefore not, “are we increasing our security at their expense?”. It is: “is our partner a democratic state who respects the rule of law, or a totalitarian regime with expansionist ambitions?”.

That is the fundamental question they need to ask themselves.

Comment battre le Daech et les terroristes islamiques en général ?

Vendredi, le 13 novembre, des terroristes islamiques appartenant à, ou commandités par, l’Etat Islamique (Daech) ont frappé la France et tue plus de 120 personnes.

Cela malgré toutes les restrictions des libertés publiques mises en oeuvre après les attentats du janvier.

La question se pose : que faut-il faire maintenant ? Mais avant d’y répondre, il faut d’abord expliquer une autre chose : pourquoi l’EI a-t-il frappé l’Occident et comment l’EI est-il né ? D’ou vient le terrorisme islamique ?

Il faut faire la diagnose correcte avant de faire des prescriptions.

Les causes du terrorisme islamique

Il y a plusieurs causes du terrorisme islamique, plusieurs motivations qui poussent des musulmans à faire du djihad, qui malheureusement renforcent l’une l’autre, notamment:

• L’idéologie djihadiste – une idéologie de haine envers non-musulmans qui appelle les musulmans à conquêter le monde non-islamique;
• Le soutien historique (et actuel) de l’Occident pour des dictateurs tyranniques dans plusieurs pays musulmans (notamment en Iran, Irak et Egypte, ainsi qu’aujourd’hui pour les monarchies absolues du Golfe arabe et au gouvernement pakistanien);
• L’occupation répressive des territoires palestiniens par l’Israel et ses attaques périodiques contre les Palestiniens (et le soutien continu et inconditionnel de Washington pour Tel Aviv);
• Les interventions des USA au Moyen-Orient et les tortures utilisées par les Americains à Abou Ghraib et à Guantanamo; et
• Plus généralement, la pauvreté et la tyrannie sous laquelle vivent les résidents de la plupart des pays musulmans.

Dans le cas spécifique de l’Etat Islamique (EI), né en 2006 en Irak en conséquence de l’invasion américaine de ce pays trois ans plus tôt, sa montée en puissance est due d’un grand part au président syrien Bachar el-Assad:

• D’abord, parce que M. Assad mène, depuis 2011, une guerre génocidaire contre son propre peuple et a déjà tué 250 000 de ses concitoyens, pour la plupart des femmes et des enfants, souvent avec des armes chimiques;
• D’un autre cote, parce que M. Assad a relâché en 2011 des centaines de terroristes islamiques de ses prisons ; ces terroristes ont ensuite rejoint l’EI ;
• Enfin, parce que depuis le début de la guerre civile en Syrie (en 2011) M. Assad a attaqué exclusivement les positions de l’opposition syrienne moderée, pas celles de l’EI.

Bien évidemment, l’invasion américaine de l’Irak en 2003 a aussi nettement contribué à cette conflagaration qui est actuellement en train de détruire la région. Les Américains ont déposé le dictateur irakien sounnite Saddam Hussein et ont ensuite organisé des élections remportées par la majorité chiite irakienne (répressée par Saddam) ménée par le politicien chiite revanchiste Nouri al-Maliki. Celui-ci a ensuite commencé une chasse aux sorcières contre les sounnites – une campagne de répression systematique contre la minorité sounnite. Il a aussi expulsé presque tous les sounnites du gouvernement irakien et de ses services secrètes.

Cette répression a provoqué une grande rebelle sounnite contre le gouvernement al-Maliki que l’interessé a essayé d’etouffer par force militaire avec l’aide des Américains. Cette politique a echoué et a méné, en 2006, à la naissance de l’Etat Islamique.

La situation a été un peu calmee en 2007-2008 quand l’extremité de la violence des islamistes a bouleversé les sounnites eux-mêmes, ce qui a permis à l’armée américaine à stabiliser un peu la situation. Mais au lieu de chercher la réconciliation avec les sounnites, al-Maliki a renforcé la répression contre eu, ainsi destabilisant l’Irak a nouveau, ce qui a aidé énormement à la montée en puissance de l’EI. Encore pire, les troupes américaines ont quitté l’Irak en 2011 et en 2014, en face de l’Etat Islamique, l’armée irakienne – bien que dotée de l’équipement américain le plus moderne – a abandonné ses armes et pris la fuite. Ce qui a permis à l’EI de s’emparer d’une bonne partie de l’Irak.

Que ne faut-il pas faire ?

Dans l’Occident, il y a ceux qui prônent une alliance avec la Russie de Vladimir Poutine, l’Iran des mollahs et le régime de Bachar el-Assad pour combattre l’EI. Parmi les partisans d’une telle solution sont des politiciens de la droite et de la gauche française, notamment Nicolas Sarkozy, François Fillon, Christian Estrosi, Pierre Lellouche (considéré le meilleur “expert” des Républicains sur les affaires étrangères) et Marine Le Pen.

Toutefois, ils ont complètement tort. Une alliance avec le régime d’Assad et avec ses mecènes russe et iranien serait la pire faute que l’Occident puisse commettre, pour des raisons déjà expliquées ci-dessus. D’abord parce que le dictateur génocidaire syrien, ayant tué avec prémeditation un quart d’un million de ses compatriots, est la meilleure affiche de récrutement pour l’EI – il est une énorme obstacle, pas une aide, à la victoire sur Daech. Ensuite parce que il est un pantin de la Russie et de l’Iran. En le sauvant, nous aiderons donc Moscou et Téhéran à faire du Moyen Orient leur zone d’influence exclusive.

N’oublions pas que – comme indiqué ci-dessus – l’une des causes principales du terrorisme au monde est le soutien historique aux dictateurs de certains pays du Moyen Orient, notamment Saddam Hussein et le dernier Shah de l’Iran. (En fait, l’Occident soutient toujours les monarchies absolues de la Péninsule Arabe.) Il ne faut pas commettre la même faute encore, dans ce cas avec Assad. Particulièrement pas maintenant, apres que Assad a déjà exterminé 250 000 de ses compatriotes et s’est donc fait valoir la haine de la grande plupart de ses compatriotes.

En ce qui concerne l’Iran et la Russie, ces pays constituent eux-mêmes des menaces très serieuses à la sécurité de l’Europe entiere en raison de leurs programmes nucléaires et missiliers. En particulier, la Russie, avec son vaste arsenal atomique (7 500 tetes) et ses menaces fréquentes d’utilisation de l’arme ultime contre des pays européens, menace la sécurité et la paix de tout le monde occidental. Or, les russophiles comme MM. Sarkozy, Fillon, Estrosi et Lellouche vont permettre a la Russie de creer du Moyen-Orient sa zone d’influence exclusive.

Que fait-il faire ?

Pour vaincre l’EI et résoudre – plus ou moins – la crise syrienne, il faut tirer des leçons de la diagnose ci-dessus et donc:

• Continuer de bombarder l’EI de l’air.
• Augmenter nettement l’approvisionnement en armes de l’opposition syrienne moderée et des Kourdes (ceux derniers se sont révélés comme une force militaire très efficace contre l’EI).
• Contraindre Bachar el-Assad à quitter le pouvoir ou le renverser et convaincre l’opinion publique syrienne qu’il y a une alternative anti-Assad à l’EI.
• Aider à trouver une réconciliation parmi les groupes divers de la societé syrienne pour faciliter la transition de la Syrie vers un avenir démocratique post-Assad.

Il y a 2 500 ans, le stratège chinois Sun Tzu a écrit que “en guerre, la façon de gagner est d’éviter ce qui est fort et attaquer ce qui est faible.” La force militaire de l’EI – ses armes et le fanatisme de ses militants – sont leur point le plus fort. La plus grande faiblesse de Daech est sa brutalité, voire sa barbarité, envers les populations conquises. C’est sa terreur utilisée contre les populations assujeties.

Il faut donc “attaquer” cette faiblesse de l’EI en montrant aux Syriens – et à tous les peuples actuellement gouvernés par la dictature de l’EI – qu’ils ont une chance d’un avenir de sécurité, de liberté et de paix. Mais l’Occident aura la capabilité à le faire – dans ce cas, la crédibilité morale – seulement s’il se distance complètement du régime d’Assad et exigera son départ ou le renversera.

Une alliance avec Assad discréditerait l’Occident complètement – en le démontrant comme hypocritique – et détruirait toute chance de victoire sur l’EI. Une alliance de l’Occident avec Assad ne laisserait au peuple syrien aucune possibilité de renverser ce dictateur sauf le soutien pour l’EI – et c’est ce que les Syriens choisiront si la seule alternative est le régime d’Assad.

Globalement, dans la lutte contre le terrorisme islamique, il ne suffit pas de le frapper la ou les djihadistes ont des bases. Il faut d’abord eliminer les causes premieres du terrorisme islamique. C’est-a-dire, tous les pays du Moyen Orient devraient commencer une transition democratique, vers un avenir sans dictatures, vers une forme du gouvernement qui conviendra le plus a ces pays mais qui respectera aussi les droits d’homme – pour tous leurs citoyens. Le Moyen Orient ne peut plus être gouverné par des dictateurs ou par des fanatiques religieux. C’est un récipe pour produire plus d’extremisme islamique et donc plus de terrorisme. Une telle transition sera sans doute très difficile, mais elle est nécessaire.

Il faudra donc progressivement abandonner les alliances/amitiés que l’Occident entretient actuellement avec les monarchies petrolières de la Péninsule Arabe. Il faut les contraindre (ainsi que contraindre la Turquie) à cesser leur double jeu et couper tous leurs liens avec tout groupe islamique. Il faut qu’ils cessent de soutenir la propagation de toute idéologie islamiste/djihadiste dans l’Occident.

Il faut aussi renforcer certains dispositifs de sécurité à l’Occident. Par exemple, il faut priver les djihadistes (au moins les binationaux) de leur nationalité occidentale, déporter ce qui ne l’ont pas, arrêter l’accueil des “réfugiés” syriens, fermer tous les sites et chaines YouTube djihadistes, armer les polices municipales et les services de sûreté de la RATP et la SNCF et équiper tous les transports en commun de vidéoprotection. Il est aussi possible d’installer des détecteurs de métaille/d’explosifs aux portes du métro, du RER et des certains quais ferroviaires.

Mais ce sont des mesures qui peuvent seulement adoucir le problème, pas le résoudre.

Surtout, il ne faut absolument pas rendre les libertés qui ont fait de l’Occident la meilleure civilisation au monde. Il faut, en fait, abroger les dispositifs et lois répressifs qui ont été adoptées depuis le 11 septembre 2011 et particulièrement depuis les attentats du janvier 2015. Ces dispositifs n’ont fait et ne feront RIEN pour nous protéger contre le terrorisme. En fait, ils ont déjà complètement et incontestablement échoué, comme les attentants du 13 novembre 2015 démontrent.

Rendre nos libertés et créer un état policier, cela donnerait aux terroristes islamiques la victoire même qu’ils cherchent.

 

New START treaty: An Utter Failure

The State Department has released the newest (September 2015) data on U.S. and Russian strategic weapon inventories disclosed under the New START treaty.

And boy, is the data troubling!

Since the last disclosure (in July 2015, based on March 2015 numbers), Russia has significantly INCREASED its arsenal of deployed strategic nuclear warheads (i.e. ones aimed at the United States) from 1,582 then to 1,648 today, a hike of 66 warheads. Likewise, its fleet of deployed strategic warhead delivery vehicles (i.e. missiles and aircraft carrying those warheads) has grown from 515 then to 526 now. This does not count Russia’s fleet of 151 Tu-22M strategic bombers (not counted under New START) that are capable of carrying 10 nuclear-tipped cruise missiles each.

As Pavel Podvig explains on his blog:

“The increase of 66 deployed warheads and nine launchers is most likely due to the deployment of Bulava missiles on the Alexander Nevskiy submarine that was completed in April 2015. Also, some older missiles were probably withdrawn from service.”

This is because, as I’ve pointed out in numerous publications, including my forthcoming book on nuclear deterrence, Russia is replacing older, single- and four-warhead missiles with new ones carrying up to 10-12 warheads. The Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile carries up to 10 warheads, as do new Russian Yars and Yars-M ICBMs.

By contrast, the US has unilaterally cut its inventory of deployed strategic warheads and launchers. It currently deploys 1,538 strategic warheads (1,597 in March) and 762 delivery systems (785 in March). This means the US is essentially unilaterally disarming itself while Russia is rapidly building up its strategic nuclear arsenal. In other words, the US is slowly committing national suicide.

This also means that the US is strictly complying with the New START treaty and has already gone below the limit of 1,550 warheads authorized by that accord, while Russia is ignoring the pact and is growing up, rather than cutting or even freezing the growth of, its strategic deployed nuclear stockpile. This is consistent with the United States’ record of rigorously complying with arms control treaties and with Russia’s record of systematically violating them.

All of this means that the pro-arms-control community – including the Arms Control Association, the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, the Ploughshares Fund, et al., as well as the Obama Administration – were dead wrong when they extolled the New START treaty’s supposed virtues.

They claimed the treaty would keep check on Russia’s nuclear arsenal and even lead to cuts in it while promoting strategic stability and transparency. But the treaty has utterly failed to do so. Instead, it has led to a deep, unilateral cut in America’s nuclear arsenal while allowing Russia to embark on the largest strategic nuclear buildup since the Cold War. It has allowed Russia to significantly increase its strategic nuclear arsenal – and if recent experience is any indication, Russia’s nuclear arsenal will grow in the future still further.

Nor has the treaty led to greater strategic stability and transparency. On the contrary, Russia’s strategic nuclear buildup, coupled with America’s unilateral disarmament, are gravely undermining strategic stability – between the two countries as well as globally. And Russia’s transparency on nuclear matters, especially regarding its strategic missiles, has only declined since New START’s ratification.

Yet, these organizations still falsely claim that New START  is “doing its job”. But what is New START’s “job”? What is the treaty’s purpose?

If it is to make the U.S. cut its strategic nuclear arsenal unilaterally, New START is doing that job superbly.

However, if its purpose is, or was, to reduce or at least freeze the Russian nuclear arsenal and to promote strategic stability and nuclear transparency on Russia’s part, the treaty has utterly failed to fulfill any of these purpose. It is an utter, unqualified failure.

Contrary to the pro-arms-control community’s and the Obama Administration’s claims that the treaty – and nuclear arsenal cuts more broadly – advance US national interests, the contrary is true. New START, and cuts in America’s nuclear deterrent more arsenal, only undermine U.S. national interests and national security by undermining its deterring power while allowing America’s potential adversaries to build up their arsenals – and thus their ability to threaten the U.S. and its allies.

No accord is a better example of this than New START.

Making matters worse, the treaty:

• Does not count Russia’s 151 Tu-22M strategic bombers as strategic, and therefore doesn’t limit this bomber fleet (and the nuclear weapons deployed on it) at all. Yet, the Tu-22M is clearly a strategic, intercontinental bomber. Even without aerial refueling, it can hit targets on the West Coast if flown from Chukotka. With air refueling, it can hit any targets anywhere in the US (or the world, for that matter).
• Does not prohibit Russia from developing rail-based ICBMs – which Russia is doing right now.
• Does not limit Russia’s nuclear-tipped submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). (The U.S. has no such missiles, only conventional ones. The nuclear-armed ones were withdrawn from service in 2010 by the Obama administration as part of the administration’s unilateral disarmament policy.)
• Does not at all limit Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal, which is 10 times greater than that of the U.S.

The New START treaty is, by any objective yardstick, an utter failure and a grave threat to U.S. national security.

What The U.S. Government Should Do

Congress should:

• Fully fund, and where appropriate, increase funding for, U.S. nuclear arsenal modernization – the missiles, the submarines, the bombers, the warheads, and the facilities.
• Require the USAF to make the Long Range Strike Bomber ready for, and certified for, nuclear missions as soon as the said bomber type enters service.
• Completely cut off funding for New START implementation until Russia: a) starts significantly reducing its deployed strategic arsenal; and b) resumes compliance with the INF Treaty.
• Impose the heaviest economic sanctions possible on Russia if it doesn’t comply with the above, and if it still doesn’t comply, permanently prohibit implementation of the New START treaty.

The Executive Branch should:

• Impose the heaviest economic sanctions possible on Russia if it doesn’t comply with the above, and if it still doesn’t comply, abrogate the New START and INF Treaties.
• If Russia does comply, renegotiate new START si that it will cover Russia’s 151 Tu-22M bombers, limit nuclear-tipped SLCMs, prohibit the deployment of multiple warheads on ICBMs, and prohibit the development of rail-based ICBMs. Counting the Tu-22M bombers would increase the number of deployed strategic Russian delivery systems from 526 to 787, and the total number of delivery systems from 890 to 1,041, requiring Russia to dismantle 241 such systems (e.g. all Tu-22Ms and a further 90 delivery systems).

 

La dissuasion nucléaire : contre les mensonges

Le nouveau numéro du journal Revue Défense Nationale (le N° 782 – ÉTÉ 2015) est paru. Le sujet central de ce numéro est la force de dissuasion nucléaire française. Une trentaine d’articles a été publiée à cette occassion dans ce numéro.

La plupart des articles est solidement fondée sur une base d’une recherche honnête. Ils expliquent les menaces à la securité de la France aujourd’hui et pourquoi la France a toujours besoin de sa force de dissuasion ; et pourquoi elle ne peut en aucun cas dépendre des Etats-Unis pour sa securité.

Malheureusement, la rédaction de la RDN a decidé – pour des raisons d’équilibre des vues – de publier aussi des articles écrits par des farouches opposants à la dissuasion nucl »aire ; des articles mensongères qui ne propagent que des mythes et des mensonges.

Parmi eux sont les articles de Bernard Norlain et Jean-Marie Collin. Le premier appelle au désarmement nucléaire global, une utopie complétement irréaliste et impossible tant les bombes atomiques sont les armes les plus puissantes au monde. Le deuxième – qui se dit un „expert” sur les questions de la défense – est même plus irréaliste : il appelle la France à se désarmer unilateralement (Risque nucléaire militaire ou désarmement nucléaire ?).

Concretement, Jean-Marie Collin pretend que :

« Une démarche volontariste de désarmement nucléaire conduite par la France pourrait être bénéfique en contribuant à diminuer les tensions actuelles, notamment entre Moscou et Washington. La discussion doit être lancée pour supprimer les armes nucléaires. »

Ce sont des mensonges totales.

Une démarche volontaire (c’est-à-dire, unilatérale) de désarmement du côté de la France ne ferait RIEN pour reduire les tensions parmi les autres puissances nucleaires du monde, ou entre l’Occident et la Russie generalement. Un tel acte de désarmament nucléaire unilatéral ne ferait aussi RIEN pour stimuler un désarmament nucléaire mondial. C’est pour deux raisons :

• La force de dissuasion nucléaire française n’est pas du tout la source des tensions entre la Russie et l’Occident. Ce n’est pas ce qui a provoqu » ces tensions. Les vraies raisons de cette nouvelle guerre froide entre Moscou et l’Occident sont :
• D’un côté, la détérmination de la Russie de rétablir sa dominance historique sur les pays de l’est européen, et particulierement sur les autres républiques de l’ex-URSS, une détérmination qui a déjà méné la Russie à envahir 2 parmi ses voisins (Georgie, Ukraine) et de menacer d’autres pays de l’ex-Pacte de Varsovie (notamment la Pologne et la Roumanie) ; et
• D’autre cote, l’expansion de l’OTAN menée, et le deploiement du bouclier anti-missiles aux pays de l’est-européen planifié, par les USA, ce que la Russie considère (non sans raison) comme des gestes hostiles, voire comme un encerclement d’elle. C’est encore pire parce que la Russie se sent aussi menacée par des pays musulmans à ses frontières de sud et par la Chine à son sud-est.
• Un désarmement unilateral de la France ne ferait RIEN pour réduire les tensions parmi la Russie et l’Occident ou stimuler un meilleur comportement (et encore moins un désarmament nucléaire) de la part de Moscou ou Washington. Même si la France se désarmait completement, la Russie et les USA retiendraient de vastes arsenaux nucléaires et conventionnels hors tout contrôle de la France ou d’autres pays, et les deux superpuissances continueraient à mener la politique militaire qui leur plait, sans aucun regard sur l’avis de la France.
• En fait, la France sans l’arme nucleaire peserait beaucoup MOINS qu’aujourd’hui et tout le monde se ficherait de son avis. Encore pire, une France sans l’arme nucléaire serait une France privée totalement de sa seule défense contre une attaque nucléaire, et donc totalement dépendante des USA.
• Encore pire, un désarmament nucléaire de la France aurait l’effet d’encourager la Russie d’amplifier ses menaces envers l’Occident et d’augmenter encore plus son arsenal nucléaire (deja le plus grand au monde, sauf celui des USA) et conventionnel. Une France sans sa force de dissuasion serait une cible et une victime potentielle d’aggression beaucoup plus facile, et donc beaucoup plus attractive pour la Russie (et tout autre aggresseur). En plus, un geste de désarmement unilateral par la France ne ferait RIEN pour stimuler un désarmement nucléaire mondial ou des deux grands; au contraire, les autres puissances atomiques prendraient vite avantage de la faiblesse militaire de la France.
• La France sans l’arme nucleaire ne peserait presque rien au monde et serait totalement dependante des deux grands, toujours exposee a leur chantage nucleaire. Rappelons-nous de ce qui s’est passe en 1956, pendant l’operation a Suez: les Etats-Unis avaient demande une fin immediate a cette operation, et l’Union Sovietique avait menace la France d’une attaque nucleaire si Paris persistait. L’armee francaise a donc du se retirer de l’Egypte sous le chantage atomique sovietique. Ceci ne doit plus se passer jamais.

Quand aux propos de J.-M. Collin que La discussion doit être lancée pour supprimer les armes nucléaires – des propos aussi exprimés par Bernard Norlain dans son propre article dans le même numéro – c’est aussi totalement irréaliste et infantile. Soyons clairs: il n’y a AUCUNE chance du desarmement nucleaire global tant que l’arme atomique est l’arme la plus puissante au monde – et encore moins quand elle est aussi attractive a beaucoup de pays qu’aujourd’hui. Dans l’avenir previsible, AUCUNE autre puissance atomique ne se desarmera pas – ni les USA, ni le Royaume-Uni, ni la Chine, ni la Russie, ni l’Inde, ni le Pakistan, ni l’Israel, ni la Coree du Nord – et il est presque certain que le club nucleaire sera rejoint par des nouveaux membres, notamment l’Iran et – s’il y reussi – l’Arabie Saoudite et les autres petromonarchies du Golfe arabo-persique.

Comment naif et utopiste doit-on etre pour croire que ces pays vont rendre ses armes nucleaires? C’est totalement irrealiste et utopique. C’est dangereusement naif.

La planète ne marche pas dans la direction d’un monde sans l’arme nucléaire, mais au contraire dans la direction de PLUS d’armes nucléaires et PLUS d’états en dotés. Il n’y a AUCUNE chance du désarmement nucléaire mondial.

Etant donné, il faut que la France conduisse une politique de défense réaliste et pas fantaste; il faut qu’elle modernise et augmente sa force de dissuasion nucléaire.

Un autre opposant de dissuasion, François Jourdier, préconise une réduction de la force de dissuasion à un niveau « a minima » afin de dégager des « économies » qui, selon lui, pourraient renforcer les forces conventionnelles de la France :

La dissuasion nécessite un vrai débat portant sur sa finalité et les moyens nécessaires. Une approche a minima pourrait se révéler plus pertinente, tout en dégageant des économies à réinvestir dans les programmes conventionnels.

Mais c’est aussi un mensonge. La dissuasion ne represente que 11% du budget total de la Défense et moins d’un quart des dépenses d’équipement dans le cadre de la Loi de Programmation Militaire en vigeur (2014-2019). La composante aérienne de la force de dissuasion ne coute qu’env. 200 millions d’Euros par an, ce qui est une très petite somme. La supprimation de la composante aérienne – ou même de toute la force de dissuasion – ne ferait donc grande chose pour renforcer les forces conventionnelles de l’armée française.

Il faut aussi noter que la force de dissuasion française est d’ores et déjà au niveau strictement minimal. Il serait suicidal d’aller au-dessous de ce niveau, comme l’ont reconnu les gouvernements successifs de la droite et la gauche. En fait, il faut AUGMENTER l’arsenal atomique francais, vu toutes les menaces nucléaires à la securité de la France.

Il faut aussi noter que la force de dissuasion française a déjà ete fortement réduite – par presque 50% – depuis la fin de la guerre froide. A l’époque, les politiciens avaient promis aux Français qu’en revanche les forces conventionnelles de la France soient renforcées. Mais l’inverse s’est passé : tandis que l’arsenal nucléaire francais a été fortement réduit, les forces conventionnelles ont aussi été affabliées.

Il ne faut pas donc croire en promesses vides qu’une nouvelle réduction de la force de dissuasion permettrait de renforcer les forces conventionnelles. Comme toujours, toutes les deux seraient affaibliées de nouveau.

Il est aussi tout simplement mensongère d’opposer la dissuasion aux forces conventionnelles et prétendre que l’une est financée au détriment de l’autre. C’est faux. La France a besoin de, et le gouvernement devrait financer suffisament, toutes les deux.

La senatrice de Paris Leila Aichi (EELV), quant a elle, pretend que :

La dissuasion nucléaire est considérée comme obsolète et ne répondant plus aux besoins de défense actuels. Un débat citoyen est nécessaire en préconisant une Europe de la défense plus à même de répondre aux défis sécuritaires.

Ce sont aussi des mensonges. La dissuasion nucléaire n’est pas du tout obsolète. Elle est plus pertinente que jamais, parce qu’elle repond au besoin le plus important de défense actuel : le besoin d’une protection fiable contre les menaces étatiques graves (surtout nucléaires, chimiques, biologiques, et conventionnelles majeures) à la securité de la France.

La Russie possède un vaste arsenal atomique d’environ 8 000 têtes, dont plus de 2 000 têtes stratégiques portées par 375 missiles intercontinentaux sol-sol, 231 bombardiers stratégiques (Tu-95, Tu-22M, Tu-160), et 15 sous-marins lanceurs d’engins (SNLE), armes de 16-20 missiles ballistiques chacun. Le reste de l’arsenal atomique du Kremlin peut être porté par une grande variété de vecteurs, y compris des missiles sol-sol de courte et moyenne portée (Iskander et R-500), des sous-marins dotés des missiles de croisière (les classes Oscar II, Akula, Graney, Sierra, et Victor), des bombardiers de moyenne portee Su-34 Fullback[1], des avions d’attaque Sukhoi, des navires de surface, et même des pièces d’artillerie. Tous ces vecteurs sont capables de porter des milliers de têtes nucléaires à la France.

En effet, les sous-marins d’attaque et de croisière russes fonctionnent comme des SNLE – ils portent d’habitude des missiles armés des têtes atomiques et peuvent tirer ses missiles à n’importe quelle cible au monde. Y compris des cibles en France, contre quelle la Russie n’hesitera pas d’utiliser ses armes nucleaires si la France se desarme.

Et la menace nucleaire posee par la Russie n’est pas du tout theoretique. Depuis 2007, la Russie a deja menace 15 fois de cibler ou meme d’utiliser l’arme nucleaire contre les pays de l’est europeen et meme contre des pays neutraux comme la Suede, et meme contre la Danemark – un membre de l’OTAN! Le Kremlin a meme recemment menace la Suede de guerre si celle-ci integre l’OTAN! La Russie a aussi menace generalement tout l’Occident d’utiliser ses armes nucleaires premiere. Ses bombardiers strategiques, avec des missiles nucleaires de croisiere Kh-15 et Kh-55 a bord, testent regulierement le temps de reaction des defenses aeriennes des pays de l’OTAN et du Japon. Le Kremlin a aussi envahi deux de ses voisins, la Georgie et l’Ukraine – cette derniere s’etant desarmee unilateralement en 1994 apres avoir recu des “garanties” du Kremlin de respecter son independance et son integralite territoriale.

Et maintenant, ayant deja illegalement envahi et annexe la Crimee, la Russie menace d’y deployer des armes nucleaires, ainsi qu’a l’arrondissement de Kaliningrad, aux portes de la Pologne et de l’UE.

La Russie est tout simplement un aggresseur arme du plus grand arsenal nucleaire au monde, un arsenal que le Kremlin continue toujours a aggrandir. Il serait totalement suicidal de se desarmer face a cette menace.

Il faut y ajouter la menace réelle de la Corée du Nord, qui possède déjà des missiles intercontinentaux (Taepodong-2 et KN-08) et env. 20 têtes atomiques et est un train de développer des sous-marins lanceurs d’engins, et l’Iran, qui développe des armes atomiques et des missiles ballistiques de longue portée.

La plus grande menace à la securite de la France – de très loin – est celle posée par les arsenaux et programmes nucléaires et missilières de Moscou, Pyongyang, et Téhéran. Et le SEUL moyen qui peut protéger la France et l’Europe contre ces menaces est la dissuasion nucléaire.

Les opposants de la dissuasion nucleaire ont TOTALEMENT tort. Non, la dissuasion n’est pas du tout obsolète. La force de dissuasion française – très loin d’être obsolète – est donc plus pertinente que jamais !

[1] Le Su-34 a un rayon d’action de 3 000 km, auquel il faut ajouter la portee de ses missiles de croisiere (dotes des tetes nucleaires) Kh-55, qui possedent aussi une portee de 3 000 km. Cette portee nominale peut etre encore augmentee un peu si le Su-34 vole vite et haut.

India, Take Note: Ditching the Rafale for the Su-30MKI Would Be A Grave Mistake

As mentioned here previously, and as reported already by DefenseNews, India is considering breaking negotiations to buy the French Rafale fighter and buying more Su-30MKIs instead. This is supposedly due to both budgetary reasons and heavy Russian lobbying.

If India were to do so, this would be a grave mistake that would cost India dearly in the very near future. Here’s why.

The Su-30MKI, as I have demonstrated earlier, is DECISIVELY inferior to the Dassault Rafale on all counts:

• SIZE: The Su-30MKI (like all other Flanker variants) is much bigger and hotter, and therefore much easier to detect visually, with infrared sensors (such as the Rafale’s OSF), and with radar, than the Rafale, which is a small aircraft with a wingspan of just 10.8 m. In confrontation with the PLAAF’s J-7, J-10, and J-31 fighters, or the Pakistani Air Force’s J-7, Mirage 5, F-16, and JF-17 fighters, Indian Su-30MKI pilots will be at a distinct disadvantage: they will be detected visually and with IR sensors long before they can detect these small fighters.
• PILOT VIEW: Its pilot doesn’t have a good rearward view from his cockpit, unlike the Rafale’s pilot, who enjoys full, unobstructed view in all directions from his own cockpit.
• WEIGHT: It is much heavier, and therefore is far less capable of transitioning from one maneuver to another, than the Rafale.
• MANEUVERABILITY: It is far less maneuverable than the French fighter: its wing loading and thrust/weight ratios are 401 kg/sq m and 1.00:1 at 56% fuel, respectively. For the Rafale, the figures are 306 kg/sq m and around 1.23:1. In fact, at a full fuel and weapon load, the Rafale still has a 0.988:1 thrust/weight ratio – almost the same ratio as the one achieved by the Su-30MKI at a 56% weapons load. This means that a fully-loaded Rafale is as maneuverable as a half-fully-loaded Su-30MKI, while a half-fully-loaded Rafale can run circles around a Flanker.
• RATE OF CLIMB: The Su-30MKI’s rate of climb (300 m/s) is inferior to that of the Rafale (305 m/sq).
• WEAPONS LOAD: It can’t carry as many arms as the Rafale can (12 at most, versus 13-14 for the Rafale), nor are the Russian-supplied weapons as capable as those offered by France’s MBDA (which include the supersonic, 160-km-range Meteor ramjet missile and the 50-km-range MICA IR-guided missile).
• TAKEOFF FROM MAKESHIFT RUNWAYS: It can’t take off from highways or unpaved runways – unlike the Rafale – because its wingspan and the takeoff distance requirement are too great. By contrast, the Rafale, with a wingspan of just 10.8 metres, can take off from any Western highway (motorway).
• MAINTENANCE: It spends 4 times as many hours in maintenance for 1 hour of flight than the Rafale (32 vs 8). It’s a veritable hangar queen.

How do these glaring weaknesses translate into inferiority and vulnerability in combat?

To prevail in air combat, one must:

• Be capable of defending one’s own airspace anytime, on call, at a moment’s notice if need be;
• Be harder to detect than the enemy and detect him faster so that he’ll be shot down unaware of his attacker (as 80% of all fighters shot down throughout aviation history were);
• If possible, be more numerous than the enemy;
• Provide one’s own pilots with more flight hours than the enemy to practice flying skills;
• Be more maneuverable than the enemy;
• Be more capable of transitioning from one maneuver to another than the enemy.

The Dassault Rafale meets these requirements. The Su-30MKI does not. The Rafale needs only 8 hours of maintenance for every hour flown, so a squadron can be called into duty at any moment and, with a sufficient budget, pilot skills can be maintained. It is small and has a tiny thermal signature, and is thus hard to detect. It is highly maneuverable and can run circles around bigger, heavier, more sluggish aircraft than the Su-30MKI. And it provides its pilot with full unobstructed horizontal view from the cockpit. The same cannot be said of the Su-30.

The Su-30MKI will leave the Indian Air Force at a deep disadvantage vis-a-vis the PAF (flying J-7s, Mirage 5s, F-16s, J-10s, and JF-17s) and J-7, J-10, and J-31-equipped squadrons of the PLAAF. These aircraft are all much smaller, lighter, more maneuverable, and have a much smaller infrared (thermal) signature than the Su-30. Being lighter, they can also transition from one maneuver to another far easier than the Su-30 can; and being much smaller than the Su-30, they can easily take off from highways or even dirt strips (excluding possibly the J-31).

Also, they (except possibly the J-31) spend far, far less time in maintenance than the Su-30MKI, and excluding the J-7 (which both the PLAAF and the PAF are now retiring), they offer their pilots full, unobstructed 360 degree horizontal view from the cockpit – like the Rafale, but unlike the Su-30MKI. In fact, giving the pilot such unobstructed view was a formal requirement for both the F-16 and the Rafale programs. So a PLAAF or PAF pilot flying one of the aircraft types listed above can sneak up undetected upon the Su-30MKI from the rear and shoot him down unaware, but the reverse is not the case.

Unlike the deeply and irredeemably flawed Su-30MKI, the Dassault Rafale, if procured by India, would give the IAF an advantage over both the PLAAF and the PAF, because it matches or bests all of their fighter aircraft on all the parametres listed above, including size, weight, thermal signature, maneuverability, takeoff capacity, weapons, sensors, flying availability, and ease of maintenance.

Compared to the Rafale, PLAAF and PAF aircraft are inferior by at least one criterion:

• The MiG-21/J-7 (like the Flanker family) was intended to be a supersonic interceptor. Its pilot’s view to the rear is severely obstructed.
• The J-7, Mirage 5, and JF-17 lack modern sensors which the Rafale has (which is not surprising, given that the Mirage 5 first flew in 1967; it was an excellent fighter in its day, but not anymore).
• The F-16, the J-10, and the J-31, while far more maneuverable and far lighter than the Su-30, are nonetheless less maneuverable, and accelerate worse, than the Rafale. The wing loading ratios are: 449 kg/sq m for the F-16, 381 kg/sq m for the J-10, and 306 kg/sq m for the Rafale. The T/W ratios at 50% fuel + ammo are: 1.095:1 for the F-16, 1.16:1 for the J-10, and around 1.23:1 for the Rafale. The F-16’s climb rate is only 254 m/s, while the Rafale’s is 305 m/s.
• The J-31 is larger, and may be hotter, than the Rafale, making it easier for a Rafale pilot to detect, either visually or with the French fighter’s excellent OSF IRST system. (Detecting the much bigger J-20 would, of course, be even easier.)

In short, the Su-30MKI is decisively inferior to the Dassault Rafale and to many fighter types flown by China’s PLAAF and Pakistan’s PAF – the two most likely adversaries India will face in the future – while the Rafale can beat every fighter type flown by either of these organisations. It is an aircraft which, owing to its combination of small size, radar and thermal signature reduction, maneuverability, speed, armament, and ease of maintenance will give New Delhi an edge over both China and Pakistan. It can also be integrated with India’s newest Astra missile and is already capable of carrying the much longer-ranged Meteor Beyond Visual Range missile. India would therefore be well advised to cease Su-30MKI production, ditch any plan of substituting the Su-30 for the Rafale, and procure the Dassault aircraft.

Rebuttal of liberals’ lies about nuclear weapons

Bad, ridiculous ideas, bad and ridiculous policies, and treasonous proposals never seem to die. Such is the case with the Left’s ongoing, decades-old campaign to disarm the US unilaterally. The extremely-leftist, anti-defense, treasonous Senator (and former Congressman) from Massachusetts, Ed Markey, and his far-left allies in the Congress, have reintroduced their insane, treasonous bill, mistitled “The Smarter Approach to Nuclear Expenditures (SANE) Act.”

That bill, were it to pass (God forbid), would dramatically expedite America’s unilateral nuclear disarmament. It would cut the existing fleet of ballistic missile submarines from 14 to 8, cut the planned replacement fleet from 12 to 8, delay the urgently-needed Long Range Strike Bomber (LRSB) (needed to replace obsolete B-52s and B-1s), cut the number of USAF ICBMs from 420 to just 300, dramatically cut funding for extending the service lives of nuclear warheads, and deny any funding for the development of a new ICBM (needed to replace the old Minuteman III missiles now in service). In short, it would disarm the US by dramatically cutting the nuclear arsenal America now has, and allowing what would be left of it to decay and rust out due to old age.

In support of his treasonous proposals, Sen. Markey has lied that:

“We are robbing America’s future to pay for unneeded weapons of the past. As we debate the budget and Republicans rally around devastating cuts to Medicare, Head Start and investments in research and science, it makes no sense to fund a bloated nuclear arsenal that does nothing to keep our nation safe in the 21st century.”

Tony Fleming, the said Tony Fleming, campaigns director of Citizens for Global Solutions, a progressive advocacy group based in Washington, defended Markey’s treasonous proposals by making similar, utterly false claims:

“The more tangible threats facing the United States today come from a suitcase or a personal computer. We’re more likely to suffer a cyber or terrorist attack from a small rogue group than be hit by a nuclear bomb that requires massive government infrastructure and investment. U.S. citizens deserve to have their tax dollars be used to protect them from real, 21st century, threats, not Cold War-era relics.”

What is wrong with their claims?

To start with, EVERYTHING.

Firstly, nuclear weapons are not “Cold War era relics” nor “unneeded weapons of the past”, and the US nuclear arsenal is not bloated. America’s nuclear weapons are crucial instruments of deterrence indispensable for protecting the US – and its allies – against the gravest threats to America’s and its allies’ security.

These gravest threats are the nuclear and ballistic missile arsenals of Russia, China, and North Korea (soon to be joined by Iran), NOT terrorists, “small rogue groups”, cyberattacks, suitcases, or personal computers. None of these groups or tools could do anything even CLOSE to the massive death and destruction Russia, China, and even North Korea could wreak upon the US (not to mention its allies). These three countries and Iran – NOT terrorists and hackers – pose by far the gravest, most tangible, most real threat to US (and allied) security.

THIS is the reality of the 21st century – not Markey’s and Fleming’s blatant lies that “we are robbing America’s future to pay for unneeded weapons of the past”, or that “a bloated nuclear arsenal that does nothing to keep our nation safe in the 21st century.”

How grave is the Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear threat, exactly?

Russia alone has well over 300 ICBMs capable of delivering over 1,200 nuclear warheads to the Continental US (CONUS) – and that number will only grow in the future, as Moscow replaces old, single-warhead missiles with ICBMs armed with multiple warheads. In addition, Russia has bombers capable of delivering over 900 warheads to the CONUS and 14 ballistic missile submarines capable of launching 16 missiles each; every single one of these missiles can, in turn, deliver 10-12 warheads to the American homeland.

Moscow is now building a submarine class (the Borei class) which, starting with the 4th boat, will be able to launch 20 missiles each. That will give a single Russian submarine an ability to deliver 200-240 warheads to the American homeland.

Thus, the total number of warheads Moscow could deliver to the CONUS if it wanted to is over 3,000.

Specifically, Russia currently has:

• About 414-434 ICBMs capable of delivering at least 1,684 (and probably more) nuclear warheads to the CONUS, with its fleet of 68-75 SS-18 Satan ICBMs alone being able to deliver 10 warheads each (750 in total);
• 13 ballistic missile submarines, each armed with 16 ballistic missiles (20 in the case of the sole Typhoon class boat), each missile being itself capable of delivering 4-8 warheads (12 in the future, when Bulava and Liner missiles replace the currently-used Skiff) to the CONUS even if launched from Russian ports (Moscow has had such long-ranged missiles since the late 1980s), meaning over 1,400 warheads in total deliverable by Russia’s strategic submarine fleet;
• 251 strategic bombers (Tu-95, Tu-160, Tu-22M), each capable of delivering between 7 (Tu-95) and 12 (Tu-22M) nuclear warheads to the CONUS. Russian bombers have, in recent years, repeatedly flown close to, and sometimes into, US airspace.
• 2,800 strategic nuclear warheads in total, of which 1,500 are now deployed – and more will be deployed in the future – on the forementioned ICBMs, submarines, and bombers.
• Over 20 attack and cruise missile submarines, each carrying nuclear-armed cruise missiles (one such submarine of the Akula class popped up last year near the US submarine base at King’s Bay, GA).
• The world’s largest tactical nuclear arsenal, with around 4,000 warheads deliverable by a very wide range of systems, from short-range ballistic missiles to artillery pieces to tactical aircraft (Su-24, Su-25, the Flanker family, Su-34), to surface ships using nuclear depth charges.
• Illegal (banned by the INF Treaty) intermediate-range nuclear-armed missiles (Yars-M, R-500, Iskander-M) that can target any place in Europe and China. (Nonetheless, despite these facts, the Obama administration and NATO are too afraid to recognize and name Russia as an INF Treaty violator.)

Russia is now dramatically increasing that arsenal, as the State Department and the Strategic Command’s leader have now confirmed. In addition to deploying more warheads and building more bombers from stockpiled components, it is:

• Deploying new submarine-launched ballistic missiles (the Bulava and the Liner) that can carry 10-12 warheads each. Russia plans to procure around 140-150 missiles of each type; when these are fully deployed on Russia’s 13 ballistic missile subs, that fleet will be able to carry 2,000-2,200 nuclear warheads all by itself.
• Deploying additional Yars-M, R-500, and Iskander-M IRBMs – in violation of the INF Treaty.

Russia is also steadily modernizing its existing nuclear arsenal and fleet of delivery systems. It is:

• Developing and deploying a new class of ballistic missile submarines capable of carrying missiles such as the Bulava and the Liner. Two of them have already been commissioned and at least eight in total will be built.
• Developing a next-generation intercontinental bomber, slated to first fly in 2020 – before the USAF’s planned Long Range Strike Bomber will.
• Developing a new submarine-launched cruise missile, the Kaliber;
• Procuring and deploying a new air-launched cruise missile, the Kh-101/102;
• Developing and deploying three new ICBM types – the light Yars (RS-24, SS-29) to replace the single-warhead Topol and Topol-M missiles, the midweight Avangard/Rubezh (slated to replace SS-19 Stiletto missiles), and the Sarmat (AKA Son of Satan), intended to replace the SS-18 Satan heavy ICBMs.
• Developing a rail-based ICBM type on top of the forementioned ICBM classes.
• Developing a hypersonic missile that could carry nuclear warheads to any point on Earth in an hour and easily penetrate US missile defenses.

On top of that, Russia has a vast arsenal of tactical nuclear warheads – some 4,000, including 2,000 operationally deployed. Many of these can be delivered by attack and cruise missile submarines right to the CONUS using cruise missiles.

And Russia will, in the years ahead, only increase the number of warheads it has, including those deployed on intercontinental delivery systems, as the State Department and the commander of the US Strategic Command have confirmed.

China’s nuclear arsenal is also growing – as the STRATCOM’s commander has also confirmed. It already has about 64 ICBMs capable of reaching the Continental US with multiple warheads and is deploying more – including the DF-41, a heavy, road-mobile ICBM capable of delivering 10 warheads to the CONUS. It also has 5-6 ballistic missile submarines, all but one of which can launch 12 missiles each, and each of these can deliver at least 4 warheads to the American homeland. It also has 20 land-based missiles and 120 bombers which (the latter using their cruise missiles) can deliver nukes as far away as Hawaii. Finally, China has a huge number of short- and medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles which can hit any target throughout East Asia with nuclear weapons, and is developing hypersonic missiles for nuclear delivery purposes.

North Korea is also a real nuclear threat, having deployed the TD-2 and KN-08 ICBMs and successfully miniaturized its nuclear warheads.

To unilaterally disarm in the face of these threats would be worse than pure folly; it would be utterly suicidal.

Sen. Markey and Tony Fleming are lying blatantly. No, nuclear weapons are not “unneeded weapons of the past”; they are needed now more than ever. It is Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran – not terrorists or hackers – who pose by far the greatest threat to America’s (and its allies’) security and survival.

And if the US does cut its nuclear arsenal unilaterally further, several of its allies will develop nuclear arsenals. Some Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia, have already warned they’ll do so. 66% of South Koreans already want their country to be a nuclear power. Japan, for its part, has reactors capable of producing enough weapons-grade plutonium for 3,600 warheads in a year if need be.

And no, contrary to Sen. Markey’s lies, Republicans have NOT proposed any cuts to Medicare or to science and research programs.

Shame on Sen. Markey and Tony Fleming for their treason.

Rebuttal of disarmament advocates’ blatant lies

The unilateral disarmament lobby in the US has hardly given up on its goal to compeltely and unilaterally disarm America, even though Barack Obama himself seems to have given up on that goal. Nor have Russia’s, China’s, and North Korea’s nuclear buildups and aggressive actions sobered these people up.

They have written yet another garbage screed calling for deep cuts in America’s nuclear arsenal – while Russia, China, North Korea, and others are growing their own arsenals.

Specifically, ACA’s Daryl Kimball and NRDC’s Matthew McKinzie have written a garbage screed published by the leftist DefenseNews website.

In it, they falsely claim at the beginning (3rd paragraph):

“Moscow’s actions have prompted calls from some to halt implementation of nuclear arms control agreements, including the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which verifiably limits Russian nuclear potential to no more than 1,550 strategic deployed warheads.”

That is a blatant lie right at the start. The New START treaty has not limited Russia’s nuclear arsenal AT ALL. On the contrary, it has permitted Moscow to significantly GROW that arsenal – so much so that it now stands at 1,643 deployed (and many more nondeployed) strategic warheads, far above New START limits – and Moscow keeps ADDING warheads.

If limiting Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal was the goal, New START has failed abysmally to achieve it – as I predicted in 2010.

I was right, and the pro-disarmament lobby was wrong.

But the screed’s authors don’t stop at that one blatant lie. Despite Moscow’s, Beijing’s, and Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile buildups – and aggressive actions – they falsely claim that it’s time to cut America’s nuclear arsenal even further, that the US nuclear arsenal is “excess”, and that the US should rely on “diplomacy, economic sanctions, and conventional deterrence” instead!

They reject any calls to modernize and build up the US nuclear arsenal and falsely claim that:

“But rather than helping to protect Ukraine or NATO, these proposals would undermine strategic stability and increase nuclear dangers. Moscow’s actions in Ukraine require a tough and unified US and European response involving diplomacy, economic sanctions and NATO conventional deterrence, but the challenge can’t be effectively resolved with nuclear weapons or a US nuclear buildup.

As President Barack Obama declared in 2012, “[t]he massive nuclear arsenal we inherited from the Cold War is poorly suited for today’s threats.” (…)

Moscow and Washington could do more to reduce their nuclear excess and should pursue a further one-third cut in their strategic stockpiles. With New START verification tools in place, additional nuclear reductions can be readily achieved without a new treaty.”

Au contraire! The only language that Putin, China’s Xi Jinping, and North Korea’s Kim Jong-un understand is the language of force. Ony military strength – and that has to include nuclear strength – can dissuade them from further aggression.

Diplomacy and economic sanctions have utterly failed and will continue to fail. These dictators don’t care about their nations’ economic well-being (if they did, they’d have pursued market-based economic reforms long ago) or diplomatic niceties. Western sanctions have already wrecked havoc on Russia’s economy – but Moscow’s behavior towards its neighbors (especially Ukraine) and towards the West has only become more aggressive since 2014.

As for conventional deterrence, the US alone (not to mention the entire NATO alliance) already has a huge edge over Russia in conventional weapons. The problem is not inadequate conventional deterrence. The problem is inadequate nuclear deterrence – and a lack of will to enforce the West’s red lines. No amount of military power – nuclear or conventional – means anything unless it is used when aggressors overstep acceptable bounds.

Put simply, Western nations are not willing to defend themselves (let alone Ukraine), and Putin knows it.

What would REALLY undermine strategic stability and increase nuclear dangers would be to fail to modernize and sufficiently increase America’s nuclear deterrent. It’s the only effective protection the US and over 30 of its allies and friends have against nuclear, chemical, or bilological attack – or blackmail of such an attack.

Russia has a vast and very diverse nuclear arsenal and is still growing it (along with the fleet of delivery systems: ICBMs, bombers, and boomers). China has a large and still growing nuclear and ballistic missile arsenal – in fact, the fastest growing in the world according to USAF intel. North Korea is growing its nuclear stockpile, perfecting its ICBMs, and testing a ship-based ballistic missile intended for its Golf-class submarine.

What would REALLY undermine strategic stability and increase nuclear dangers would be to fail to modernize and sufficiently increase America’s nuclear deterrent under those circumstances. Yet, that is precisely what ACA and the NRDC advocate.

The claim that America’s nuclear arsenal is “poorly suited” for today’s threats and that it’s “excess” is a blatant lie. The US nuclear arsenal is perfectly suited to address the biggest threats to America’s and its allies’ security.

These threats are not Ebola, Al Qaeda, or the Islamic state, but the nuclear and missile arsenals of Russia, China, and North Korea. Nothing else comes even CLOSE to being as grave a threat as these three.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not an isolated incident, but a mere part of Russia’s overall pattern of aggressive behavior towards the US, the West, and any country Putin perceives as aligning itself with the West – including Ukraine and Georgia. In accordance with this pattern of aggressive behavior, Russia has, in recent years, threatend to aim or use its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles against the US or its allies 15 times; has flown nuclear-armed bombers near US and allied airspace, and sometimes even into the airspace of countries such as Denmark, Sweden, and Finland; has dramatically increased the frequency of its nuclear-armed submarine patrols; has threatened to deploy nuclear weapons in the Crimea; and has conducted a dramatic buildup of its nuclear and ballistic missile arsenal.

In doing so, it has violated every arms limitation treaty it is party to, including the INF, CFE, CTBT, and New START treaties.

If the US fails to modernize and increase its nuclear arsenal, or worse, cuts that arsenal, it will fail to address that threat, and thus commit suicide.

Kimball and McKinzie deny that their organizations have recently called in Vienna on the US to disarm itself unilaterally, But ACA has repeatedly called on the US to do that on many occassions in the last several years. A few years ago, Tom Z. Collina, then ACA’s “Research Director”, called on the US to unilaterally cut its nuclear arsenal and falsely claimed that “there’s no reason to wait for Russia.” Also, ACA has, for many years, advocated (and still advocates) foregoing the modernization of the US nuclear deterrent, including cancelling the replacement for the USAF’s obsolete bombers and ICBMs and cutting the planned buy new new ballistic missile subs to just 8. That would essentially be unilateral disarmament by atrophy and neglect. That would be just as bad as scrapping the US nuclear arsenal outright.

Last but not least, Kimball and McKinzie are trying to delude the American people with totally unrealistic, fantastic fairy-tales of global nuclear disarmament:

“We proposed “making nuclear disarmament” a global enterprise. We called on all states to press China, India and Pakistan, in particular, not to increase their fissile material or weapons stocks. A unified push for further US-Russian arms cuts combined with a nuclear weapons freeze by other nuclear-armed states could create the conditions for meaningful nuclear risk reduction.”

This is a total, unrealistic fantasy. The idea that cuts in America’s and Russia’s nuclear arsenals will prod other nuclear powers to reduce their own stockpiles is fantasy – as is the idea that China, India, and Pakistan will ever succumb to “pressure” not to increase their fissile materials or nuclear weapon stocks. These countries don’t care about international pressure or America’s meaningless unilateral disarmament gestures; they only care about their own military power.

Kimball’s and McKinzie’s screed is total garbage. Shame on DefenseNews for publishing it.

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/commentary/2015/02/23/commentary-nuclear-dangers-myth-reality-responses/23885837/

 

François Hollande confirme: la dissuasion nucléaire est indispensable, la France ne peut pas baisser la garde

Le président de la République, François Hollande, en tant que chef des armées, a confirmé lors de sa visite à la base aérienne d’Istres que la dissuasion nucléaire est indispensable à la securité nationale et l’independance de la France et que la France ne peut pas baisser la garde en vue du contexte international actuel. Il a exprimé ces propos dans un discours à la base aérienne d’Istres, l’une des deux bases des Forces Aériennes Strategiques:

http://videos.tf1.fr/infos/2015/hollande-pas-question-de-baisser-la-garde-sur-la-dissuasion-nucleaire-8567339.html

Il a raison. Le monde est en effet très dangereux aujourd’hui, et le contexte international présent exige que la France maintienne sa force de dissuasion nucléaire au moins au niveau actuel (déjà à peine suffissant en raison des coupes profondes faites par les presidents précedents, y compris Nicolas Sarkozy, qui esperait en 2008 de donner un exemple qui stimulerait un desarmement nucléaire global… ce qui ne s’est pas du tout passe).

Rappelons-nous du contexte international actuel:

• La Russie dispose d’un arsenal nucléaire de 8,000 têtes, y compris 1,643 têtes strategiques deployées et ciblees sur les USA, environ 2,000 têtes strategiques en total, et entre 2,000 et 6,000 têtes nucleaires tactiques qui peuvent être utilisées partout en Europe, y compris contre la France, et peuvent être portées par des vecteurs très divers, y compris des sous marins d’attaque, des navires de surface, des pièces d’artillerie, des avions d’attaque tactiques Sukhoi et MiG, des bombardiers continentaux Tu-22M Backfire, des missiles de courte et moyenne portée (Iskander, Brahmos, R-500), et par un pseudo-ICBM envisagé par la Russie. Le developpement du missile R-500, qui a une portée entre 500 et 5 500 kilomètres, est en violation du traité INF entre Moscou et Washington.
• La Chine possède un arsenal nucléaire qui est estimé de comprendre entre 800 et 3,000 têtes nucléaires (elle ne divulge pas aucun nombre exact). Ces têtes peuvent être portées par des missiles ballistiques de courte, moyenne, et longue (intercontinentale) portée, par des missiles croisières, par des bombardiers strategiques H-6, par des SNLE (Type 094 et Type 096), et par des sous-marins d’attaque.
• La Corée du Nord possède un arsenal nucléaire et des missiles qui peuvent porter ses têtes sur des distances intercontinentaux; elle continue à perfectionner ses missiles intercontinentaux Taepodong-2 et KN-08; elle est en cours d’essayer le lancement des missiles ballistiques mer-sol et construit un sous-marin lanceur d’engins; et, selon le renseignement américain, elle prepare maintenant un nouvel essai nucleaire, ce qui est tout en violation du Traité de Non-Proliferation Nucléaire et les obligations de la Corée du Nord sous les résolutions du CS de l’ONU.
• L’Iran continue à developper des armes nucléaires, ce qui est une ménace à la securité de la France, de l’Europe entière, des partenaires de la France au Golfe Perse, et a l’Israel.

Ces arsenaux nucléaires ne sont pas une ménace théoretique, mais réelle : par exemple, la Russie envoie ses bombardiers nucléaires proche des frontières des pays européens, du Canada, et des USA, pour les ménacer. C’est aussi  le cas avec la France. Aucun pays européen, y compris la Finlande et la Suéde, n’a pas été épargné par les Russes. La Russie s’est aussi reservé un “droit” à utiliser l’arme nucléaire premiere, même contre des états qui n’en disposent pas.

Dans cette situation mondiale, la France ée peut absolument pas baisser la garde et affaiblir sa force de dissuasion nucléaire. Ce serait suicidal.

La dissuasion nucléaire assure aussi l’independance de la France vis-a-vis toute puissance étrangere, y compris les USA et la Russie. Grace à sa force de dissuasion, la France peut leur parler comme un égal, pas comme un vassal à ses maitres.

Enfin, la dissuasion nucleaire aide a la France de developper sa puissance technologique et économique, notamment dans le domaine missilier et nucléaire.

Quant à ceux qui cherchent à délegitimer la force de dissuasion en l’accusant de priver les forces coventionnelles des moyens, c’est une mensonge : le coût de la dissuasion nucléaire représente seulement 0,0015% du PIB et 10% du budget de la Défense. C’est un coût miniscule – et la securité de la France vaut cette dépense.

Donc François Hollande a raison : la France a besoin de sa force de dissuasion nucléaire plus que jamais. Il est hors de question de baisser la garde.

 

How American, Russian, and Chinese nuclear-powered submarines compare

Oftentimes, and especially by rank amateurs, submarines’ quality is measured by just one criterion: noise level. While it’s critical (as it determines its stealthiness), it isn’t by any means the sole criterion. Being stealthy does not make a submarine completely invincible; conversely, being noisy doesn’t automatically doom a sub to being sunk. A lot of other factors are in play, including the submarine crew’s training and competence, the tactics adopted by its skipper, and the quality of the opposing force (both materiel and men).

That being said, one can make a careful comparison of the nuclear powered submarines of the US, Russian, Chinese, British, and French navies, to the extent data is publicly available. Based on the data that IS available, I’m offering this simple comparison of these submarines based on noise levels, maximum depth, and speed. All of these criteria are crucial for submarine survival and capability; it doesn’t matter if you can detect an enemy submarine if it can outrun you and escape.

Noise levels

The following graph was published in 1997 by the Office of Naval Intelligence – the US Navy’s intelligence arm.

A word of caution is on order: any ONI publications or data must be treated very skeptically. The ONI is also known as the US Navy’s propaganda arm. It routinely overestimates and exaggerates the USN’s capabilities and dramatically underestimates that of its adversaries. Moreover, it can’t even get basic facts right: for example, it calls the Vanguard class “SSNs”, i.e. attack submarines, when they are in fact ballistic missile subs, and includes them in a noise comparison of other attack submarines. No professional organization would make such a mistake.

 

The above ONI graph shows that when the Improved Akulas entered service in the late 1980s and early 1990s, thanks to the milling equipment sold to the USSR by Japan, they were quieter than the Improved Los Angeles (688I) class. So will be the Severodvisnk class SSGNs the Russian Navy is now building. The US Navy has been forced to respond by building first Seawolf-class and then Virginia-class (NSSN) submarines. By contrast, the Chinese Navy’s Type 091 Han class and Type 093 Shang class were found in 1997 to be very noisy – but that is very old (18 year old) data. The PLAN is now building a newer, much quieter variant of the Type 093 Shang class – as well as the even newer and quieter Type 095 class.

Speed

As stated above, it doesn’t matter how noisy the enemy submarine is if it can run fast enough to escape its predators.

The Seawolf and Virginia classes are Fast Attack Submarine classes, that is, the vessels which make them up can run fast when submerged (at a speed of up to 35 knots), one of the fastest in the world. The LA class is slower: officially, it can run only at speeds “over 20 knots” (the exact speed is classified), but reportedly, it can do up to 33 knots.

Which puts it at rough parity with the older Victor and Sierra classes of Soviet attack submarines and the Oscar class of SSGNs, all which can run at 32 knots maximum, but at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the Akula and Yasen classes, which can do as many as 35 knots. The Chinese Type 093 Shang class also comes somewhat short, at 30 knots maximum, although the newest Chinese SSN class, the Type 095, can run at over 30 knots (how many exactly is classified). On par with all these classes is their British contemporary, the late 1970s Trafalgar class, which can run at up to 32 knots (surprisingly, the newest British SSN class, the Astute class, can run at only 30 knots).

France is at a great disadvantage vis-a-vis the rest of the club – her Rubis class of SSNs has a max speed of “over 25 knots”, but it isn’t known how many. The newest French class of SSNs – Barracuda – will have the same max speed. This suggests speed is not a priority for the French SSN fleet.

Operating depth

Another important criterion – which indicates a submarine’s survivability as well as its possible range of missions – is the maximum depth at which it can operate. Here, the Russian Navy holds an overwhelming, outsized edge over the US Navy – and everyone else in the world, for that matter.

Data is not available for the Chinese Navy, but for the other navies’ submarine classes, maximum depths are as follows:

Yasen class: 600 m (2,000 ft)

Akula class: 600 m (2,000 ft)

Borei class: 450 m (1400 ft) (test depth)

Los Angeles class: 290 m (950 ft)

Seawolf class: unknown

Virginia class: 240 m (800+ ft)

Sturgeon class: 400 m (1,320 ft)

Astute class: over 300 m (test depth)

Comment la France peut gagner des commandes pour le Rafale

Le Dassault Rafale, en dépit d’être un superbe avion de combat polyvalent, n’a pas encore gagné aucune commande étrangère et a déjà echoué à plusieurs concours. Sans de commandes étrangères, la chaîne de production des Rafale sera fermée en 2019 – et la France perdra donc des milliers de bons emplois, des milliers d’employés très qualifiés, et un know-how et bijou industriel precieux. Comment donc l’empêcher? Comment gagner des commandes étrangères pour le Rafale?

La réponse est: il faut écouter les clients potentiels, remplir ses besoins, et être un exporteur credible.

Pour être un vendeur credible, la France doit absolument toujours tenir sa parole donnée et livrer tout armement commandé par ses clients. Il faut donc livrer les 2 navires Mistral que la Russie a commandés. L’Inde, l’Egypte, les pays du Golfe de Perse, la Malaysie, l’Indonesie, et le Bresil ne peuvent pas acheter des armes à un fournisser qui subit facilement la pression américaine. Les USA ont essayé, depuis longtemps, d’isoler le président egyptien et ont eu parfois des relations difficiles avec l’Inde et le Bresil. Il faut donc être un fournisseur 100% fiable et credible.

Quant à écouter les clients potentiels et remplir ses besoins, chacun a ses besoins specifiques, et il faut les toutes remplir. Heureusement, le Rafale est parfaitement capable de remplir les besoins strictement militaires et technologiques. Mais la vente des armes, ce n’est pas que la vente des armes elles-mêmes; c’est aussi un jeu poliitque, géopolitique, et économique.

Le Bresil aura bientôt besoin d’un avion de combat capable d’opérer de leur porte-avions Sao Paulo. Le Qatar, le Koweit, et les Emirates Arabes Unis, quant à eux, veulent non seulement un avion mais aussi un partenaire credible qui leur aidera à combattre l’Iran et son programme nucléaire illegal, qui est une menace grave à tous les pays du Proche Orient et aussi pour l’Europe. Le desir de l’Iran de dominer le Golfe Perse et tout le Proche Orient (avec l’aide de ses proxies Hezbollah et Hamas et de la Syrie de Bachar al-Assad) est également une menace grave à leur securite – et la notre. Pour combattre ces menaces et gagner la confiance des partenaires arabes de la France, il faut donc:

• Soutenir le projet de loi Menendez-Kirk au Congrès américain, encourager de toute façon possible le Congrès américain à le voter, et soutenir même des sanctions américaines plus dures. Convaincre l’administration Obama à soutenir ces sanctions.
• Instituter des sanctions plus dures au niveau national en France.
• Encourager l’UE à adopter des sanctions plus dures, y compris un embargo total sur les importations iraniennes.
• Dans les negociations directes entre le groupe P5+1 et l’Iran, bloquer tout accord qui permettrait a l’Iran de retenir l’usine à eau lourde d’Arak, la capacite d’enrichessement d’uranium, ou des missiles ballistiques. Il faut des inspections regulières et très intrusives pour verifier que toutes ces conditions seront remplies.
• Etre prêt à bombarder l’Iran (avec les partenaires arabes de la France mais sans les USA), s’il le faut pour arrêter le programme nucléaire iranien.
• Vendre aux pays arabes tout armement qu’ils demanderont.

En plus, pour faire l’offre française plus attractive économiquement, il faut:

• Leur promettre un transfert total de technologie; et
• Leur vendre les aéroports français (y compris ceux de Paris, Lyon, Nice, etc.) s’ils s’engagent a n’acheter que des avions civils et militaires français.

Enfin, pour encourager les clients potentiels même plus à acheter le Rafale, il faut inviter ses chefs d’état/de gouvernement et ses armées aux defilés militaires du 14 juillet et approfondir les liens culturels entre la France et ces pays.